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Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract
Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground
Approach
P E NASH SWISHER*
Welcome to the world of insurance coverage litigation where nothing is
certain, but if plaintiffs are in the right state, they may be covered for
everything from dog bites to herpes, child molestation or even intentional
shootings.
Or they may not be.
The uniformity some might expect from standardized insurance language
... has instead provided lawyers with a wonderland of surprises.. .  The
problem, in part, stems from the fact that even though most policies are
standardized, each state's courts supply their own interpretations.1
This court has not explicitly adopted the doctrine of "reasonable
expectations," at least by name, in any of its forms. Neither has this court
explicitly rejected it .... At some point, this court will have to address the
series of conflicting precedents in our cases which today's majority opinion
simply ignores. 2
Probably the most interesting litigation currently under way in the United
States involves insurance coverage disputes. The novelty of the legal issues, the
enormous amount of money involved, and the caliber of counsel all combine to
produce extremely difficult disputes.3
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School; B.A. Amherst College,
1966; M.A. Stanford University, 1967; J.D. University of California, Hastings College of
the Law, 1973. The author gratefully acknowledges the following persons for their helpful
comments, questions, and insights leading to the development of this article: Professor
Mark Rahdert, Temple University Law School; Professor Jeffrey Stempel, Brooklyn Law
School; and Justice Richard Unis of the Oregon Supreme Court. Any deficiencies in this
article, however, are those of the author alone.
I Milt Policzer, Sane Words, Different Meanings: Lawyers Struggle to Make Sense of
Insurance Coverage Language, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 25, 1991, at 1.
2 Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1162 (Or. 1991) (Unis, J., dissenting).
3 Francis E. McGovern, Mass Tort Litigation and Insurance Coverage Cases: Five
Modelsfor Judicial Case Management, THE BRIEF, Winter 1993, at 25, 54.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous law review article,4 this author analyzed the seemingly
arbitrary and contradictory decisional patterns in American insurance law
cases. The article concluded that these contradictory judicial patterns could be
understood and appreciated if one recognized the fundamental impact-and
clash-of two competing theories of American jurisprudence: Legal Formalism
and Legal Functionalism in an insurance law context.
Broadly speaking, Legal Formalism is based upon the traditional view that
correct legal decisions are determined by pre-existing legal rules, and that the
courts must reach their decisions in a logical, socially neutral manner.
Formalist judges therefore apply the philosophy of judicial restraint in favor of
established legislative and administrative authority. 5 In an insurance law
context, Legal Formalism is exemplified by the writings of Professor Samuel
Williston and others who believe that insurance contracts ought to be judicially
interpreted under the same legal principles as contracts in general, with the
exception of various insurance forms, laws, and procedures that are regulated
by statute. 6
Legal Functionalism, on the other hand, is based upon the view that the
paramount concern of the courts should not be logical consistency, as the
Formalists believe, but socially desirable consequences. Functionalist judges
therefore apply the philosophy of judicial activism, co-equal to legislative and
administrative authority.7 In an insurance law context, Legal Functionalism is
exemplified by the writings of Professor Robert Keeton and others who believe
that the reasonable expectations of the insured ought to be honored, even
though a careful examination of the insurance policy contractually would have
negated those expectations. 8
The article concluded that although Legal Functionalism is widely
recognized as the dominant theory of legal jurisprudence in many other areas of
American law today, Legal Formalism nevertheless has maintained continuing
theoretical credibility with many courts in the field of insurance law, while
Legal Functionalism-as exemplified by the Keeton insurance law doctrine of
reasonable expectations-has experienced a more limited judicial application
than various commentators initially had predicted.9
4 PeterN. Swisher, JudicialRationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formalfor the
Function, 52 OIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991).
51d. at 1039-47, 1073.
6 1d. at 1047-73.
7 1d. at 1039-47, 1073.
8 Id. at 1047-74.
9 Id. at 1074 C'It is not enough, therefore, to understand insurance law 'in the books' and
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The reaction to this article from a number of academic colleagues,
practitioners, and judges has been supportive and encouraging. Indeed, I was
asked if I might expand upon my original article and answer two additional
questions:
(1)Why do many courts, which seemingly apply a more
Functionalist judicial approach to other areas of the law, still retain a
more Formalistic judicial approach in cases involving insurance
contract disputes?
(2) Is there any viable way to reconcile these two competing
doctrines of Legal Formalism and Legal Functionalism in an insurance
law context?
The answer to the first question necessarily leads to some speculation and
alternative possibilities. However, law professors are seldom shy about rushing
in where others fear to tread,Wo so I shall offer a number of possible answers to
this first question.
In answering the second-and the most important-question, I will argue
that the best elements of Legal Formalist and Legal Functionalist judicial
interpretations of insurance coverage disputes may indeed be reconciled and
incorporated into a viable, contractually based, and eminently realistic judicial
approach to insurance contract interpretation that a number of courts are
already applying on an informal basis. It is a common sense "middle ground"
judicial approach to the interpretation of insurance contract disputes that is both
insurance law 'in action.' One must also know the judge-and understand the jurisprudential
philosophy of each particular court").
This Formalist-Functionalist analysis in an insurance law context has been questioned by
at least one commentator, James M Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special
Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 995 (1992). Initially Fischer
observes that "Professor Swisher's description of the insurance law landscape is accurate." Id.
at 998 n. 11. Fischer later states, "I believe Swisher overstates the importance of the formalistic
[contractual] approach as a jurisprudential model. I tend to see it as more of a default approach,
which courts use when the functional approach is not needed or is inappropriate." Id. at 1001-
02 n. 19. Professor Fischer's "default approach" however, puts the cart before the horse, and is
at odds with the great weight of historical and contemporary insurance contract analysis. See
infra notes 13, 15-20, 27-28, 33-34, 41-56, 61-71, 76-77, 148, 161-65, 190-96, and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 197-315 and accompanying text
10 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Decline ofLaw As an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 HIRv. L. REV. 761,777 (1987) ('I daresay that many legal scholars who today are
breathing the heady fumes of deconstuction, structuralism, moral philosophy, and the theory of
second best would be better employed... synthesizing the law of insurance.").
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legally sound and socially expedient. Accordingly, I call this synthesis of
judicial Formalism and judicial Functionalism in an insurance law context the
realistic middle ground approach to insurance contract interpretation.
II. LEGAL FORMALISM AND LEGAL FuNCTIONALISM IN AN
INSURANCE LAW CONTEXT
As discussed in greater depth in a previous article, 1' there are presently
two 12 conflicting judicial philosophies coexisting within the field of American
insurance law today: Legal Formalism 13 and Legal Functionalism.14
In an insurance law context, Legal Formalism is best exemplified by the
seminal writings and the major influence of Professor Samuel Williston relating
to American contract law in general, and American insurance law in
particular.15 The bedrock principle underlying Williston's Formalistic view of
11 See Swisher, supra note 4, at 1047-73.
12 A third newly emerging school of American legal theory, the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, which calls for the dismantling of existing political and legal institutions in favor of
newly empowered forms of social democracy, has not yet made any measurable impact on the
field of American insurance law. See generally MARK ELvMN, A GUtE TO CRmcAL LEGAL
STuDiEs (1987); RoBERTo l{ UNGER, THE CRrmAL LEGAL STu)Is MOVEMENr (1986);
William Ewald, Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665 (1988); Mark
V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
13 Legal Formalism, also known as Legal Positivism, is the traditional view that correct
legal decisions are determined by pre-existing judicial and legislative precedent, and the law is
viewed as a complete and autonomous system of logical, socially neutral principles and rules.
Judging under this Formalistic theory is thus a matter of logical necessity rather than a matter of
choice. See, e.g., MAIO JOR, LEGAL POSmVISM (1992); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing how Legal Formalism still serves to limit judicial discretion
or judicial activism); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Imminent Rationality of
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (questioning whether law is essentially rational as the Formalists
believe, or whether law is essentially political as the Functionalists believe); see also Swisher,
supra note 4, at 1039-47.
14 Legal Functionalism, also known as Legal Realism or Legal Pragmatism, is based on
the belief that the Formalistic theory of a logical and socially neutral legal "certainty" is rarely
attainable and may be undesirable in a changing society, and the paramount concern of the law
should not be logical consistency, but socially desirable consequences. Thus, where Legal
Formalism is more logically based and precedent oriented, Legal Functionalism is more
sociologically based and result oriented. See, e.g., Roscoe POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959);
WmIFRED RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); ROBERT SUMMERS, PRAGMATIC
INSTRUMEmAuSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); see also Swisher, supra note 4, at
1039-47.
15 See, e.g., SAMUEL WmLuSTON, TmE LAW OF CoirmAcrs (1921); SAMUEL WLuSTON,
LTE AND LAW; SAMUEL WILSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (W. Jaeger 3d ed.
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insurance contract interpretation is that an insurance policy must be construed
and enforced according to general principles of contract law, 16 and the courts
therefore are not at liberty to reinterpret or modify the terms of a clearly
written and unambiguous insurance policy.' 7 A number of courts continue to
1957-1978 & Supp. 1995). The latter treatise currently comprises 18 substantive volumes and
three volumes of forms. Professor Williston also was the reporter for the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts (1928).
16 See 7 SAMuEL WLisToN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONmRAm § 900, at 28 (W.
Jaeger 3d ed. 1963 & Supp. 1995) ('Unless contrary to statute or public policy, a contract of
insurance will be enforced according to its terms.").
17 See, 4 WHsTON, supranote 16, § 610, at 513 (footnote omitted).
Under the guise of interpretation, courts are repeatedly importuned to give a meaning to
the writing under consideration, which is not to be found in the instrument itself, but
which is based entirely on direct evidence of intention. And just as steadfastly, the courts
reiterate the well-established principle that it is not the function of the judiciary to
change the obligations of a contract which the parties have seen fit to make.
Id.
See also BARRY R- OsrRAGER & THOMAS R NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON TNSURANCE
COVERAGE DmS = 3-5 (7th ed. 1994).
As a general rule, the language of an insurance policy will be given its plain meaning and
there will be no resort to rules of construction unless an ambiguity exists.... Whenever
there is any question of interpretation of a written contract, the court will seek to
determine the intention of the parties as derived from the language employed .... In
short, any clause which has been inserted in an insurance policy with the insured's
consent is valid as long as it is clear, unambiguous, and not in contravention of public
policy.
Id. One commentator asserts that this strong contractual foundation for interpreting insurance
policy disputes is from a "now bygone era." Fischer, supra note 9, at 1001. However, a
substantial number of courts and commentators disagree with his assessment See infra notes
18-20, 30, 33-34, 47-50, 61-70, 75-76, 81-82, 96; Swisher, supra note 4, at 1047-74. One
commentator has stated:
The plain meaning [contractual] approach [in interpreting insurance coverage disputes]
is, however, far from extinct .... The potential implications of a large-scale refusal to
enforce boilerplate insurance policy clauses are apparently too daunting for the judiciary.
Instead, judges intervene on an ad hoc basis through other doctrines-for example,
waiver, estoppel, contra proferentem, and reasonable expectations-to police insurance
policies when perceived as necessary to avoid unfairness.
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated" Policyholder Defense in Insurance
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follow Professor Wiliston's often-cited legal axiom regarding this contractual
interpretation of insurance contracts,' 8 and this Formalistic legal principle of
insurance contract interpretation is also recognized in influential insurance law
treatises, such as Appleman's Insurance Law and Practice,19 and Couch's
Cycopedia of Insurance Law.20
Although a strict Formalistic contractual approach in the judicial
Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807,810-11 (1993) (footnote omitted).18 See, e.g., Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Conn. 1990) (C'an
insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of
any written contract and enforced in accordance with the real intent of the parties as expressed
in the language employed in the policy"); Showers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 222 S.E.2d 198, 199
(Ga. Ct App. 1975) (an insurance policy, which by clear and unambiguous terms is limited in
its coverage, cannot be so construed as to expand coverage beyond its stated terms); Insurance
Co. of N. America v. Adkisson, 459 N.E.2d 310,313-14 (Ill. CL App. 1984); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Id. 1985), cerl denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987);
American Family Mut Ins. Co. v. National Ins. Ass'n, 577 N.E.2d 969, 971 (Ind. Ct App.
1991) ("[Wlhen interpreting an insurance [contract, the court must] ascertain and enforce the
parties' intent as manifested in the insurance contract [A court] cannot extend coverage beyond
that provided in the contract and lit] may not rewrite plain and unambiguous language in the
contract"); Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 210 S.E.2d 187,247 (N.C. 1974) (if"the language of
an insurance policy is plain, unambiguous, and susceptible [to only one] reasonable
construction, the courts [must] enforce the contract according to its terms") (quotation omitted);
Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ohio 1992), cert
denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469
A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983); Transit Casualty Co. v. Hartman's, Inc., 239 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1978)
('A contract of insurance, as any other contract, must be construed to give effect to the intention
of the parties, if that intention can be determined from the instrument when read as a whole.");
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 313 P.2d 347, 350 (Wash. 1957)
('Since an insurance policy is a written contract between an insurer and the insured, courts
cannot rule out of the contract any language which the parties thereto have put into it; cannot
revise the contract under the theory of construing it; and neither abstract justice nor any rule of
construction can create a contract for the parties which they did not make for themselves.").
19 1 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1, at 3-4
(rev. ed. 1981 & Supp. 1995) C'There are certain principles applying to the law [of]...
insurance which pertain to all contracts... except for special forms regulated by statute."); 13
JOHN A. APaLMA & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 7386, 7402 (rev.
ed. 1976 & Supp. 1995) (an insurance contract will be enforced according to its terms, unless
ambiguous); 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
4254 (rev. ed. 1979 & Supp. 1995). See generaly infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text
20 1-2 GEORGEJ. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCELAW §§ 1:4, 2:1, 2:12-:13, 15:1-
:97 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1995); see also OSTRAGER& NEWMAN, supra
note 17, at 3-5; JFFRmEY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CoNTRACrS: LAW AND
STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POUCYHOLDERS § 2.1, at 33-40 (1994); 1 ALLAN D. WINDT,
INSURANCECLAIMS& DISPUTES 352-58 (3d ed. 1995); infranotes 47-49.
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interpretation of insurance policies arguably brings a great deal of uniformity
and predictability to insurance contract disputes, a serious problem with a strict
Formalistic interpretive approach is that insurance policies very often are not
ordinary contracts negotiated by parties with roughly equal bargaining power.
Rather, insurance policies are perceived to be adhesion contracts, where the
insurance company has a superior bargaining position and the insured often has
to accept the policy on a "take it or leave it" basis if the insured desires any
kind of insurance coverage. 21 Moreover, in the real world, few insureds take
21 See, e.g., Healy Tibbitts Const Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 140 Cal.
Rptr. 375, 379 (Cal. Ct App. 1977) ('insurance contracts ae regarded as contracts of adhesion
expressing the superior bargaining power of the insuer"); Stewart v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co.,
477 P.2d 966 (Kan. 1970); Powers v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 398 N.W.2d 411, 413
(Mich. 1986) (an insurance contract is "not a hard-bargained contract drafted [by] two
negotiators with equal skills and resources[; it] is a contract of adhesion, a take-it-or-leave-it
insurance policy not drafted by the buyer or even by the seller of the policy, but by insurance and
legal experts of a state, national, or international organization, hundreds and maybe thousands
of miles away"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lainme, 425 P.2d 346, 347 (Nev. 1967) ('insurance
contracts are contracts of adhesion, complex instniments unilaterally prepared by the insurer
and seldom understood by the insured"); Meier v. New Jersey Life Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 862 (N.J.
1986); Bunn v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 478 P.2d 363 (Or. 1970); see also WuNDr, supra note
20, § 6.03, at 375-76.
The underlying premise of the [Functionalist] rule [of the insured's reasonable
expectations] is that insurance policies are adhesion contracts. Their terms are not the
result of fomal assent, but are imposed; insurance policies are, for the most part, form
contracts. The existence of a negotiated consent, therefore, on which the law of contracts
is based, is a fiction in the case of most policies.
Id. Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUN. L.
REv. 833, 856 (1964) (describing the concept of a "contract of adhesion" as a rule of
construction where the court favors the weaker party whenever "it appears that the drafting
party was in the stronger bargaining position"). See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953); Fredrich Kessler,
Contracts ofAd4esion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLuMN L. REv. 629
(1943); Todd RakoffW Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv.
1173 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971). But see Fischer, supra note 9, at 1014-15.
Even if insurance contracts involve standardized agreements provided in the
proverbial "take it or leave it' fashion, the pro-insured bias may amount to excessive
correction if courts fail to accurately and precisely identify the danger that standardized
agreements present Use of the term "adhesion contracts" invites courts to employ a pro-
insured bias without first determining whether the contract terms, in fact, reflect an anti-
insured or pro-insurer bias.
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the time or effort to read their insurance policies, although under a strict
Formalistic interpretative approach they are generally bound by the terms of
their insurance contracts. 22
Id.
Another response to this adhesion contract argument is that standardized insurance
contracts are indispensable instruments in conducting the insurance business in a mass society.
See, e.g., STIEPEL, supra note 20, at 101.
Standardized adhesion contracts are not necessarily bad, although lawyers for
policyholders often talk that way. The standardized contract exists for a reason: It is
efficient Instead of spending valuable employee time (especially expensive, but not
always valuable, attorney time), the commercial actor can avoid all these individualized
costs by investing in one tightly drafted contract and using it repeatedly. In effect the
contract becomes part of a mass-produced product with an economy of scale all its own.
In insurance, the contract is itself the product
Id. See also infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text
2 2 See, e.g., Powers v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 398 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Mich. 1986)
("The common wisdom is that very few insurance policy purchasers read all or even
substantially all of the purchased contract, and it is not guaranteeable that they would
understand it if they did."); State See. Life Ins. Co. v. Kinter, 185 N.E.2d 527, 531 (Ind. 1962).
In Kinter, Chief Justice Arterbum stated:
Coupled with this situation [that an insurance policy is a contract of adhesion] is the
recognized fact that rarely, if ever, does an insured read his insurance contract, although
the law has said, with reference to contracts generally, that a party is bound by wiat the
instrument says, though ignorant of its terms. In fact realistically, even if the insured had
the inclination to attempt to read the policy, I doubt that he would gain much more
knowledge than he previously had because ofthe technical language he would encounter.
I doubt that most lawyers or even judges (who say one is presumed to have read his
insurance policy) have ever read them.
Id. (Arterburn, C.J., concurring).
Chief Justice Arterburn was referring to another underlying principle of Formalistic
insurance contract interpretation, that the insured is bound by the terms of the insurance
contract whether the insured has read the policy or not See, e.g., Vasquez v. Bankers Ins. Co.,
502 So. 2d 894 (Fa. 1987); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Sliter, 555 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); see also 16A JoHN A. APPLEmAN & JAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AN
PRACriCE § 8843, at 231 (rev. ed. 1981) (stating that most insureds never read their policies,
and 90/o of those who do read their insurance policies would not understand them).
This conventional wisdom that insureds seldom read their insurance policies has been
challenged by at least one recent survey conducted by the Independent Insurance Agents of
America finding that 48% of insurance consumers "always' read and re-read their policies and
29% "sometimes" read and re-read their policies. USA TODAY, Oct 23, 1995, at IA. Perhaps
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In reaction to this strict Formalistic contractual interpretation of insurance
policies, a number of courts and commentators, beginning in the early 1970s
and largely influenced by the writings of Professor (now Judge) Robert
Keeton23 and others,24 utilized a more result-oriented Functionalist approach in
interpreting insurance contract disputes in order to protect the reasonable
expectations" of the insured policyholder from possible forfeiture of coverage
that might occur under a more traditional Formalistic25 insurance contract
analysis. As propounded by Professor Keeton, this Functionalist "doctrine of
reasonable expectations" is based upon a two-prong rationale: (1) an insurer
should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance contract; and
(2) the reasonable expectations of the insurance applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts should be honored even
though a painstaking study of the policy provisions contractually would have
negated those expectations. 26
insurance consumers are now more sophisticated than they were 10 or 20 years ago. On the
other hand, reading an insurance policy is not always synonymous with understanding all of its
terms.
Professor Karl Llewellyn argues that a "blanket assent" is presumed in standardized
contracts as long as the contractual provisions are fair and not absurd. Thus, if the terms of an
insurance policy are plain, unambiguous, and explicit to the "reasonable laynan" or the
"cornmon person in the marketplace," then the insurer in the vast majority of American
jurisdictions has no affirmative duty to orally explain any policy exclusions or limitations to the
insured. See KARL LLEWELLYN, TiE COMMON LAW TRADmON-ECIDiNG APPEALS 370-71
(1960); see, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Russell, 402 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969); supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
77, 167 and accompanying text.
23 Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961 (1970); Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions:
Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1970); see also RoBERT KEETON & ALAN WiDISs,
INSURANcE LAw: A GuDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRNm , LEGAL Do=D ms, AND
COMMRCLALPRAeICES §§ 6.1-.10 (1988).
24 See, e.g., Kenneth Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring
the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Roger Henderson,
The Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIo ST.
L.J. 823, 823 (1990); see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 998, 1064-65. Fischer argues that a
Functionalist approach to insurance contract interpretation (context) is preferable to a Formalist
approach (text). Id. He concludes that a number of "pro-insured bias rules" are appropriate
whenever an insurer fails to disclose information concerning underwriting risks in a way that
would allow both the insurer and the insured to select efficient levels of coverage, and such pro-
insured bias rules would therefore "reconstruct the contract to create the contract that full
disclosure would have achieved." Id.2 5 See supranotes 13, 15-20 and accompanying text26 Keeton, supra note 23, at 963-64; see also KEETON & WIDiSS, supra note 23, § 6.3, at
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The major problem with this Functionalist approach regarding the
interpretation of insurance contract disputes, however, is that under the Keeton
reasonable expectations formula, the insurance policy need not be interpreted
according to its clear and unambiguous contractual language-which is
anathema to a Formalistic theory of insurance contract interpretation:
The Keeton formula suggests that an insured can have reasonable
expectations of coverage that arise from some source other than the policy
language itself, and that such an extrinsic expectation can be powerful enough
to override any policy provisions no matter how clear. So interpreted, the
Keeton formula pushes insurance law in a dramatic new direction, one that
discards the traditional [Formalist] contract premise that a written agreement is
the controlling code for determining the parties' rights and duties. 27
Moreover, those courts purportedly applying the Keeton reasonable
expectation doctrine in interpreting insurance contracts have been unable to
agree on what specific factors actually constitute such a reasonable expectation
of coverage and what factors do not.28
633. "In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, insureds, and
intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by insurance contracts even though a
careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that such expectations are contrary to the
expressed intention of the insurer." Id. (emphasis omitted).
2 7 Mark Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323, 335
(1986); see also WINDT, supra note 20, § 6.03, at 376.
The reasonable expectations rule, therefore, abandons the general contract principle
that the insured's legitimate expectations are necessarily governed and limited by the
terms of the policy. That principle will, instead, be applied only when it is fair to do so.
As a result, in a proper case, an insured may be held to be entitled to coverage despite
unambiguous language in the policy to the contrary.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63
(Alaska 1977); Stewart v. Bohnert's Estate, 162 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Cal. Ct App. 1980); Collister
v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979). But
see Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 517 A2d 910 (Pa.
1986) (apparently limiting the Keeton reasonable expectation approach as enunciated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Collister case).
28 See Rahdert, supra note 27, at 335.
[I]he Keeton [reasonable expectations] formula gives no hint at what fctors other than
the policy provisions courts might use to define the "terms" of the insurance
arrangement, or how the courts are to measure the force of these external factors against
the force of restrictive policy provisions to determine which should prevail in any given
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Accordingly, the interpretive battle lines have been drawn between the
Functionalist supporters29 and the Formalist critics3" of Professor Keeton's
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations. 31 Likewise, a number of
state courts have either expressly adopted32 or expressly rejected33 Professor
instance.
Id. See also Abraham, supra note 24, at 1153.
The corts [purportedly following the Keeton doctrinel have employed the [reasonable]
expectations principle in cases where the insured's expectation of coverage was probably
real and reasonable. They have also employed it where an expectation of coverage was
less probable, but the policy's denial of coverage seemed unfair. Finally, they have relied
on the principle even where an expectation of coverage was improbable and the denial of
coverage would not appear unfair. In short, the [Keeton Functionalist] judicial concept of
an "expectation" of coverage is not a monolithic one.
Id. (footnote omitted); WJnT, supra note 20, at 376 C'Unfortunately, however, the courts have
had little success in formulating a test for determining when equity necessitates that the
[Keeton] reasonable expectations rule be applied."); Henderson, supra note 24, at 837-38.
[E]ven after two decades, there still seems to exist a great deal of uncertainty as to the
doctrinal content and when the [reasonable expectations] principle may be invoked,
including most of the jurisdictions that have professed to have adopted it In short,
questions remain as to whether the principle has developed into a full-fledged doctrine
which can be applied in a predictable and evenhanded manner by the courts.
Id.
2 9 See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 24; Fischer, supra note 9; Henderson, supra note 24;
Keeton, supra note 23; Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM
275 (1976).
3 0 See, e.g., Frank E. Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution Completed or
Revolution Begun? 669 INS. L.J. 573 (1978); Rakoff, supra note 21, at 1268-69 (attacking the
reasonable expectations doctrine as a fiction the courts have created to avoid addressing the
concept of contracts of adhesion); Conrad L. Sqires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 6 FORUM 252 (1971); Edward Collins, Comment, Insurance Law-
Insurance Contract Interpretation: The Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations Has No Place in
Illinois, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 687 (1985); William M Lashner, Note, A Common Law
Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1175 (1982); Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHL. L. REV. 1461, 1487-93 (1989) (criticizing the
reasonable expectations doctrine for limiting the parties' fleedom to contract and unreasonably
interferring with the market control of insurance companies); see also supra note 21.
3 1 See generally Radhert, supra note 27; Swisher, supra note 4, at 105 1-58.
32 See, e.g., Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1976); Puritan Life
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Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine as applied to the judicial
interpretation of insurance contracts. Many other courts, however, have not yet
expressly adopted nor expressly rejected the Keeton doctrine of reasonable
expectations. 34
So Query: Does this mean that an irreconcilable conflict now exists-and
must continue to exist-between judicial Formalists and judicial Functionalists
involving the interpretation of insurance contract coverage disputes? Not
necessarily, since these two interpretive theories arguably may be reconciled
Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900 (Alaska 1979); Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d
441 (Ariz. 1982); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975);
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 427 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1983); Transamerica Ins. Co. v.
Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983).
According to Professor Henderson, the following states have adopted the Keeton
reasonable expectations doctrine: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Iowa, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. Henderson, supra note 24, at 827-28.
Another six states may-or may not-have adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine, but
the case decisions and judicial rationales in these states are not entirely clear and require further
analysis: Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Id. at
829-34.
3 3 See, e.g., Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 701 P.2d 217 (Idaho 1985); Menke v.
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.E.2d 539 (11. 1980); Bond Bros. v. Robinson, 471 N.E.2d 1332
(Mass. 1984); Robbins Auto Parts Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 435 A.2d 507 (N.1-I 1981);
Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192 (Ohio Ct App. 1986); Ryan v.
Hanison, 699 P.2d 230 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany
County Scb. Dist., 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988).
According to Professor Henderson, nine state courts have declared that the Keeton
reasonable expectations doctrine has not been adopted: Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming. Henderson, supra note
24, at 834 n.68.
34 A majority of state courts to date apparently have neither expressly adopted-nor
expressly rejected-the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations. See, e.g., Collins v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1162 (Unis, J., dissenting) ('This court has not explicitly adopted the
[Keeton] doctrine of 'reasonable expectations,' at least by name, in any of its forms. Neither has
this court explicitly rejected it.... At some point this court will have to address the series of
conflicting precedents in our cases which today's majority opinion simply ignores."); see also
Henderson, supra note 24, at 829-38 ('In short, questions remain as to whether the principle
has developed into a full-fledged doctrine which can be applied in a predictable and
evenhanded manner by the courts."); Radhert, supra note 27, at 367 (arguing that various states
apply strong and weak versions of the reasonable expectation doctrine just as they apply strong
and weak versions of the doctrine of ambiguities); Stempel, supra note 17 (arguing that
characterizing the states' use of the reasonable expectations doctrine is to a great extent an
exercise in futility). See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. See generally Swisher,
supra note 4, at 1053-57.
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and synthesized into a viable and realistic middle ground judicial approach to
insurance contract interpretation, as will be discussed and demonstrated
below.35
mII. WHY Do MANY COURTS STILL APPLY A FORMAuSTIC JUDICIAL
APPROACH TO INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES?
Why do many courts, which seemingly apply a Functionalistic judicial
approach to other areas of the law, still apply a more Formalistic judicial
approach in cases involving insurance contract disputes? The reasons for this
apparent dichotomy are historical, complex, and interrelated. First, trial and
appellate court judges must, out of necessity, become knowledgeable in an
incredibly large number of legal areas during the course of their judicial
careers.36 Practicing attorneys, on the other hand, normally specialize in a
much more limited area of the law,37 as do academic lawyers. 38 A judge,
therefore, realistically may not be as well-versed in the field of insurance law
as he or she might wish to be.39 Moreover, where the vast majority of judges
35 See infra part IV.
36 For example, areas of the law in which trial court judges and appellate court judges are
asked to decide legal disputes include, but are not limited to: contract law, tort law, property
law, criminal law, criminal procedure, state and federal civil procedure, administrative law,
admiralty law, agency and partnership law, antitrust law, bankruptcy law, commercial law,
conflict of laws, constitutional law, construction law, consumer protection law, corporate law,
creditor's rights law, disability law, education law, elder law, employment law, energy law,
environmental law, equity law, estate planning law, evidence, family law, federal tax law,
health care law, immigration law, insurance law, intellectual property law, international
business transactions, international law, juvenile law, labor law, land use planning, law and
medicine, legislation, local government law, military law, mortgages and suretyship, probate
law, products liability law, real estate development law, remedies, sales and secured
transactions, securities regulation law, social security law, sports law, state and local tax law,
Uniform Commercial Code law, workers compensation law, and wills and trusts law.
37 See, e.g., MARTIDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1995) (listing the rather limited
areas of legal specialties that most American lawyers and law firms practice).
38 As a law professor, my own principal areas of concentration are insurance law, products
liability law, and family law. IfI find it difficult to stay current in these three limited fields of the
law, a judge's necessary faimiliarity with over 60 legal fields and hundreds of legal sub-
specialties boggles the mind and numbs the soul. See supra note 36.
39 Realistically, how many trial court or appellate judges actually have the opportunity or
the time to read at least some of the insurance law articles cited in supra notes 23-34-or this
law review article? How many attorneys have read at least some of these insurance law articles?
How many law professors? See infra notes 44, 58 and accompanying text. Query Is anyone out
there?
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almost certainly were introduced to a basic first-year course in contract law
while in law school,4 it is doubtful that a majority of these same judges took
any introductory insurance law course while in law school.41 Judges and their
legal staffs, therefore, out of necessity must rely on often unquestioned, and
often unexplained, insurance law precedent within their particular
jurisdictions.42 And frequently these judges and their law clerks also must rely
on various insurance law treatises43 in order to understand and apply the law of
insurance within the limited context of a particular insurance law coverage
dispute.44
40 The vast majority of American law schools continue to offer introductory contracts
courses in the first year, although not necessarily in the format of Professor Kingsfield of Paper
Chase fame, or Scott Turow's 1L. Currently there are approximately 640 law professors
teaching contracts courses in 177 accredited American law schools. ASSOCIATION OF Am. L
SCH., AALS DIREcrORY OFLAWTEACHERS 1034-42 (1994-95).
4 1 According to the 1994-95 AALS Directory of Law Teachers there are only 105 law
professors currently teaching insurance law courses in American law schools today and not all
law schools offer a course in insurance law. Of this number, only 41 professors currently
teaching insurance law have taught insurance law for 10 years ormore. Id at 1102-03.
42 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text
43 See, e.g., JoHq A. APPLmAN & JEAN APmAn, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE (rev.
ed. 1981) (approximately 59 volumes, with cumulative annual supplements and forms);
GEORGE J. CoucH CYCLOPEDA oF INSURANCE LAW (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984)
(approximately 30 volumes, with cumulative annual supplements); see also SA um
WLuSTN, THE LAW oF CoNTRAcrs (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1963) (approximately 21 volumes, with
cumulative annual supplements).
One-volume general insurance law treatises also include: Wn.A~m VANCE, HANDBOOK ON
ThE LAW oF INsURANcE (3d Anderson ed. 1951); ROBERT R JERRY II, UNDERSrANDiNG
INsURANCE LAW (1987); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 23 (a successor work to ROBERT
KEErON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW (1971)); OSTRAGER & NEW1AN, supra note 17;
EDwiN PATrERSON, EssEsALs oF INsuRANcE LAW (2d ed. 1957); STEWPEL, supra note 20;
WNDT, supra note 20.
Older influential insurance law treatises include: ROGER W. CooLEY, BRIEFS ON THE LAW
oF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927); CHARiS B. ELUOT, ThE LAW oF INsURANCE (rev. impression ed.
1907); and ROWLAND H. LONG, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANcE (4th ed. 1932) (Professor
Richards published his previous editions in 1892 and 1909.).
44 The interpretation of insurance contract disputes has normally been the function of the
judge, rather than the juy. See, e.g., Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 402 P.2d 839, 842 (Cal. 1965)
(according to Justice Traynor, insurance contract interpretation is "solely a judicial function"
unless the insurance contract interpretation "turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence").
See generalJ 2 GEoRGE J. Couc CYCWExA. OF ISuRANCE LAW § 15:3 (Mark S. Rhodes,
rev. 2d ed. 1984) C'As a general nile, the construction and effect of a written contract of
insurance is to be determined by the court and not by the jury.") (citations omitted).
Although most judges must rely on insurance law precedent within their own jurisdictions,
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The precedential value of many insurance law cases, however, is hampered
by a large number of insurance law decisions that are "less than ordinarily
enlightening" regarding their underlying rationales and bases for decision,45
and over the years this has resulted in "a mass of litigation and confused
precedent" in the field of American insurance law, "the like of which cannot be
found in any other field of our law." 46 On the other hand, various insurance
law treatises continue to utilize a number of judicial cases as doctrinal examples
for the interpretation of insurance coverage disputes that often predate47 or
and although they may occasionally rely on various insurance law treatises as secondary
authority, it is axiomatic that law review articles written by academic lawyers and legal scholars
in the field of insurance law generally are not heavily utilized by a majority of American judges.
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mc L.
REv. 1835, 1889 (1988). "Do judges really need to be told [by legal scholars] how to interpret
prior cases, or how to construct a legal argument? That is the very essence of their job, after all,
and most people tend to believe that they can do their job reasonably well on their own." Id. See
also infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 341 (1971); KEFroN &
WMxss, supra note 23; see also JERRY, supra note 43, §§ 25A-25B.
46 See, e.g., William R Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in
Insurance Law, 20 YALE L.J. 523, 534 (1911); see also KEETON & Wnxss, supra note 23, at
615 C'[J]udicial opinions resolving such [insurance contract] disputes were often less than
ordinarily enlightening about the principles or doctrines upon which the decisions were being
made. To some observers, the judicial decisions in these cases often appeared to be arbitrary
and unpredictable.").
This interpretive problem of insurance coverage disputes by state court judges continues
today. See, e.g., Milt Policzer, Sane Words, Different Meanings: Lawyers Struggle to Make
Sense ofInsurance Coverage Language, NAT'LL.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 1.
Welcome to the world of insurance coverage litigation where nothing is certain, but
if plaintiffis are in the right state, they may be covered for everything from dog bites to
herpes, child molestation or even intentional shootings. Or they may not be. The
uniformity some might expect from standardized insurance language-particularly in
homeowners and auto liability policies-has instead provided lawyers a wonderland of
surprises. It's all because some courts-but definitely not others-have found the
incidents to be "accidental," "unintentional," or "arising out of the use of a vehicle."
The problem, in part, stems from the fact that even though most policies are
standardid each state's courts supply their own interpretations.
Id. at 1.
47See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text Earlier influential insurance law
treatises also predate the Keeton Functionalist doctrine of reasonable expectations. See, e.g.,
PATrERSON, supra note 43; VANCE, supra note 43. Even the newer editions of John
Appleman's Insurance Law and Practice (rev. ed. 1981), and George J. Couch's Cyclopedia of
Insurance Law (2d ed. 1984) continue to include many illustrative judicial cases predating the
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basically ignore48 the Keeton Functionalist reasonable expectations doctrine.
These influential insurance law treatises therefore continue to maintain, justify,
and reinforce a more traditional Formalistic approach to insurance contract
interpretation by basically ignoring the Keeton Functionalist reasonable
expectation doctrine.49
1970s and 1980s. See also SAMuEL WILLvoN, THE LAW OF CoNrnhcrs (W. Jaeger 3d ed.
1963).
4 8 For example, John Appleman, in his extensive Introduction and Preface to the 1981
revised edition of Insurance Law and Practice, makes no mention whatever to Professor
Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations, and the Applemans basically ignore the Keeton
Functionalist reasonable expectations doctrine of insurance contract interpretation in their 1981
"massive rewrite." 1 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
XI-LI (rev. ed. 1981).
It may be significant that Mr. Appleman was the former head of the Legal Department of
the State Farm Insurance Companies in the 1930s when he found "much of the insurance field
in chaotic condition," and this may have influenced his treatise's general philosophy of
emphasizing the more predictable and more uniform Formalistic contractual approach to the
interpretation of insurance policies. Id. at V, XI. As a former insurance defense attorney while
writing his impressive insurance law treatise from 1939-47, Mr. Appleman arguably may not
have been a strong advocate of Legal Functionalism in the academic or legal community.
Furthermore, his law school training may, or may not, have predated the rise of Legal Realism
as ajurisprudential model in American law school classrooms of the 1930s.
Likewise, Couch's Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, in its discussion of the interpretation of
insurance contracts, has no mention whatever of the Keeton Functionalist doctrine of reasonable
expectations, other than a tangential discussion dealing with ambiguous contract provisions.
See, e.g., 1-2 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 1:4, 15:16 (Mark S.
Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984).
Little is known of George J. Couch except that he was born in 1881, that he was a member
of the New York Bar, and that he wrote his insurance law treatise from 1929-31, a time which
predated the Keeton Functionalist reasonable expectations approach, and which arguably
predated the predominant view of Legal Realism in American law schools. Subsequent authors
and revisers to the Couch treatise include Ronald A- Anderson, a member of the Pennsylvania
Bar, and Mark S. Rhodes, a member of the Illinois Bar. Both revising authors have paid little,
if any, attention to the Keeton Functionalist reasonable expectations doctrine in the Cyclopedia
ofInsurance Law, 2d edition.
49 See, e.g., 1 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSuRANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ I (rev. ed. 1981). "There are certain principles applying to the laws of personal insurance
which pertain to all contracts alike, except for special forms regulated by statute."
There are only two indexed references to the doctrine of reasonable expectations in the
Appleman insurance law treatise. The first is in 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTtCE § 4254 (rev. ed. 1981).
The obligation of a liability insurer has been held to be contractual and is
determined by the terms of the policy...
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Insurance policies, like other forms of contracts, are interpreted as a reasonable man
woud understan them. The terms of policies are construed in their plain, ordinary, and
popular sense. This policy has been referred to as the "principle of reasonable
expectations .....
While insurance policy provisions must be construed liberally in favor of the
insured, that maxm neither mandates nor even permits rewriting of provisions to give a
strained construction. Nor is there a basis for such construction if the provisions are not
ambiguous.
Id. (citations omitted).
The second indexed reference to the doctrine of reasonable expectations in the Appleman
treatise appears in 13 JoHNA- APPLEmAN & JEA APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcICE
§ 7386 (rev. ed. 1976).
The construction of an insurance policy should be a natural and reasonable one,
fairly construed, to effectuate its purpose .... Furthermore, the contract should be read
to accord with the reasonable expectations of the purchaser so far as its language will
permit...
Of course, such construction must be reasonable and not such as to deprive the
insurer of the benefit of an unambiguous provision placed in the contract for its
protection .... Insurance is matter of contract, not sympathy ....
Where the policy language is clear and simple, nothing ought to be imported into it
by construction ....
Id. (citations oritted).
Clearly, this is not the Functionalist noncontractual insurance law doctrine of reasonable
expectations, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, but another more limited reasonable
expectations of coverage model based upon an insurance contract interpretation as it would be
understood by a reasonable insured or common man or woman in the marketplace.
Accordingly, the Appleman insurance law treatise basically ignores the Keeton Functionalistic
noncontractual doctrine of reasonable expectations in favor of the more traditional Formalistic
interretation of insurance contract disputes.
See also 1 GEORGE J. CucdH, CYCLOPEDu OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:4 (Mark S. Rhodes,
rev. 2d ed. 1984) ('Insurance is a matter of contract .... The parties to the insurance contract
are bound by the terms thereof, the same as parties to other contracts."); 2 GEORGE J. CouCH,
CYCLOPIAOF INSURANCE LAW § 15:10 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984).
The relation of the parties to a contract of insurance are contractual and must be
determined by its terms, as in the case of any other contract .... The court is not
permitted, under the guise of interpretation, to write a new contract for the parties, or to
do violence to the plain meaning of the language used. If the language used by the parties
in writing the contract is plain and susceptible to but one meaning, and the transaction is
free fiun fiud or mistake, that language will control....
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A number of more recent insurance law treatises also have emphasized the
traditional contractual framework underlying insurance coverage disputes.
Professor Jeffrey Stempel, for example, states that:
Although insurance contract law is often reputed to bear little relation to
basic contract law, this aphorism is inaccurate. For the most part, insurance
contract law is "real" or "regular" contract law applied to situations involving
insurance. These situations may to a greater degree than usual involve:
standard form contracting, unequal bargaining power, non-negotiated terms,
ambiguity, and recurring equitable considerations that tend to bring results less
doctrinaire and consistent than those perhaps found in other areas of the law.
Courts and legislatures have frequently attempted to organize or explain
these results by enunciating contract axioms that purport to be peculiar to
insurance disputes, but these pronouncements and case outcomes are not so
different from what one would expect from "ordinary" contract litigation.50
Id. (citations omitted).
According to the Couch treatise, the doctrine of reasonable expectations applies when
ambiguities appear within the policy. 2 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAw§ 15:16 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2ded. 1984).
If the terms of a policy are clear, consistent, and unambiguous, no forced or strained
constriction can be indulged, even to give effect to the policy, for a contract of insurance
cannot be given an interpretation at variance with the clear sense and meaning of the
language in which it is expressed.
Id.
Again, it is clear that the Couch analysis of an insured's reasonable expectations, like the
Appleman analysis, is not the same as the Keeton noncontractual reasonable expectations
doctrine. Thus, the Couch insurance law treatise, like the Appleman insurance law treatise,
basically ignores the Keeton noncontractual reasonable expectations doctrine of insurance
policy interpretation.
5o STEMPEL, supra note 20, § 2.1; see also Stempel, supra note 17, at 809-10.
Although insurance contract cases often differ from sale-of-goods or other typical
contract cases, the conventional view categorizes insurance policy interpretation as an
occasionally erratic subset of contract law. Regardless of practical differences between
insurance disputes and commercial contract cases, courts continue to use the contract law
model, contract jargon, and basic contract interpretation methods in deciding insurance
disputes. Cases routinely hold insurance policies are to be constued in the same manner
as any other contract Basic contract law forms the framework for addressing policy
coverage disputes, but the discussion frequently focuses on issues peculiar to insurance
law.
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Author Allan D. Windt likewise criticizes the noncontractual reasonable
expectations doctrine,5' and although authors Barry Ostrager and Thomas
Newman assert that courts "in thirty-two jurisdictions have recognized some
variations of the reasonable expectation doctrine,"52 a number of these judicial
decisions cited by Ostrager and Newman actually deal with ambiguous
insurance policies and other contractually based interpretive rules.5 3 Thus,
most American courts have not adopted the Keeton reasonable expectation
doctrine in toto,54 and since a majority of state courts have neither expressly
adopted nor expressly rejected the Keeton reasonable expectation doctrine,55
these courts still continue to employ a more traditional contractual analysis in
Id
Indeed, it appears that only one state actually has applied Functionalistic § 211 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) to an insurance policy dispute, and thus a plain
meaning contractual approach to insurance coverage disputes is "far from extinct" Id. at 810.
See also supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text
51 WNDRT, supranote 20, at 376,383 ("In short, if a policy is not a contract of adhesion or
if the policy provisions are not inequitable, either in substance or in fom, the policy should be
enforced as written, regardless of what the insured's expectations might have been.").
52 O AG & NEWN , supra note 17, at 20-24.
53 Id. at 18-24. Indeed, many courts that currently recognize an insured's reasonable
expectation to coverage may in fact be utilizing a contractually based reasonable expectations
doctrine, rather than expressly adopting Professor Keeton's Functionalistic reasonable
expectation doctrine that is at variance with the clear and unambiguous tenms in an insurance
policy. See supra note 49; infra notes 99-102; see also S1hMPEL, supra note 20, at 354.
Characterizing the states' use of reasonable expectations under [any] classification
sdhm... is to a large extent an exercise in futility... [since] intra-state variance in the
cases or among the panels, courts, and shifting appellate court majorities is often at least
as great as the differences between states. However, like most situations involving mild
chaos, it offers great opportunity for counsel to present the client's case as falling within
a currently reigning precedent or distinguishable from adverse rulings. This is especially
true since so many of [these] inconsistent decisions ... did not involve formal overruling
or resulted fiom plurality disposition.
Id.
54 For example, Ostrager and Newman state that only Illinois, Ohio, and Idaho "have
rejected all formulations of the reasonable expectations doctrine which conflict with the
traditional principle that unambiguous policy language must be given effect" OsnAoER &
NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 24-25. But see supra note 33 and accompanying text (stating that
courts in states such as Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Washington, and
Wyoming also have expressly rejected a noncontractual reasonable expectations doctrine);
supra note 34; infra note 56.
55 See supra note 34 and accompanying text
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the interpretation of insurance contract disputes.56
Another reason why the Keeton Functionalist reasonable expectations
doctrine has not been enthusiastically embraced by a majority of judges may be
that it might not be perceived to be "practical" legal scholarship. 57
56 See supranotes 15-20, 50-51 and accompanying text; Stempel, supra note 17, at 827-
28.
Approximately fifteen states have adopted a strong or broad version of the
reasonable expectations concept and have invoked the doctrine to find in fivor of
policyholders, despite clear policy language, when the language is insufficiently apparent
and not drawn to the policyholder's attention. Some reasonable expectations states
appear to have moved from the Keeton-stated formula to a more narrow view in which
the degree of the policyholder's reasonableness, reliance, and damage is weighed against
the clarity of the policy, insurer conduct, and disclosure in light of the overall equities of
the situation. A similarly sized group of states has rejected the reasonable expectations
doctrine in more or less explicit terms.
Another third of the states appear receptive to the underlying notions of vindicating
the reasonable expectations of the policyholder but stop short of treating the notion as a
distinct doctrine or principle for decision.
Id (citations omitted).
57 See, e.g., Judge Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
ald the LegalProfession, 91 Ma L. REV. 34,42-43,50 (1992).
The growing disjunction between legal education and legal practice is most salient
with respect to scholarship. There has been a clear decline in the volume of "practical"
scholarship published by law professors. "Practical" legal scholarship, in the broadest
sense, has several defining features. It is prescriptive: it analyzes the law and the legal
system with an aim to instruct attorneys in their consideration of legal problenim, to guide
judges and other decisionmakers in their resolution of legal disputes, and to advise
legislators and other policymnakers on law reform. It is also doctrinal: it attends to the
various sources of law (precedents, statutes, constitutions) that constrain or otherwise
guide the practitioner, decisionmaker, and policymaker....
There are too few books, treatises, and law review articles now that usefully "chart the
line of development and progress" for judges and other governmental
deeisionmakers ....
[Liaw schools must hire more "practical" scholars .....
Judge Edwards has particular criticism for critical legal studies and law-and-economics
theoretical approaches as "impractical" legal scholarship. Id. at 47-48. But see Learned Hand,
Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching of Law?, 24 MIC. L. REV.
466 (1926) (arguing that judges are a proper audience for academic scholars); George L. Priest,
Social Science Theory mid Legal Education: The Law School As University, 33 J. LEGAL
E C. 437 (1983) (arguing in favor of a "graduate school" model for legal education and legal
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Additionally, in the real world, law review articles are not often read by the
judiciary, nor are law review articles often cited in appellate decisions.58
Moreover, a continuing Formalistic doctrinal approach to the interpretation
of insurance contracts may also be explained by a rather surprising resurgence
of Legal Formalism as a viable theory of contemporary American
jurisprudence59 and as a framework for judicial decisionmaking in the field of
insurance law. 6 Indeed, a number of state courts have either rejected,
retracted, or limited their earlier Functionalist approaches to the interpretation
of insurance contracts, and have instead recognized a more Formalistic
scholarship). For a pemmsive reply to Judge Edwards' criticism, see Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice to Life, 91 MIM. L.
REV. 1977, 1997 (1993) C'IMhe disease of disjunction between legal education and the
profession is not caused by too much theoiy or too little doctrine and practice, but by too little
attention to their essential interplay in a complex and interconnected world. The cure I prescribe
is not further polarization but a more thoughtful integration not only of theory, doctrine, and
practice in the classroom, but of the complementary roles of scholar, teacher, and lawyer in
ourselves and in our understanding of each other.").
It is also interesting to note in an insurance law context that Professor Keeton himself later
served as a federal district court judge and subsequently wrote a treatise on judging. See
ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING (1990). Nevertheless, his insurance law doctrine of reasonable
expectations was expressly rejected by the supreme court in his own home state of
Massachusetts. See, e.g., Bond Bros. v. Robinson, 471 N.E.2d 1332, 1334-36 (Mass. 1984).
58 See, e.g., Louis 3. Sirico Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United
States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051, 1052 (1991).
Arguably, however, a number of state court appellate judges are familiar with Professor
Keeton's reasonable expectation insurance law doctrine by expressly adopting, or expressly
rejecting, his theory. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text A majority of state courts,
however, apparently continue to ignore it See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
59 See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text; Swisher, supra note 4, at 1037-47; see
also JoHN AGRETO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSnhriONAL DmcRACY (1984); GARY
JAN A HEL, LEGAL REAuSM AND TWNEm -CEIURY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE X (1990)
('Impossible only a decade ago, 'mechanical jurisprudence' has made a remarkable comeback,
and a new Legal Formalism may yet triumph as the principal mode of [judicial]
interpretatiom"); RoBERT BORK, THE TETfING OF AMERICA: THE PoLwrICAL SEDUCTION OF
THELAW (1990); MARIO JORI, LEGALPOSmViSM (1992).
It will be interesting and informative to see how judicial appointments made under the
Clinton administration will affect the federal judiciary after 12 years of Republican
administrations. As governor of Arkansas, Clinton was an active participant in the moderate
Democratic Leadership Conference. So whether his judicial appointments will be "moderate"
or "liberal" jurists remains to be seen. Likewise, the underlying political philosophy of a new
Republican majority in Congress after nearly halfa century cannot be ignore&60 See generally Swisher, supra note 4, at 1047-73.
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doctrinal analysis of insurance contracts. 61
Finally-as will be discussed below-a contractually based middle ground
analysis of insurance coverage issues, with supplemental interpretive rules to
protect the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, may still
constitute the better-reasoned judicial approach in the interpretation of
insurance contract disputes.
All these interrelated factors help explain why many American courts today
still continue to apply a more Formalistic and contractually based judicial
61 See, e.g., Hallowell v. State Farm Mut Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925 (Del. 1982); Casey v.
Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387 (Idaho 1979); Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 517 A2d 910 (Pa. 1986) (all retracting or limiting an earlier Functionalist
approach to the interpretation of insurance contracts); see also Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co.,
401 N.E.2d 539 (l. 1980); Bond Bros. v. Robinson, 471 N.E.2d 1332 (Mass. 1984); Robbins
Auto Parts v. Granite State Ins. Co., 435 A.2d 507 (N.H. 1981); Sterling Merchandise Co. v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192 (Ohio Ct App. 1986); Ryan v. Harrison, 699 P.2d 230
(Wash. CL App. 1985); St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Scb. Dist, 763 P.2d
1255 (Wyo. 1988) (all expressly rejecting the Keeton Functionalist doctrine of reasonable
expectations).
[The California Supreme Court under Chief Justice Lucas] also has expressed a
preference for deferring policy judgments affecting important social issues and
comnercial relationships to legislative decision making. Some court watchers see this as
a healthy return to the proper role of the court as an intpreter, rather than a maker, of
law.
Others. .. think the court is too deferential....
In the area of the common law... [the Lucas court's] conservatism is reflected in
the notion that it is unwise to expand liability, that liability on the whole should be
contracted, that contract principles should be applied strictly and without regard, or with
very little regard, for differences in bargaining power between the parties, and in a
tendency toward the insistence upon clear, bright lines and rules.
Blum, The California Supreme Court: Toward a Radical Middle, 77 A-B.A-J. 48, 50 (1991);
see also Claire Cooper, California Courts, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1993, at 27 C'In the past six years
... the Malcolm Lucas Court's conservative majority usually has seemed more comfortable
following the conservative U.S. Supreme Court [and] [tlearing up state rules laid down by its
moreliberalpredecessors .... ").
Although Chief Justice Lucas has announced that he will retire on May 1, 1996, "it seems
unlikely that [the California Supreme Court's] philosophical orientation will change," and
California legal scholar Bernard F. Witkin was quoted as saying that Lucas's administration of
the court "marks the most significant effort to improve the administration of justice in the
history of California." Nancy McCarthy, Supreme Court Faces Major Change, CAL. ST. B.J.,
Dec. 1995, at 12.
See generally Swisher, supra note 4, at 1045-47, 1056-57.
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approach to the interpretation of insurance contracts, rather than embracing a
noncontractual Functionalist doctrine of reasonable expectations which may be
at variance with the clear and unambiguous language found in the insurance
policy itself.
IV. RECONCILING THE FORMALIST AND FUNCTIONALIST
INTERPRETATIONS OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES:
A REALISTIC MIDDLE GROUND APPROACH
Is there a viable and realistic way to reconcile these two competing
doctrines of Legal Formalism and Legal Functionalism in the judicial
interpretation of insurance contracts? I believe there is-and I will demonstrate
below how the best elements of the Formalist and Functionalist judicial
approaches to insurance contract interpretation may be reconciled and
incorporated into a realistic, contractually based judicial approach that a
number of courts already are applying on an informal basis. It is a middle
ground interpretive approach that is supplemental to-rather than at variance
with-traditional contract-based interpretations of insurance coverage
disputes.62
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the 1973 case of Brown v.
Equitable Life Insurance CO.63 interpreted insurance policies under a
Formalistic theory of strict contractual construction:
62 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 17, at 828.
[A] third of the states appear receptive to the underlying notion of vindicating the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder but stop short of treating the notion as a
distinct doctrine or principle for decision. Instead, these courts introduce reasonable
expectations thinking into their opinions, often combining it with the ambiguity doctrine
and relatively broad notions of promissory and equitable estoppel, waiver,
unconscionability, and public policy review, but stop short of using the policyholders'
expectations, however reasonable, to override policy language viewed as clear.
Id
Although some recent commentators criticize contractually based interpretations of
insurance contracts, see, e.g., Fischer, supra note 9, the underlying rationale and justification for
a contractually based middle ground approach to insurance coverage disputes remains
doctrinally and jurisprudentially sound. Moreover, it is a realistic and pragrnatic approach to
insurance contract interpretation, since a majority of American courts today still apply some
form of a contractually based analysis in the interpretation of insurance coverage disputes. See
also injfra notes 197-3 15 and accompanying text See generally supra notes 16-20, 33-34,
49-50,61; infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
63 211 N.W.2d 431 (Wis. 1973).
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We think the theory of strict contractual construction of insurance
contracts followed by a majority of jurisdictions is consistent with the
philosophy of this court. . . . "Contracts of insurance rest upon and are
controlled by the same principles of law that are applicable to other contracts,
and parties to an insurance contract may provide such provisions as they deem
proper as long as the contract does not contravene law or public policy."
64
However, sixteen years later, in the case of Wood v. American Family
Mutual Insurance C0.,65 the Wisconsin Supreme Court arguably had adopted a
more realistic middle ground approach to insurance contract interpretation-
rejecting a strict Formalistic contractual interpretation on one hand, but
refusing to recognize a noncontractual Functionalistic reasonable expectations
approach on the other hand:
Insurance contracts are controlled by the same rules of construction as are
applied to other contracts [citing as authority Vidmar v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 312 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Wis. 1981) and other cases]. The goal
of construction is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties to an insurance
contract [citing again to the Vidmar case, 312 N.W.2d at 131]. In the case of
an insurance contract, the words are to be construed in accordance with the
principle that the test is not what the insurer intended the words to mean but
what a reasonable person in the position of an insured would have understood
the words to mean [citing Vidmar, 312 N.W.2d at 131 and one other case].
Ambiguities in coverage are to be construed in favor of coverage, while
exclusions are narrowly construed against the insurer [citing again to the
Vidmar case, 312 N.W.2d at 131 and other authority].
6 6
One commentator believes that the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wood
therefore had "combined" various Formalistic and Functionalistic interpretative
standards in the same opinion. 67 However, a careful reading of the Wood
decision suggests otherwise. First, the Wood court expressly reaffirmed its
contractual commitment to the interpretation of insurance policies. 68 Second,
64Brown, 211 N.W.2d at 435 (quoting McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 205
N.W.2d 152, 152 (Wis. 1973)).
65 436 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1989).
66 Wood, 436 N.W.2d at 599.67 See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1001-02 n. 19. "Wisconsin courts, like most jurisdictions,
frequently combine formalistic and functional standards in the same opinion." Id. See, e.g.,
Wood v. American Family Mut Ins. Co., 436 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Wis. 1989) C'[i]nsurance
contracts are controlled by the same rules as are applied to other contracts" but reasonable
expectations of the insured control, and "exclusions are construed narrowly against the
insurer").68 Wood, 436 N.W.2d at 599.
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the court never stated in its opinion that the "reasonable expectations of the
insured control." The test of a "reasonable insured" as cited in Wood was
derived instead from a more traditional contractually based insurance law
concept of the reasonable insured in the marketplace, 69 and thus it falls far
short of embracing a noncontractual Functionalist reasonable expectation test.70
Third, in the absence of ambiguity, the reasonable expectations of the insured
may not always control, since the Wisconsin Supreme Court also has held that
"when the terms of an insurance policy are plain on their face, the policy
should not be rewritten by construction to cover matters not contemplated by
the insurer nor paid for by the insured." 71 Thus, a realistic middle ground
approach to insurance contract interpretation, as illustrated in the Wood case,
expands a number of contractually based interpretive safeguards favoring the
insured, but still falls far short of embracing a noncontractual Functionalist
reasonable expectations analysis.
This contractually based synthesis of judicial Formalism and judicial
Functionalism in an insurance law context therefore constitutes a realistic
middle ground approach to insurance contract interpretation and this middle
ground judicial approach to the interpretation of insurance contract disputes
may be summarized as follows:
A. In general, insurance contracts will be construed according to general
principles of contract law, unless modified or regulated by state statute, or
unless contrary to state public policy.
B. However, since insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts and are
often perceived to be contracts of adhesion, and since the reasonable
expectations of the insured should be honored when appropriate, insurance
contracts are subject to the following additional interpretive rules:
1. Insurance contracts will be construed and interpreted in their
ordinary sense, rather than in a purely technical or legal sense, from the
viewpoint of the untrained mind or the "common man or woman in the
marketplace."
2. If the insurance contract is susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations, then it generally will be construed liberally in favor of the
nondrafting party, the insured, and it will be strictly construed against the
drafting party, the insurer. This rule, however, is subject to extrinsic evidence
to determine the parties' intent, and subject to the "sophisticated policyholder"
defense.
69 See supra note 49 and aeompanying text; infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
71 Vidmar v. American Family Mut Ins. Co., 312 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Wis. 1981).
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3. Based upon the acts and representations made by the insurer and its
agents, the legal doctrines of waiver, estoppel, election, and reformation of
contract are available to the insured and should be liberally construed to
validate the insured's reasonable expectation to coverage.
4. In order to further validate the reasonable expectations of the
insured to coverage, any exclusion, exception, or limitation to coverage must
be clearly, expressly, and unambiguously stated in the insurance contract.
At this initial stage, a number of readers might observe that this middle
ground approach to insurance contract disputes incorporates a number of
insurance contract interpretive rules that are already well recognized in a
number of jurisdictions today. These readers therefore might conclude that
there is nothing strikingly new about this middle ground interpretive approach.
Yet a realistic synthesis and application of these analytical rules establishes the
strength, rationale, and underlying justification for a middle ground
reconciliation of judicial Formalism and judicial Functionalism in insurance
contract disputes. It also brings greater uniformity, predictability, and
precedential credibility to the confusing field of American insurance law as it
presently exists today. Moreover there are a number of subtle-but very
important-distinctions in the underlying theory and application of this middle
ground interpretive approach that differ from both a strict Formalistic approach
and a more modem Functionalistic approach to insurance contract
interpretation, and thus require further elaboration, as discussed in more detail
below. 72
A. In General, Insurance Contracts Will Be Construed According to
General Principles of Contract Law, Unless Modified or Regulated by
State Statute, or Unless Contrary to State Public Policy.
Since the Keeton Functionalist doctrine of reasonable expectations73 has
been criticized for its lack of uniformity and predictability, 74 and since a
serious lack of uniformity and predictability continues to exist, even among
those courts that purportedly apply the Keeton Functionalist reasonable
expectations doctrine,75 a middle ground approach to insurance contract
72 For example, parts (A) and (B)(1)-(4) all involve important interpretive distinctions that
go beyond a traditional Formalist insurance contract analysis, but stop well short of the Keeton
Functionalist doctrine ofreasonable expectations.
73 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text
74 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text
7 5 See supra note 32 and accompanying text
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interpretation would continue to recognize the well settled doctrinal rule that
insurance contracts should be construed according to general principles of
contract law, unless modified or regulated by state statute, or unless contrary to
state public policy.76 However, this middle ground approach to insurance
76 See I JOHNA. APPLEMAN& JEANAPPLEMAN, INsuRANcE LAW AND PRACiCE § I (rev.
ed. 1981) C'There are certain principles applying to the laws of personal insurance which
pertain to all contacts alike, except for special form regulated by statute."); 2 G.oRGE J.
Couc, CYcLOPEDmAOF INSURANCE LAW § 15:15 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984) ('In the
absence of a statute to the contry, an insurance policy, being a contract, is construed as an
ordinary contract") (citing many supporting cases).
See, e.g., Industrial Inden. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 465 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.
1972) (applying Hawaii law); Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1131, 1134-35
(Conn. 1990) ("An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern
the construction of any written contract and enforced in accordance with the real intent of the
parties as expressed in the language employed in the policy."); Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am,
768 P.2d 678, 680 (Colo. 1989) ('unambiguous insurance contracts.., should be enforced
according to their terms"); Cantrell v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co., 302 S.E.2d 415 (Ga. Ct. App.
1983); Seeburg Corp. v. United Founders Life Ins. Co., 403 N.E.2d 503 (IMI. App. Ct 1980);
Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stapleton, 556 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Ind. 1982); Cody v. Conn.
General Life Ins. Co., 439 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1982); Moore v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 491
P.2d 227 (Utah 1971); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Budrus, 332 N.W.2d 837 (Wis. Ct
App. 1983);see also Cascyv. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979).
[We reject] an adoption of the [Keeton] doctrine of reasonable expectations and [rely]
upon the traditional basic principles involved in construing contracts. Intent is to be
detenmined fom the language of the contract itself and "in the absence of ambiguity,
contracts for insurance must be construed as any other and understood in their plain,
ordinmy and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of
the contract"
Reliance on this traditional approach avoids the danger that the court might create
liability by [a Keeton Functionalist] construction of the contract terms or creation of a
new contract for the parties. In the event that there is an ambiguity in the terms of the
policy, special rules of construction apply to insurance contracts to protect the insured.
Since these rules protect the insured under a more traditional approach, it becomes
unnecessary to adopt a new theory of recovery where, conceivably, the periphery of what
losses would be covered could be extended by an insured's affidavit of what he
"reasonably expected" to be covered.
Id.; see supra notes 15-20,49-50 and accompanying text.
Even Professor James Fischer, a proponent of fictionalist "pro-insured bias rules,"
admits that at a minimum, "the insurance contract is subject to the same rules as apply to
contracts in general." Fischer, supra note 9, at 1001. Fischer recommends as an alternative to
his pro-insured bias rules the creation of "neutral rules that would give greater effect to the
literal terms of the contract." Id. at 1065.
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contract interpretation would further moderate the strict contractual Formalist
rule by providing that a literal contractual interpretation would be avoided if
such an interpretation would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result. 77
There are a number of compelling reasons for applying this middle ground
contractual approach to the interpretation of insurance policies. First, the
application of the Keeton Functionalist doctrine of reasonable expectations has
State legislative and administrative regulation of the insurance industry, including the form
and content of insurance policies, is well established in all fity states. See, e.g., Spencer L.
Kimball & Werer Pfennigstorf, Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms of Insurance
Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practice, 39 IND. L.J. 675
(1964); Spencer L. Kimball & Werner Pfennigstorf, Administraive Control of the Terms of
Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study, 40 IND. L.J. 143 (1965). The jurisdictions are
split, however, on whether the state insurance commissioner or the courts should decide
whether or not the terms of an insurance contract violate a state's strong public policy. Compare
Burme v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 301 A.2d 799 (Pa. 1973) (the court may determine state public
policy in interpreting an insurance policy) with Kirk v. Financial See. Life Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d
144 (111. 1978) (state public policy is best left to the state legislature and the insurance
commissioner). See generally Swisher, supra note 4, at 1062-66.
77 See, e.g., Seeburg Corp. v. United Founders Life Ins. Co., 403 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill.
App. Ct 1980) (the court should give effect to the plain and obvious import of the policy
language without considering extrinsic evidence unless the construction would lead to
unreasonable and absurd consequences); Frank Lucas Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Am.
Ins., 425 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (an interpretation that is fair and
reasonable is prefened to one which leads to an unreasonable result); Dixon v. Gunter, 636
S.W.2d 437, 441 (Tern. Ct. App. 1982) (an insurance contract should not be given a forced,
unnatural, or unreasonable construction which would extend or restrict the policy beyond what
is fairly within its terms, or which would lead to an absurd conclusion or render the policy
nonsensical or ineffective).
This approach is consistent with Professor Karl Llewellyn's observation that in a
standardized contract, such as a standard form insurance contract. both the consumers and the
insurers are aware that the consumer has not read the insurance contract in its entirety. This
knowledge by both the consumers and the insurers therefore creates an additional element to
any traditional "bargained for" or "dickered" contractual assent regarding insurance policy
provisions that the consumer is aware of. This additional element "is a blanket assent (not a
specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on its fom,
which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms." Thus, according
to Professor Llewellyn, supplementary standardized or "boiler plate" terms in an insurance
contract should be honored to the extent that: (1) they do not undercut the meaning of the
bargained-for terms; and (2) they are not manifestly unfair. LLEWELLYN, supra note 22, at 370-
71 (1960).
This middle ground contractual approach thus allows enforcement of unread
supplementary boiler plate terms and provisions in a standard form insurance contract as long
as such terms are reasonable and not manifestly unfair. See also Lashner, supra note 30, at
1196-97.
Vol. 57:543
INSURANCE CONTRACTDISPU'IFS
been criticized for its lack of uniformity and predictability. 78 Although
uniformity and predictability in the law should not be bought at too high a
price, 79 courts still must legitimately focus upon-and must legally justify-
their judicial interpretive approach to insurance contract disputes based upon a
fundamental, well settled, and realistically applied doctrine of insurance
contract interpretation rather than based upon an amorphous Functionalistic
pro-insured or pro-insurer subjective judicial "bias." 80  However, in
78 See supranotes 27-28, 30,33-34 and accompanying text.
79 See, e.g., BENJAMINCARDOZO, T-mNATuRE OF T-m JuDCIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1949).
One of the most fundamental social interests is that the law shall be uniform and
impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even
arbitrary whim or fitness. Therefore, in the main there shall be adherence to
precedent ... But symmetrical development may be bought at too high a
price. Uniformity ceases to be good when it becomes unifomnity of oppression. The
social interest served by symmetry... must then be balanced against the social
interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare.
Id.
8 0 See supra notes 16-20, 50, 66, 68-71 and accompanying text; see also Lashner, supra
note 30, at 1195 ("The piecemeal creation of [judiciall standards would cause uncertainty
lasting as long as new [policy] provisions continued to be created. The disparity in [judicial]
standards among different jurisdictions would make risk distribution over more than a single
jurisdiction difficult, if not impossible.") (footnote omitted); supra notes 45-46 and
accompanying text
Professor Jeffi-ey Stempel suggests, however, that:
the criticism that [the Keeton] reasonable expectations analysis makes insurance case
result too unpredictable and undermines the actuarial precision sought by insurers seems
overdone. Courts are probably no more likely to adopt "wild" arguments regarding
expectations than they are to embrace equally wild arguments about the meaning of
[insurance contract] language.
STEMPEL, supra note 20, at 356. I respectfilly disagree with Professor Stempel. Trial court
judges, although possessing a great deal of judicial discretion in deciding insurance contract
disputes, still require at least some definitive parameters in order to reach a reasoned decision
with some degree of predictability and uniformity, rather than relying on an amorphous judicial
bias in the absence of such interpretive rules. Courts that make a judicial practice of finding
"constructive" ambiguities in insurance policies are just one example of such "wild" judicial
arguments. See, e.g., Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 450 P.2d 271 (Cal. 1975); Ransom v.
Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 274 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1954); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 539
P.2d 433 (Nev. 1967). Even Professor Keeton has criticized this unwarranted judicial role. See
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961,972 (1970) ('To extend the principle of resolving ambiguities against the draftsman
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recognizing the crucial importance of governmental regulation over the
insurance industry in general, and governmental regulation of insurance
policies in particular, 81 such a middle ground interpretive approach likewise
must reject a strict contractual Formalist interpretation of insurance policies in
favor of a middle ground regulatory/contractual hybrid approach.
For example, it is generally acknowledged today that standardized
insurance contracts are indispensable instruments in conducting an insurance
business in a mass society, 82 and that insurance companies must be legally and
contractually protected in their legitimate assumption and limitation of insurable
risks.8 3 These contractual rights of the insurer, however, are not absolute,
in this fictional way not only causes confusion and uncertainty about the effective scope of
judicial regulation of [insurance] contract terms but also creates an impression of unprincipled
judicial prejudice against insurers.").
8 1 See Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 76.
82 Professor Slawson estimates that over 99% of all contracts are standard form contracts.
See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). According to Professor Friedrich Kessler, the
benefits of standard form contracts are five-fold: (1) saving contract formation costs; (2)
reducing an agent's authority to modify the terms of the contract; (3) allowing collection of
necessary underwriting data; (4) reducing performance costs; (5) allowing an insured to
purchase packages of coverage that meet the insured's basic needs, even when an insured is
unable to identify all of his or her basic insurance coverage needs. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts
ofAd4esion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629, 631-32
(1943).
See also KEETON& WIDLss, supra note 23, at 119.
One of the major benefits of standardization for the consumer is lower costs: in
insurance, as in other areas, customization invariably costs more than standardization. By
using standard policy forms, insurers are able to avoid incurring many expenses that
would inevitably result from individualizing millions of transactions.
Standardization of insurance coverages is also important to insurers because it is a
very significant factor in the basic process of transferring risks from an insured to an
insurer. In fact, risk distribution on the scale that exists in a complex commercial society
may only be feasible if insurance transactions employ standardized insurance policy
terms.
Id.
83 See, e.g., Gowing v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 483 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Kan. 1971);
Estin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
see also Bimbaurn, Stahl & West, Standardized Agreements and the Parol Evidence Rule:
Defining and Applying the Expectations Principle, 26 ARiz. L. REV. 793 (1984); Lashner,
supra note 30; Slawson, supra note 82; Conrad L. Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 6 FORUM 252 (1971).
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because it is universally recognized in all American jurisdictions that state
legislatures and insurance commissioners have the power and the right to
regulate the insurance industry84  through legislative statutes85  and
administrative regulations.8 6 Accordingly, insurance contracts are heavily
regulated by appropriate legislative and administrative agencies representing the
public welfare of the citizens of each state, in addition to being subjected to
judicial scrutiny. 87
84 eisuanc is affected with a strong public interest and thus any insurer's alleged
cstitutional right to contract free of state regulation will be rejected by the courts unless the
objectives of such state statutes and administrative regulations go well beyond the reasonable
and legitimate interest of the state. See, e.g., California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v.
Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951); Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n v. Goodpaster,
200 S.W.2d 120 (Ky. 1946); see also Spencer Kimball, The Purpose ofInsurance Regulation,
45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 490-91 (1961) ('Insurance law is... a hybrid mixture of private
contractual law and state statutes which seek to control the substantive terms of the insurance
policy so that the insured may enter into a fair and equitable contract").
85 See, e.g., Spencer Kimball & Werner Pfenmigstorf, Legislative and Judicial Control of
the Terms ofInsurance Contracts, 39 IN. L.J. 675 (1964).
86 ee, e.g., Spencer Kimball & Wemer Pfennigstorf, Administrative Control of the
Terms ofInsurance Contracts, 40 IND. L.J. 143 (1965).
87 See, e.g., Kirk v. Financial See. Life Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 11. 1978).
Furthemore, public policy of a State or the nation is found imbedded in its
constitution and its statutes, and, when these are silent on a subject, in the decisions of
the courts.... The legislature has not been silent on the matter of public policy as it
relates to the contents of insurance policies. The Director of the Department of Insurance
is required by statute to review the policies of insurance in certain categories and approve
or disapprove them, based on criteria including the established public policy of this
State....
The approval of... limitation periods in policies of insurance by the Department,
although not conclusive on the courts, is, however, entitled to great w~eight against the
contention that such a provision is against public policy.
Id. (citations omitted).
A court therefore, is not the sole interpreter, regulator, or enforcer of insurance contracts.
Other state agencies also play a legitimate and important role in this interrelated process. See
also Fischer, supra note 9, at 1065 ('Likewise, the legislature could provide its own rules of
coverage or insurance commissioners could exercise greater scrutiny with respect to the content
of insurance contracts.").
This state legislative and administrative function in regulating the insurance industry,
however, needs more attention. See, e.g., Jane B. Quinn, The Regulator's Boogie: Insurance
Commissioners Can't Break Free of the Industry They Oversee, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1994, at
54,54-55:
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Yet even though some forms of insurance-such as automobile no-fault
insurance, uninsured motorist statutes, and motor vehicle financial
responsibility acts-statutorily mandate compulsory insurance coverages, under
a better reasoned middle ground approach to insurance contract interpretation,
such compulsory insurance programs would not completely abolish an insurer's
underlying fundamental right to contract with the insured. For example, in the
case of Ferrell v. Columbia Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 88 the insurer
sought to rescind an automobile insurance policy based upon fraudulent and
material misrepresentations made by the insured in an application for
automobile insurance. The insured contended, however, that the insurer no
longer possessed any contractual right of rescission since the automobile policy
was protected under compulsory state insurance statutes.
The Ferrell court correctly observed that although, under the common law,
an insurance company could retroactively and contractually rescind insurance
coverage based on an insured's fraud or material misrepresentation, many
courts today have interpreted no-fault automobile insurance legislation and
compulsory state motor vehicle acts as expressing a strong public policy that
one who suffers loss as a result of an automobile accident shall have a legal
source and means of recovery. As a result, many courts now hold that when an
innocent third party suffers damages as a result of the insured's negligent
operation of an insured vehicle, there is no contractual right to a retroactive
rescission of the policy by the insurer. These courts therefore have held that an
insurance company's contractual right to a retroactive policy rescission for
fraud or misrepresentation has been abrogated by state statute, and the only
remedy for an insurance company is for prospective cancellation of the policy
in accordance with the terms and parameters of state statute.8 9 Thus, most
Long term, however, the regulatory stncture tips too far toward [the insurancel
industry. On deceptive sales, consumers aren't being heard at all. [National
Association of Insurance Commissioners President David] Walsh says that
improving the marketplace will be the NAIC's next job, but he won't get the
industry backing that he did when he tackled solvency rules. An alternative approach
would be federal standards for price disclosure and policy access, with the NAIC
hashing out the rules and enforcement handed to the states. Either way, alas, it may
take a crisis of loss and fraud before [the insurance] industry accepts reform.
Id.
88 816 S.W.2d 593 (Ark. 1991).
89 d. at 595 (quoting with approval Teeter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (AD.
1959), afid, 212 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. 1961)). One reason for this statutory rule is that if an
insurer could unilaterally rescind coverage, unscrupulous automobile insurers might hold the
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courts that have considered the question as it applies to an innocent third-party
claimant have held that an insurer cannot, on the contractual ground of fraud
and misrepresentation, retroactively avoid coverage under a compulsory
insurance or financial responsibility law.90
Nevertheless, the Ferrell court also recognized that there is no compulsory
automobile insurance statute which requires one to insure oneself against
personal property loss. When a case involves the insured and the insurer and
lacks a third-party claimant, and the loss involves the insured's property, then
there is no public policy reason to hold that the insurance company's common
law contractual right to rescission has been completely abrogated. To hold
otherwise would permit an insured to benefit from his or her fraudulent
misrepresentations and leave the insurer without a remedy. 91 The Ferrell court
therefore protected the insurer's underlying contractual right to rescind its
policy under a middle ground contractual interpretation by holding that
compulsory state insurance statutes did not totally abrogate the insurer's
contractual rights of rescission when the insurer and insured were involved in a
dispute concerning noncompulsory provisions within the insurance policy itself.
Other courts have adopted this middle ground interpretive approach by
continuing to recognize the contractual rights and obligations of the parties,
even as these contractual rights coexist within an acknowledged legislative and
administrative right to regulate the insurance industry in general, and to
regulate insurance policies in particular. For example, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in the case of King v. Allstate Insurance Co.92 recognized the
legal right of the parties to "contract out of" or "contract around" state and
federal law within a particular insurance contract, so long as there was nothing
in the contract in violation of state or federal statutory law or against public
policy. 93 A number of other courts also have allowed the parties to contract out
of or contract around state insurance law within their particular insurance
contracts, as long as there was no violation of state statutory law or state public
threat of insurance contract rescission over the head of third-party claimants in an attempt to
bargain down claims. Id. at 595-96. See also Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Insurance Comm'r, 535 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1987).
90 816 S.W.2d at 596. See Dunn v. Safeco Insurance Co., 798 P.2d 955 (Kan. 1990), for a
listing of these cases.
91 816 S.W.2d at 596; see also Dunn v. Safeco Ins. Co., 798 P.2d 955 (Kan. 1990);
United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 348 N.W.2d 34 (Mich. Ct App. 1984). But see
Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comnm'r, 535 A2d 588 (Pa. 1987).
92 906 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding that state insurance law would apply to a
marine insurance contract, rather than federal admiralty law, based upon the contractual
language in the particular marine insurance policy).
93Id. at 1540.
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policy. 94
A final legal safeguard in favor of the insured under this middle ground
interpretive approach is that even though an insurance contract is clearly and
expressly written, and even though its policy language is unambiguous
according to traditional rules of contract interpretation, it may still be declared
to be null and void if it is contrary to state public policy. 95 State public policy
normally is expressed through the state legislature and through the legislature's
duly authorized administrative agency, the state insurance commission, because
a state possesses a valid legal right to regulate and control the business of
insurance for the public good. 96 Various courts, however, also have held that
an insurance policy may be void not only because it violates a state's statutorily
declared public policy, but also because it violates a public policy that the
courts would enforce in the absence of any statutory authority.97
9 4 See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Travelers Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 702, 709 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding
that an insurance policy is the "law between the parties" and must be enforced as written,
unless its provisions are contrary to public policy or statutory law); Compagnie Des Bauxites de
Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 551 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that
insurance is a matter of contract, and parties are free to agree to any reasonable conditions not
contrary to public policy); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bouler, 198 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. Ct. App. 1967)
(recognizing the "settled principle" that a contract of insurance is a voluntary agreement
between the parties, who may incorporate into the contract any provisions and conditions that
they see fit as long they are not contrary to statutory law or public policy).
95 See, e.g., Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McLain, 270 A.2d 362 (Maine 1970). See
generally 12 JOHN A. A iPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcnCE § 7027
(rev. ed. 1981); 9 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 39:14 (Mark S.
Rhodes, rev. 2ded. 1985).
The test of whether or not an insurance contract is void as against public policy is whether
it is injurious to the public or contravenes some important established societal interest, or when
its purpose is to promote, effect, or encourage a violation of the law. See L'Orange v. Medical
Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying Ohio law).
9 6 See, e.g., Swanco Ins. Co. v. Hager, 879 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493
U.S. 1057 (1990); California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105
(1951); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
97 For example, some Functionalist courts have liberally utilized state public policy
grounds to override nonambiguous, explicit terms in an insurance contract whenever the
contract terms would arguably operate to defeat the reasonable expectations of the insured. See,
e.g., Sands v. Granite Mut. Ins. Co., 331 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1974). Formalist courts, however,
would reiterate the traditional rule that any seemingly harsh contractual result against an
insured should not justify public policy "meddling" by the courts in the absence of clearly
stated legislative or administrative guidelines. See, e.g., Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 269 N.E.2d 97 (1. 1970). See generally Swisher, supra note 4, at 1062-66.
A middle ground interpretive approach to these public policy arguments would be to
follow the traditional Formalist rule of giving judicial deference to clearly stated legislative or
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Thus, a middle ground interpretive approach to insurance contracts rejects
the noncontractual Functionalistic reasonable expectations doctrine based upon
its lack of uniformity and predictability of application. Likewise, the middle
ground interpretive approach rejects the strict Formalistic contractual approach
to insurance policies in favor of a more realistic regulatory/contractual hybrid
approach. This middle ground regulatory/contractual approach recognizes the
right of the state to properly regulate the insurance industry, but it also
recognizes the contractual rights of the parties to contract out of or around
noncompulsory state insurance law as long as the contract is not in violation of
state statutory law or state public policy.
However, since insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts, and are
often perceived to be contracts of adhesion,98 insurance contracts under a
middle ground interpretive approach are subject to additional interpretive rules,
as discussed below.
B. Because Insurance Contracts Are Not Ordinary Contracts and Are
Often Perceived to Be Contracts of Adhesion, and Because the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured Should Be Honored When
Appropriate, Insurance Contracts Are Subject to the Following
Additional Interpretive Rules.
Before discussing these additional rules of insurance contract interpretation
under a realistic middle ground contractual approach, it is important to
understand that although the reasonable expectations of the insured should be
honored when appropriate, this middle ground interpretive approach does not
implicitly adopt the noncontractual Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine at
variance with the insurance policy provisions.99 Rather, the middle ground
interpretive approach subsumes and expands upon a more traditional reasonable
expectations test as propounded in Appleman's Insurance Law and Practice
and Couch's Cyclopedia of Insurance Laww ° which recognizes a contractually
based reasonable expectations interpretation when there is an ambiguity in the
insurance contract,101 or when the policy is to be interpreted by the untrained
administrative public policy guidelines, unless a literal contractual interpretation would lead to
unreasonable or absurd results. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.98 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text But see supra notes 82-83 and
acmpanying text
9 9 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text
100 See supra note 49 and accompanying text
101 See, e.g., Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marnel, 587 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D.C. Conn.
1983); Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.E.2d 539, 541 (M. 1980); Bond Bros. v.
Robinson, 471 N.E.2d 1332, 1334-36 (Mass. 1984); see infra notes 127-43 and
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mind or the common man or woman in the marketplace. 10 2 This middle ground
reasonable expectations approach thus differs significantly from the Keeton
Functionalist reasonable expectations doctrine which does not necessarily
depend on contractual ambiguity or contractual terms of coverage in its analysis
of insurance law disputes.' 0 3 Likewise, this middle ground judicial approach to
insurance contract interpretation does not adopt a rigid and inflexible traditional
rule of insurance contract interpretation,10 4 and thus it rejects a strict
Formalistic contractual insurance law doctrine as propounded by Professor
Williston and others. 105
The "appropriateness" of the insured's reasonable expectations under a
middle ground contractual analysis also differs from the Keeton Functionalist
reasonable expectations doctrine in one other important respect. Under this
middle ground analysis, the reasonable expectations of the insured cannot
deprive the insurer of any clear and unambiguous policy provisions placed in
the insurance contract for its protection.106 Stated another way, an insurance
accompanying text; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Sh. Dist., 763
P.2d 1255, 1263 (Wyo. 1988) C'A rule of construction that considers the reasonable
expectations of the parties is of no assistance where the policy terms are clear and
unambiguous.")
102 See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text This interpretive approach in favor of
the unsophisticated insured or the common man or woman in the marketplace also has
important implications on the supplemental interpretive doctrines of waiver and estoppel, as
well as the interpretive doctrine relating to exclusions or limitations of coverage in insurance
contracts. See inf-a notes 170-89.
10 3 See, e.g., Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977);
Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1987); Corgatelli v. Globe Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737 (Idaho 1975); see supra note 26; infra note 164 and
accompanying text.
104 See supra note 75 and accompanying text
10 5 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text; see also Swisher, supra note 4, at
1039-49.10 6 See, e.g., Rivers v. Richard Schwartz/Nefl Weber Inc., 459 N.W.2d 166, 172 vfiM.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the doctrine of reasonable expectations would not apply to provide
coverage to the insured when there was an express exclusion in the policy, and when there were
no ambiguities within the policy); see also State Farm Mut Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 549 S.W.2d
616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Devanzo v. Newark Ins. Co., 374 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. 1974) (both
holding that a court cannot rewrite a clear and unambiguous insurance contract in order to avoid
harsh results to the insued).
This assumes, of course, that the clear and unambiguous policy language is not in
contravention of state statutes or state public policy. See, e.g., Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 697
P.2d 684,690 (Ariz. 1985); Cardin v. Royal Ins. Co., 476 N.E.2d 200, 204 (Mass. 1985) (both
holding that clear and unambiguous exclusionary language in an automobile insurance policy
was a nullity since it contravened state uninsured motorist statutes); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
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contract under this middle ground reasonable expectation analysis cannot be
given a judicial interpretation at variance with the clear and unambiguous
language appearing within the insurance contract itself.107 However, a
Formalistic literal interpretation of an insurance contract would also be avoided
under a middle ground contractual analysis whenever such an interpretation
would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result. 10
Whether or not the language in an insurance contract is clearly
understandable by the insured, and whether that language is ambiguous or
unambiguous, however, are two additional issues of paramount importance
under the middle ground interpretive approach, as will be addressed in greater
depth below.
1. Insurance Contracts Will Be Construed and Interpreted in Their
Ordinary Sense, Rather Than in a Purely Technical or Legal Sense,
from the Wewpoint of the Untrained Mind or the
Common Man or Woman in the Marketplace.
Since insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts, and are often
perceived to be contracts of adhesion, 1°9 the middle ground interpretive
approach to insurance contracts is that insurance contracts will be construed
and interpreted in their ordinary sense, rather than in a purely technical or legal
sense, from the viewpoint of the untrained mind or the common man or woman
in the marketplace.110
Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex Ct App. 1982) (a life insurance endorsement was
a nullity since it was not approved by the State Insurance Board as required by the Texas
lsurance Code).
107 In this important respect, the middle ground interpretive approach of the insured's
reasonable expectations and the noncontractual Functionalist reasonable expectations approach
doctrinally cannot be reconciled. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text; see also infra
note 165 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979) (an
insurance policy will be construed "to provide that coverage which a layperson would have
reasonably expected from a lay interpretation of the policy terms"); see also Pacific Indent Co.
v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 488 A-2d 486, 488 (Md. 1985); Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441
S.W.2d 15,27 (Mo. 1969); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, 405 S.W.2d 64,65 (Tex 1966). See
generally 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, NsuRANcE LAW AND PRAcncE § 4254
(rev. ed. 1981) C'Insurance policies, like other forms of contracts, are interpreted as a reasonable
man would understand them. The terms of policies are construed in their plain, ordinary, and
popular sense. This policy has been referred to as the "principle of reasonable expectations.").
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For example, in the case of Dixon v. Gunter,"1 the Tennessee appellate
court embraced this middle ground approach by stating that:
A contract of insurance should be given a fair and reasonable construction;
and likewise should be given a sensible construction, consonant with the apparent
object and plain intention of the parties; a construction such as would be given the
contract by an ordinary intelligent business man; and a practical and reasonable
rather than a literal interpretation." 12
Similarly, in the case of Barber v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co.113 the
Arizona appellate court agreed that "[i]n ascertaining the meaning of an
insurance policy, the language must be viewed from the standpoint of the
average layman who is untrained in either law or insurance .... That is to
say, simply, that a universal standard of plain English prevails, and an insurer
who chooses esoteric language does so at its risk."114 Accordingly, a middle
ground approach to insurance contract interpretation would reject any
confusing legal or technical language in insurance policies in favor of a "plain
English" or "ordinary" interpretation made by the untrained layman or the
common man or woman in the marketplace.115
In life and accident insurance policies, for example, a confusing and highly
technical insurance law doctrine that purportedly distinguishes between
"accidental means"-which is interpreted as synonymous with "cause"-and
"accidental results" is still recognized in a number of jurisdictions. 116
However, a realistic middle ground interpretation of insurance contracts would
reject this highly confusing, technical, and legalistic distinction between
accidental means and accidental results as creating an unwarranted "Serbonian
11636 S.W.2d 437 (enn. Ct. App. 1982).
112 636 S.W.2dat 441 (Tenn. Ct App. 1982).
113 647 P.2d 1200 (Ariz. CL App. 1982).
114 647 P.2d at 1202 (Ariz. CL App. 1982). See generally WnT, supra note 20, at 353-
75.
115 See, e.g., Queen City Farms Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 827 P.2d 1024, 1032
(Wash. Ct App. 1992) (undefined terms in an insrance contract must be given their plain,
ordinary and popular meaning, and the courts can look to standard dictionaries to determine
such meming). Nevertheless, under this middle ground approach an insurer may still
contractually define the policy terms in a way that differs from the ordinary understanding of
those terms. Filip v. North River Ins. Co., 559 N.E.2d 17,18 (11. Ct App. 1990).
116 See, e.g., Linder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 250 S.E.2d 662, 665 (N.C. Ct App. 1979); see
also Rotuman, The Meaning of the "Accidental Means" Clamse in Accident Insurance
Policies, 48 INs. CouNsEL J. 231 (1981). See generally O.C. Sattinger, Annotation, Insurance:
"Accidental Means" as Distinguishable from "Accident," 'Accidental Resul," 'Accidental
Death," 'Accidentallnjury, "Etc., 166 A.L.R. 469-79 (1947).
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Bog" for the unwary and unsophisticated insured.117
Another example of interpreting the "plain meaning" of an insurance
policy with highly technical coverage language is found in the case of Allen v.
Manhattan Fire & Marine Insurance Co." 8 In Allen, the insured sued his
insurance carrier on the ground that the destruction of his tanker truck was
caused by an explosion within the terms and coverage of his insurance policy.
For some unknown reason, however, the insured and his attorney voluntarily
stipulated with the insurer that the actual cause of the loss was by an
"implosion," defined as an internal collapse followed immediately by a rush of
air. The insured then argued that such implosion should come under the
coverage of an explosion, defined as a sudden breaking forth of a confined
substance as a result of an internal force, rather than as a result of an internal
collapse. This unwise stipulation by the insured and his attorney regarding the
technical definition of an implosion ultimately sealed his fate and the court held
that the insurer was not liable for loss under the policy. Arguably, had there
been no prior implosion stipulation, the destruction of the tanker truck probably
would have been covered under a nontechnical lay definition of an explosion
from the understanding of the untrained mind or the common man or woman in
the marketplace. 19
11 7 See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934) (dissenting
opinion by Justice Cardozo, stating that attempting to distinguish accidental means and
accidental results would plunge the courts into a "Serbonian Bog"); Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the United States v. Hemenover, 67 P.2d 80, 81 (Colo. 1937) ('Whatever kind of a
bog that is, we concur."); see also Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 67
N.E.2d 248,251-52 (N.Y. 1946) C'Legal scholars have spent much effort in attempts to evolve
a sound theory of causation and to explain the nature of an 'accident'.... Our guide must be
the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when making an
insurance contract such as we have here ... In this State there is no longer any distinction made
between accidental death and death by accidental means, nor between accidental means and
accidental results.").
Many courts since the Burr decision have adopted this realistic middle ground approach.
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 493 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Md. Ct App. 1985). See generally
43 A. JUR. 2D Insurcawe § 561 (1982); KEETN & WIDISS, supra note 23, § 5.4[b][3].
118 519 S.W.2d 706 (Fex. Ct App. 1975).
119 Id.; see Rolifing v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 S.W.2d 472, 482 (Mo. Ct
App. 1961) (holding that ajury could find that loss of a frmace was caused by an explosion
where witnesses heard a loud "boom" and found the flinace blown open); Ormsby v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 573 S.W.2d 281, 284 (fex. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that an "explosion" is to be
constued in its popular sense, rather than in a highly technical or legal sense); Graham v.
Public Employees Mut Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077 (Wash. 1983) (characterizing the Mount St
Helens volcanic eruption as an explosion within the coverage of a homeowners insurance
policy); see also infra notes 282-83 and accompanying text
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Thus, although a number of courts will allow expert testimony and
extrinsic evidence to be admitted in court if the insurance policy language has a
peculiar or unusual meaning in a particular trade, business, profession, or
commercial usage,120 expert testimony as to the meaning of nontechnical words
or phrases would not be a proper subject for expert testimony. For example, in
the case of Truck Insurance Exchange v. Marks Rentals, Inc.,121 the Maryland
Supreme Court correctly defined the parameters for allowing expert testimony
in interpreting insurance policy language within a middle ground insurance
contract context:
Expert testimony will not be admitted to prove to a court or jury the
proper or legal construction of any instrument in writing. Where parol or
extrinsic evidence is otherwise admissible, however, in construing a contract,
expert testimony is admissible to aid the fact finder in interpreting words or
phrases in the instrument which have a peculiar meaning in a trade, business,
or profession .... 122
The principles admitting opinion evidence do not permit a party to a
contract to testify as to the effect of the language of the contract as he or she
understood it; nor do they permit any other witness to testify as to what is
meant by statements in a document prepared by another, unless the words,
phrases, or statements used have some unusual or technical meaning peculiar to
a certain trade, business, or profession. Thus, expert testimony cannot be
received to prove to the court or jury what the proper or legal construction of
any instrument of writing is. If, however, words have an unusual meaning or
application in a peculiar trade, persons familiar with such trade may testify to
such meaning and thereby assist the jury or court in interpreting the written or
120 See, e.g., Savoy Medical Supply Co. v. F & H Mfg Corp., 776 F. Supp. 703,710 rL2
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (language in a business policy must be given the meaning that an ordinary
businessman in the insured's line of business would give the language); Frank Lucas Ins.
Agencyv. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins., 425 A.2d 1378, 1381-82 (Md. Ct. App. 1981) (while one
of the primary rules of insurance contract interpretation is that the common or normal meaning
will be given to the words in which it is expressed, nevertheless if those words have a meaning
different from the meaning commonly or generally given to them which is peculiar to a locality,
a trade, a profession, or the like, then evidence of such a particular or peculiar meaning may be
submitted to the court); Purdy v. Tennessee Farmers Mut Ins. Co., 586 S.W.2d 128, 130
(Tenn. CL App. 1979) (the terms of an insurance contract are to be construed according to their
plain, ordinary, and popular sense unless the words have acquired a technical sense by
commercial usage).
121 418 A.2d 1187 (Md. 1980).
12 2 Id. at 1190 (quoting Della Ratta, Inc. v. American Better Community Developers,
Inc., 380 A.2d 627,635 (Md. 1977).
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verbal passage in which the words occur. 123
In this particular case, neither alleged expert witness testified that the
insurance policy language in question had any peculiar or particular trade
usage. Each expert merely stated that he believed the language meant one thing
or the other. Consequently, there were no disputed issues of fact presented
through this extrinsic evidence.124
2. If the Insurance Contract Is Susceptible to Tw or More Reasonable
Interpretations, Then It Will Be Construed Liberally in Favor of
the Nondrafting Party, the Insured, and It Will Be Strictly
Construed Against the Drafting Party, the Insurer. This Rule Is Subject,
However, to Extrinsic Evidence to Determine the Parties' Intent,
and Subject to the Sophisticated Policyholder Defense.
Under both a Formalistic approach' 25 and a Functionalistic approach 126 to
the interpretation of insurance contracts, a general rule has evolved that
whenever an insurance policy is susceptible to two or more reasonable' 27
interpretations so that an ambiguity exists, under the doctrine of contra
proferentem, any ambiguous insurance policy language should be strictly
construed against the insurer who drafted the contract, and the policy should be
liberally construed in favor of the insured who was the nondrafting party. 128
123 Id. (quoting 31 AM. JuR. 2D Expen and Opinion Evidence § 171).
124 1d
12 5 Seesupra notes 13, 15-20 and acconpanying text.
126 See supra notes 14,23-26 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indern Co., 933 F.2d 1162,
1182 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Delaware law) ('Policy language is considered ambiguous only
if it 'permits of two or more reasonable interpretations."' To establish an ambiguity, "the
insured must do more than proffer a competing 'possible construction of the policy."'), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co.,
796 F. Supp. 929, 936 (W.D. Va. 1992) (Norfolk held that even when the insured is able to
proffer two meanings for the policy language, that does not necessarily make the policy
language ambiguous. "Competent legal counsel can always make a colorable argument that
language is ambiguous by proffering two meanings. Ultimately, the court must examine both
proffered meanings and decide if each is plausible."), aff'd in part, 41 F.3d 928 (4th Cir. 1994).
12 8 See 13 JoHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INMuR LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 7401 (rev. ed. 1981); 2 GEoRG EJ. COUCH, CYCLPEDiAOFINSuRANcELAW § 15:74 (Mark S.
Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984); KEEmN & WIDISS, supra note 23, at 628-30; RESTAThMENT OF
CONrRACMS § 236(d) (1932); RESTATEMEN (SECOND) oF CoNTRAS § 206 (1981); JERRY,
supra note 43, at 94-98; ORAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17; WND'T, supra note 20, at 361-
75. This is a widely recognized rule of contract interpretation in general, and insurance contract
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On this general rule of insurance contract interpretation many Formalist and
Functionalist courts apparently agree. 129 However, a closer analysis of the
doctrine of ambiguities in an insurance law context demonstrates that a wide
interpretive disparity still exists in how the courts actually apply the doctrine of
ambiguities to insurance coverage disputes.
On one hand, some courts have applied the doctrine of ambiguities strictly
against the insurer, irrespective of whether or not the insured was a
sophisticated policyholder, 130 and without utilizing any extrinsic evidence' 31
law in particular, although there has been recent criticism of this rule. See, e.g., OsnLkER &
NEWMAN, supra note 17; Rahdert, supra note 27, at 330, 369-70. But see Stempel, supra note
17, at 826.
Contra proferentem continues to have force when applied to many coverage
questions because most poliyholders are nondrafters who have nothing to say about the
language of the contract Consequently, if someone has to lose a contract dispute, one can
make a good case it should not be the nondrafling policyholder.
If anythin& drafter of standardized contracts have more time, resources, and
experts to devote to contract drafting than their customized contract predecessors....
The complex nature of insurance, the information disparity between insurer and
policyholder, the virtual necessity for insurance, and the industry's ability to collaborate
on contract terms without legal liability (because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
antitrust exception for insurers) all make modem consumer insurance a stronger case for
calling close questions in favor of the nondrafter than were presented in the customized
land lease, sale of goods, and shipping contracts from which the ambiguity doctrine
sprang. Thus, the implicit rationale of contra proferentem continues with some vigor.
Id.
129 See, e.g., Hartnett v. Southern Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 524, 528 (Fla. 1965) ("so long as
[insurance] contracts are drawn in such a manner that it requires the proverbial Philadelphia
lawyer to cornprehend the terms embodied in it, the courts should and will construe them
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer to protect the buying public who
rely upon [insurers] and agencies in such transactions"); see also Swisher, supra note 4, at
1058-62. However, a "strong" application of the Functionalist doctrine of reasonable
expectations could still find coverage "even though the insurer's [policy] form is very explicit
and unambiguous." See infra note 164 and accompanying text
13 0 The term "sophisticated policyholder" refers to policyholders who have substantial
economic strength, desirability as customers, understanding of insurance, or readily available
assistance in understanding and procuring insurance. For the most part, sophisticated
policyholders are relatively large commercial enterprises. See Stempel, supra note 17, at 808
n.1. Sophisticated policyholders would also include insurance companies in reinsurance or
excess insurance contract disputes. See, e.g., Keystone Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 633 F.
Supp. 1358, 1360 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 349
N.W.2d 238,246 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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not found in the insurance policy itself that might resolve the uncertainty. For
example, in the case of Adrian Associates, General Contractors v. National
Surety Co.,' 32 a Texas appellate court held that under the insurance law
doctrine of ambiguities, the language construction urged by the insured "must
be adopted as long as the construction itself is not unreasonable, and even if the
construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more
accurate reflection of the intent of the parties." 133 Other courts also have held
that under a strict application of the doctrine of ambiguities extrinsic evidence
cannot be used to interpret ambiguous policy provisions, and such ambiguous
provisions must be interpreted against the insurer.' 3 4 This rather severe
contractual application of the doctrine of ambiguities in an insurance law
context has been criticized by a number of recent commentators.' 35
131 Under a traditional contractually based parol evidence rule, the terms of an insurance
contract may not be contradicted-or supplemented-by evidence of any prior agreement or
negotiations of the parties that are not found in the contract itself, unless the terms of that
contract are ambiguous. See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 43, at 274.
Considerable controversy exists over the circumstances under vich parol evidence
should be admitted to supplement a writing. Under the strict view, if the contract is clear
on its face, as indicated by evaluation of the "four corners" of the document, parol
evidence is inadmissible to contradict the writing. This approach has been applied to
assertedly "unambiguus" insurance policies, parole testimony seeking to alter the
coverage terms has been held inadmissible. Under the broader, more modem view,
evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the contract's formation, including
negotiation and prior dealings and conduct, are all admissible to determine viether the
contract is "integrated", a finding preliminaxy to applying the parol evidence rule.
Id.
132 638 S.W.2d 138 (rex. Ct App. 1982).
13 3 Id. at 140; see also Chen v. Metropolitan Ins. & Annuity Co., 907 F.2d 566, 569 (5th
Cir. 1990) (applying Texas law); Niagara County v. Utica Mut Ins. Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 171,
176 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1981); Gunn v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Co., 629 S.W.2d 59,60 (rex. Ct App. 1981).
13 4 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 714-16 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(applying Indiana law), cer denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); ACANDS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467,470 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987).
135 See, e.g., WJNDT, supra note 20, at 368-69.
[Under this strict rule], once an ambiguity is discovered, courts may not look first to
extrinsic evidence in order to eliminate the ambiguity, they may, instead, automatically
resolve the ambiguity against the insurer. This can, of course, result in the creation of
policy coverage when neither party intended or expected such coverage. This should not,
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On the other hand, a larger and growing number of courts have held that if
insurance policy terms are ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence should be
permitted to ascertain the parties' true intent, and the contra proferentem rule
interpreting ambiguous policy language in favor of the insured should be relied
upon only as a last resort or an interpretive tie-breaker. 136 This middle ground
contractual analysis appears to be the better-reasoned interpretive approach to
ascertain the parties' intent, rather than relying solely upon a strict and
inflexible "four comers of the contract" traditional approach. 137
A final important element of the contra proferentem doctrine of ambiguities
involves the sophisticated policyholder. 138 Normally, the terms of an insurance
contract will be construed and interpreted in their ordinary sense, rather than in
therefore, be the law.
The rule interpreting ambiguous policy language in favor of the insured should be
relied on only as a last resort. It should not be permitted to fiustrate the intention of the
parties, if that intent can somehow be ascertained. As a result courts should resort to the
rule only if an evaluation of the pertinent extrinsic evidence does not indicate the parties'
true intent
Id.
See also OSMAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 5-7.
The parol evidence rule general precludes consideration of extrinsic evidence of the
meaning of an insurance contract unless the policy language is ambiguous.... If there
appears to be an ambiguity in the policy, a court must consider extrinsic evidence
submitted by the parties to assist in determining the actual intent of the parties. ...
If the intent of the contracting parties cannot be ascertained after the trier of fact
considers extrinsic evidence about the meaning of an ambiguous policy term, other rules
of construction may then be applied only as a last resort ... Thus, the issue of whether
an insured is entitled to contra-insurer rules of construction does not arise unless it is first
demonstrated that (a) the policy is ambiguous; and (b) the ambiguity may not be
resolved by resort to extinsic evidence of intent
Id.
13 6 See, e.g., Kenevan v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 791 F. Supp. 75, 79
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Wolf Bros. Oil Co. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 839,
843 (W.D. Wash. 1989); Rainer Credit Co. v. Western Alliance Corp., 217 Cal. Rptr. 291,295
(Cal. Ct App. 1985); Inland Constr. Co. v. Home Indem Co., 447 N.E.2d 1023, 1024 11. Ct
App. 1983); Walle Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 419 N.W.2d 176, 180 (N.D. 1980); General Am.
Life Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 847 S.W.2d 125, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
137 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 17, at 821. "This notion of invoking the contra-
proferentem principle as a tie breaker only after consideration of extrinsic evidence specific to
the case is the better reasoned modem view of contract law." Id.
13 8 See supra note 130.
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a purely technical or legal sense, from the viewpoint of the untrained mind or
the common man or woman in the marketplace. 139 However, should a
sophisticated policyholder such as an insurance company in a reinsurance or
excess insurance contract, or a large commercial policyholder with ready access
to available legal and technical assistance in procuring and understanding
insurance coverage, be entitled to this same interpretive rule as the untrained
policyholder or the common man or woman in the marketplace? Again, the
courts have split on this important issue.
Some courts have applied a strict contractual interpretation to every
policyholder under the contra proferentem doctrine of ambiguities, irrespective
of whether or not the policyholder was "sophisticated" or "unsophisticated" in
procuring insurance coverage or in understanding the technical language within
the insurance policy. 140 Other courts, however, have recognized that in the real
world insurance companies and other large commercial corporations often are
sophisticated policyholders, and therefore they should not be entitled to the
doctrine of ambiguities interpretive rule under a sophisticated policyholder
defense, and the contra proferentem doctrine should only be applied to the
unsophisticated policyholder or the common man or woman in the
marketplace. 141 Again, this latter approach appears to be the better-reasoned
139 See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text
140See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa, 651 F.
Supp. 1042 (ED. Pa. 1987) (holding that the doctrine of ambiguities applies to commerical
policyholders as well as ordinaxy consumers unless the parties possessed equal bargaining
power); Minier v. Traveler Indem. Co., 159 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. IM. 1958) (holding that the
doctrine of ambiguities is based, not upon the sophistication or bargaining power of the
policyholder, but on the concept that the insurer drafited the policy); Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204 (11. 1992) (holding that the sophistication of the
insured is irrelevant); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 815
(Cal. Ct App. 1993); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990);
D'Annunzio v. Security Conn. Life Ins. Co., 410 S.E.2d 275 (W.Va. 1991).
141 See, e.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d
1068, 1080 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law) C'If an ambiguity does exist and if the
insurer wrote the policy or is in a stronger bargaining position than the insured, the ambiguity is
generally resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer. However, the principle that
ambiguities in policies should be strictly construed against the insurer does not control the
situation where large corporations, advised by counsel and having equal bargaining power, are
the parties to a negotiated policy."), cerL denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981); Eagle Leasing Corp. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Missouri law) ('We do
not feel compelled to apply, or indeed, justified in applying the general rule that an insurance
policy is construed against the insurer in the commercial insurance field when the insured is not
an innocent but a corporation of immense size, canying insurance with annual premiums of six
figures, managed by sophisticated business men, and represented by counsel on the same
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middle ground contractual view for ascertaining the parties' intent, especially in
a business insurance context.1 42 However, not all commercial policyholders
necessarily will be sophisticated policyholders, and two commentators suggest
similar checklists for determining whether or not a commercial policyholder
would constitute a sophisticated policyholder.' 43
professional level as the counsel for the insurers."), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977); see also
Halpem v. Lexington Ins. Co., 715 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1983); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Fibreboani Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 203 (Cal. Ct App. 1986).
14 2 See generally Bany Ostrager & David Ichel, Should the Business Insurance Policy
Be Construed Against the Insurer? Another Look at the Reasonable Epectations Doctrine,
33 FED. INs. & CoRP. CouNsEL Q. 273 (1983); Stempel, supra note 17. Although Ostragerand
Ichel characterize the sophisticated policyholder defense in more functionalistic temis, Professor
Stempel's characterization of the sophisticated policyholder defense in contractual terms is apt
and, in this author's view, more appropriate. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 17, at 855-57:
The sophistication of the policyholder is, however, a valid consideration in applying
a number of contract principles. For example, a policyholder's expertise and historical
experience create specialized understanding of the meaning of policy language, making it
less likely that a court will find the language ambiguous. Also, the policyholder's
sophistication may foreclose as unreasonable certain policy interpretations that would be
reasonable to the average layerson. The policyholder's discussion and rejection or
acceptance of certain policy options also creates context and extrinsic evidence courts
may employ in deciding cases, thereby making ambiguity less frequent as a tie
breaker ....
Treating Fortune 500 companies like impoverished and credulous individuals
makes no sense. A blanket or reflexive rejection of the time-honored ambiguity approach
for commercial policyholders, however, makes even less sense.
Id.
143 See generall OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 26-36.
The courts that have declined to apply the contra-insurer rule [to business insurance
coverage disputes] have relied on evidence establishing the equivalence of bargaining
power between the insurer and the insured, including: (1) the large size of the business
insured; (2) the involvement of counsel on behalf of the insured in the negotiation of the
policy, (3) the representation of the insured by an independent [insurance] broker in the
negotiation of the policy, (4) the use of a "manuscript" policy [an individually negotiated
and drafted policy rather than a "standard form" policy]; (5) the "insurance"
sophistication of the insured; (6) whether the dispute is between two insurance
companies; and (7) whether the parties possess equal bargaining power.
Id
See also STEMPEL, supra note 20, at 849-57.
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Thus, under a middle ground interpretive view, the contractually based
contra proferentem doctrine of ambiguities would be retained in favor of an
unsophisticated policyholder's reasonable expectation of coverage, but subject
to extrinsic evidence to help clarify any such ambiguity, and subject also to a
sophisticated policyholder defense.
3. Based upon the Acts and Representations Made by the Insurer and Its
Agents, the Legal Doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel, Election, and
Reformation of Contract Are Available to the Insured and Should
Be Liberally Construed to Validate the Reasonable Expectation
of the Insured to Coverage.
Insurance coverage today is sold by a multitude of insurance agents who
often emphasize the insured's "peace of mind" and reasonable expectation to
Several issues are woth considering.
First, courts should consider the actual identity of the drafter. At the outset,
commentators and courts should distinguish more carefully between situations in which
the policyholder is merely a sophisticated party adhering to a standardized contract of
adhesimon, and those cases in wiich the policyholder is more than the consumer of a
prefabricated insurae product ... Second, courts should consider broker presence and
activity ... Third, courts must consider attorney presence and activity .... Fourth, courts
should consider the degree of negotiation surrounding the policy and whether it is fairly
characterized as "customized" rather than standardized... Fifth, courts must consider
whether, regardless of the drafter's identity, the term in dispute is really ambiguous if
examined in light of the parties and the facts.... Sit courts should consider the
understanding conveyed by the oral and written conduct of the parties surrounding the
negotiation, finalization, and implementation of the policy... . Seventh, courts should
consider the presense of an objectively reasonable expectation of or reasonable reliance
upon coverage due to no fault of the policyholder... Eighth, courts should consider the
presence of a genuine contractual relationship between the disputants.... Ninth, courts
must consider the presence of extrinsic evidence .... Tenth, courts should consider
whether, in the absence of more probative evidence of contract meaning, it is
fundaimetally fair to invoke contra proferentem against the insurer. ... Finally, courts
must consider impact of policyholder sophistication on contract doctrines other than
ambiguity....
Assessing future coverage questions involving sophisticated policyholders by
reference to this Article's list of considerations can form an initial basis for a sounder
insurance coverage doctrine.
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coverage, 144 even though the insured seldom reads his or her policy, 145 and
even though there may be a number of contractual conditions, limitations, or
exclusions within the insurance policy that the insurer subsequently may cite in
order to defeat the insured's reasonable expectation to coverage.1 46 Although
some commentators have characterized these insurance sales/coverage disputes
in terms of a more Functionalistic analysis, 147 judicial interpretations of
sales/coverage disputes are more persuasive utilizing an insurance-as-contract
analysis. 148 Accordingly, under a contractually based middle ground
interpretive view of insurance coverage disputes, and based upon the acts and
representations made to the insured by the insurer and its agents, the legal
doctrines of waiver, estoppel, election, and reformation of contract also are
available to the insured and should be liberally construed to validate the
144 See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry, 1I, Remedying Insurer's Bad Faith Contract Performance:
A Reassessment, 18 CONN. L. REv. 271,298-99 (1986) (stating that insurers and their agents
often emphasize the catastrophic effects of loss, and the "peace of mind" that insurance
provides when attempting to convince a prospective insured to purhase insurance coverage).
145 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., D'Ambrosio v. Penn. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. Super.
1978) ("The insurer's promise to the insured to 'simplify his life,' to put him in 'good hands,'
to back him with 'a piece of the rock' or to be 'on his side' hardly suggests that the insurer will
abandon the insured in his time of need."), afid, 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981). But see Rodio v.
Smith, 587 A.2d 621, 624 (N.J. 1991) ('However persuasive, 'You're in good hands with
Allstate' is nothing more than puffery."). For an excellent discussion of the duality between
insurers' sales inducements to the insured on the one hand, and insurers' contractual claims
defenses on the other hand, see Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales
Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX L. REV. 1395 (1994).
1 4 7 See Baker, supra note 146, at 1417 n.77, citing as some examples: SPENCER L.
KMBALL, CASES AND MATERALS ON INSURANCE LAW 8-31 (1992); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULAnON: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-52 (1990); and ALAN L Wmiss,
INSURANCE MATERiALs ON FUNDAmENAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DocmuINs, AND REGULATORY
ACmS 599-654 (1989). But see Spencer Kimball, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory,
and Public Policy, 19 CONN. L. REv. 311 (book review) (expressing criticism of the
Functionalist reasonable expectations doctrine).
148See, e.g., Baker, supra note 146, at 1417 ("The 'insurance-as-contract' story is
typically the baseline [for judging the insurance relationship]. Many, if not most, courts-
whether deciding in favor of insurance companies or insureds-rely heavily on a
straightforward interpretation of the insurance company's printed form."); STEMPEL, supra note
20, at 298 ('Although insurance marketing involves sales force solicitation, mass advertising,
and efforts to build a secure, positive image rather than to promote a given coverage scheme or
contract language, the insurance policy still figures prominently in the manner in which
insurance is usually sold.") (footnote omitted); see also EMEc FISCHER & PETER N. SWMHER,
PRINCILES OF INSURANCE LAW 1-12, 20-40 (2d ed. 1994); supranotes 15-20, 33-34,41-56,
61-71 and accompanying text
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reasonable expectation of the insured to coverage.
A waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right
which may result from either the affirmative acts of the insurer or its authorized
agents, or from the insurer's inaction, with knowledge of the applicable
facts.149 Because there must be a clear, requisite intent to establish such a
waiver, it generally cannot be found in negligence or mistake. 150 Common
examples of waiver on the insurer's part in sales/coverage disputes include: (1)
the insurer waiving or accepting overdue premium payments; 151 and (2) the
insurer waiving certain misrepresentations in the insurance application, or
waiving conditions or warranties found in the insurance policy. 152 Estoppel, on
the other hand, does not require any actual surrender of a known right. Rather,
the doctrine of estoppel implies some misleading act, conduct, or inaction on
the part of the insurer or its agent, upon which the insured detrimentally
relies. 153 Estoppel has been utilized by the insured in insurance sales/coverage
149 16B JOHN A. APpLEMMn & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACICE
§§ 9081-9090 (rev. ed. 1981); 7 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOpFEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§§ 35:248-:275 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1985); WuNr, supra note 20, at 468-73. Waiver
principles are well recognized and well established supplemental rules of American contract
law. See, e.g., 2 E. ALLAN FARNswORTt, FARNswORTH ON CoNmRcrs §§ 8.5, 8.19 (1990);
ARTHuRL. CRBIN, CORBIN oN CONmACS, §§ 752-766 (1 vol. ed. 1952).150 See, e.g., Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Howell, 357 P.2d 400 (Or. 1960).
151 See, e.g., Kramer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1026 (D. N.J. 1980);
Northeast Ins. Co. v. Concord Gen. Mut Ins. Co., 461 A.2d 1056 (Me. 1983); Lawrimore v.
American Health & Life Ins. Co., 276 S.E.2d 296 (S.C. 198 1).
1 5 2 See 16B JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 9082 (rev. ed. 1981) (stating that the doctrine of waiver evolved in insurance law to prevent
forfeitmes of the insured's coverage that would otherwise result when an insured breaches a
policy condition); see also W.C. Crais, III, Annotation, Doctrine of Estoppel or Waiver As
Available to Bring Within Coverage of Insurance Policy Risks Not Covered by Its Terms or
Expressy Excluded Therefrom, I A.L.R.3d 1139-83 (1965).
153 See, e.g., Loyola Univ. v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 1993)
(applying Illinois law) C'[E]stoppel occurs when one party knowingly misrepresents or
conceals a material fact and the other party, not knowing the truth, reasonably relies on that
misrepresentation or concealment to his detriment"). However, in the absence of a reasonable
belief of coverage or detriment reliance on the part of the insured, estoppel will not be available.
See Transamerica Ins. Group v. Turner Constr. Co., 601 N.E.2d 473, 477 (Mass. CL App.
1992); see also 7 GEORGE J. CouCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 35:250-:275; (Mark
S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1985); Crais, supra note 152; WINDT, supra note 20, at 460-67.
Increasingly, the courts are viewing estoppel in terms of the standards set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981):
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forebearance on the part of the pronisee or a third person and which does induce such
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disputes when an insurance agent misrepresents that the insured has more
coverage than is found in the policy itself.154
Although the doctrines of waiver and estoppel "have been used to deprive
insurers of defenses in virtually every context in which the insurer might deny
liability," 55 and although waiver and estoppel often are utilized as doctrines of
judicial discretion 156 by Formalist and Functionalist judges alike 57 in order to
validate the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage, one commentator
opines that "it is somewhat surprising that courts in most jurisdictions hold that
the doctrines [of waiver and estoppel] are not available to broaden
coverage."' 58 Nevertheless, a majority of jurisdictions have held that the
doctrines of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend the coverage of an
insurance policy, nor to create any new liability, but may only affect those
contractual rights that are already reserved in the policy. Thus, while a
forfeiture of benefits already contracted for in an insurance policy may be
waived, or an insurer may be estopped to deny them, the doctrines of waiver or
estoppel cannot create liability on the insurer for any new coverage benefits that
were not already contracted for in the first place.' 5 9 In other words, a number
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
REsTATeMEmr (SEcoND) oF CoMNxAcrs § 90 (1981). Estoppel principles are well recognized
and well established supplemental rules of American contract law. See FARNSWORTh, supra
note 149, §§ 2.19,6.12; CORBIN, supra note 149, §§ 93-209; see also STFMPEL, supra note 20,
at 222-29.
154 See, e.g., Weaver v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 545 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mo. 1982)
(holding that an agent's misrepresentation of coverage in a disability insurance policy, plus the
company's "sales aids" promising coverage, and the acceptance of the insured's premiums,
constituted actual or apparent authority of the agent to act on behalf of his principal, and waiver
and estoppel principles applied against the insurer, providing coverage to the insured); Jones v.
United Ins. Co. of Arnt, 338 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an agent's
knowledge of the insured's health and drinking habits were imputed to the company, even
though material misrepresentations had been made in the insurance application, and the
company therefore waived and was estopped to deny any defense to coverage); Durham v. Cox,
310 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an agent's knowledge of the insured's
upholstery business in his garage, and acceptance of enhanced premiums, constituted waiver
and estoppel barring the insurer to deny coverage).
155 JERRY, supra note 43, at 269-73.
156 See STEMPI., supra note 20, at 222-25.
157 See, e.g., Crais, supra note 152 and cases cited therein; see also KEETON & WDIs,
supra note 23.
158 See, e.g., McGee v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d 993 (Ala. 1985); Ricci v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 721 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1986); see JERRY, supra note 43, at 269.
159 See, e.g., Topeka Tent & Awning Co. v. Glen Falls his. Co., 774 P.2d 984 (Kan. Ct
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of courts utilizing a middle ground interpretive approach, hold that waiver and
estoppel defenses would apply to representations, warranties, and conditions in
the insurance contract, but waiver and estoppel would not apply to exclusions
or limitations to coverage. 160 Other middle ground courts have applied waiver
and estoppel principles more broadly, and have liberally construed their
application to provide coverage that, in certain circumstances, may be excluded
in the policy. 161 Under this middle ground interpretive view, judicial discretion
in the utilization of waiver and estoppel principles, although expanded from a
traditional contractual analysis and liberally construed, 162 is not limitless, and
although the doctrines of waiver and estoppel have been used to protect the
reasonable expectations of the consuming public to coverage, for the most part
the courts have acted with reasonable restraint. 163 Adopting a more
App. 1989); Daca, Inc. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 822 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Ct App.
1992); Shannon v. Shannon, 442 N.W.2d 25 (Wis. 1989); see also 16B JOHN A. APPLEMAm &
JEAN Apnumm, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE (rev. ed. 1981); 7 GEORGE J. CouC-
CYCLoPEIXA OF INSURANCE LAW (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1985); Crais, supra note 152.
160 See, e.g., Fishel v. American Sec. Life Ins. Co., 835 F.2d 613, 615-16 (5th Cir. 1988)
(applying Mississippi law) (allowing estoppel to prevent forfeiture of coverage, but not as a
basis for the nexistence of coverage in the first place); Gordon v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 675 F.
Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1987); Vision Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 744 P.2d 998, 1001
(Or. 1987) (estoppel may be invoked with regard to conditions of foifeiture, but it cannot be
invoked to expand the scope of insurance coverage).
Accordingly, it is very important to determine how these particular middle ground courts
will characterize an insurance policy provision: (1) as a condition to coverage; or (2) as an
exclusion fiom coverage. See, e.g., Durham v. Cox, 310 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. CL App. 1984)
(characterizing a fire loss of a garage used for commercial purposes in a homeowners insurance
policy as a mode of use warranty or "accepted risk" rather than as a business exclusion
provision or "excepted risk" thus allowing waiver and estoppel defenses to apply in favor of
the insured). But see Badger Mut Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 157 S.E.2d 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)
(characterizing a fire loss of a garage used for commercial purposes as a business exclusion
"excepted risk," and thus denying any waiver or estoppel defenses in favor of the insured).
161 See, e.g., Loyola Univ. v. Humnana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Illinois law); Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 823 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass.
1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 339 (1st Cir. 1994); Childress v. Foremost Ins. Co., 411 So. 2d 124 (Ala.
1982). For example, such exceptional circumstances have included when the insurer's agent
materially misrepresents the extent of policy coverage to the insured, and when the insurer fails
to transmit a proper reservation of rights notice while defending the insured. See infra notes
241-49 and accompanying text
162 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text; see also WNDT, supra note 20, at
460 ('Numerous courts have summarily stated that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to
provide coverage that is excluded by the policy. That proposition, however, read literally is far
too broad."); infra notes 241-55 and accompanying text
163 See JERRY, supra note 43, at 272; see also STMPEL, supra note 20, at 223-24.
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Functionalistic view of "broadening" coverage without relying on waiver or
estoppel principles 164 would, in effect, eviscerate these important parameters of
judicial restraint, uniformity of decision, predictability of result, and a more
balanced interpretive approach affecting both the insured and the insurer.165
Additionally, the insured also may utilize the doctrine of election in order
the validate the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage. The doctrine of
Judicial discretion over waiver and estoppel doctrines is not limitless....
Despite limits on [thesel doctrines and a general sense that courts have not "gone
overboard" to assist policyholders, insurers can improve the odds by acting quickly in the
event of a claim to analyze the loss in terms of applicable policy exclusions. If a potential
defense exists, insurers should raise it with the policyholder as soon as possible and
emphasize its impact on coverage.
Id.
164 See JERRY, supra note 43, at 273.
The reasonable expectations doctrine... in its strong form has the potential to create
coverage where none would otherwise exist Professor (now Judge) Keeton, who was
instrumental in the early growth of the doctrine, wrote that insurers should not be able to
limit coverage inconsistently with the insured's reasonable expectations "even though
the insurer's form is very explicit and unambiguous. ... [Not only should a
policyholder's reasonable expectations be honored in the face of difficult and technical
language, but those expectations should prevail as well when the language of an unusual
provision is clearly understandable," unless the insurer shows that the insured acted
unreasonably in not reading the policy.
... This doctrine has more far-reaching implications for coverage than estoppel
because the reasonable expectations doctrine does not require the insured to show
reliance, which is an element of both equitable and promissory estoppel.
Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting ROBERTKEETN, IMNtuaCELAW 351-52 (1971)).
165 See Wn, r, supra note 20, at 465 (stating that some courts "have been all too willing
to find an estoppel, even in the absence of prejudice to and justifiable reliance by the insured');
see also Clarence Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 925,926 (1957).
[Tihis process of favoring [insurance] consumers can be carried too far. Insurance
companies need and are entitled to reasonable limits on their responsibilities, the public
is prejudiced when company liabilities are by generous caprice stretched over risks that
cannot be profitably underwritten at a just premium. By and large, however, the courts
have not been overgenerous to the public. Judges have limited their use of the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel because of their awareness of important underwriting realities.
Vol. 57:543
INSURANCE CONTJRACTDISPU7ES
election is a hybrid legal remedy between waiver and estoppel. It contemplates
a rule of law that restricts the actor-normally the insurer-to a choice from
among a limited number of legal options. It is similar to estoppel because it is
an imposed rule of law, and it is similar to waiver because a choice must still
be made by the actor. Election is most commonly found in insurance law when
the insurer has the option to repair or rebuild insured property or pay a
monetary claim. 16 According to Professors Keeton and Widiss, although the
concept of election is "more troublesome" for the courts to employ than either
waiver or estoppel, it is often more useful for the insured to utilize the doctrine
of election since it does not require the voluntary relinquishment element for
waiver, nor the detrimental reliance factor for estoppel.1 67
The insured has a final contractual remedy to safeguard his or her
reasonable expectation to coverage in the form of contract reformation. If an
insurance agent makes an innocent or fraudulent representation to the insured
regarding policy coverage, the insured may bring an action for a reformation of
the insurance contract based upon a mutual mistake of the parties, or based
upon mistaken or fraudulent representations or conduct of the insurer or its
agent who issues the policy. 168 Under traditional contract law principles,
166 When the insurer elects to repair or rebuild, the former contract of insurance is
transformed into a construction contract and the insured no longer has an action on the policy to
recover any monetary indemnity. Likewise, the insurer cannot later claim a breach of any
condition in the insurance policy that would lead to a forfeiture. Walker v. Republic
Underwriters Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp. 686 (I). Minn. 1983); Home Inderm. Co. v. Bush, 513 P.2d
145 (Ariz. CL App. 1973). If the insurer elects to repair a damaged vehicle or rebuild a
damaged building, the insurer is bound by its election-even though the cost of this
undertaking may be more or less than the original amount of the insurance coverage under the
policy. Venable v. Import Volkswagen Inc., 519 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1974); Walker, 574 F. Supp. at
688; see also Howard v. Reserve Ins. Co., 254 N.E.2d 631 (11. App. CL 1969).
The doctrine of election likewise may be applied against the insured. See, e.g., Dunm v.
Way, 786 P.2d 649 (Mont. 1990) (holding that the insureds' failure to elect as to whether they
wished to replace destroyed items or seek reimbursement from the insurer on the basis of
depreciated costs, as required in their homeowners' insurance policy, precluded a suit against
their insurer). See also FARNSWORTh, supra note 149, § 8.19; 15 GEORGE J. COUCH,
CYCLOPEXAOFINSURANCELAW §§ 54:17-:18, :20-:26 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1983).
167 See generally KEEON & WwUss, supra note 23, at 618-20.
168 See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Didier, 783 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1990) (holding that
a written instnment may be reformed if there has been a mistake of one party accompanied by
fraud or other inequitable conduct of the other party); Magnus v. Barrett, 557 N.E.2d 252 (I1.
App. Ct 1990) (holding that reformation of contract should be allowed only when clear and
convincing evidence compels the conclusion that the contractual instrument as it stands does
not properly reflect the intention of the parties, and that there has been either a mutual mistake
of the parties or mistake by one party and fraud by the other); see also Board of Trustees v.
Insurance Corp., 969 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Illinois law); Raymond v. Zeringue,
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contract reformation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
although some recent insurance cases have required less proof. The insured
also may show by parol evidence that the parties' intent was different from the
terms of the insurance contract and may, in some jurisdictions, also present
evidence that the insured had not read the policy to support the insured's
allegations that he or she had a mistaken understanding of its terms. 169
The legal doctrines of waiver, estoppel, election, and reformation of
contract, as utilized in a realistic middle ground interpretive approach to
insurance coverage disputes, therefore provide additional parameters for
judicial discretion in recognizing and honoring the insured's reasonable
expectation of coverage that are supplemental to-rather than at variance with-
the terms of the parties' insurance contract.
422 So. 2d 534 (La. CL App. 1982); Wood Goods Galore, Inc. v. Reinsurance Ass'n, 478
N.W.2d 205 (Minn. Ct App. 1991). Indeed, it has been held that the insmred and the insurer
can legally reform an insurance contract subsequent to the insured loss, even to the detriment of
an excess insurer. See, e.g., Great Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 773 F.2d 976 (8th
Cir. 1985) (applying Misouri law).
169 See, e.g., National Ben Franklin Ins. Co. v. Davidovitch, 462 N.E. 2d 696 (11. App.
Ct 1984) (holding that for reformation to be ordered, evidence of mutual mistake must be
clearly and convincingly proven); see also FARNSWORTh, supra note 149, § 7.5. See general,
17 GEORGE J. COUcH CyaOpEmA AOF INSURANCE LAW §§ 66:1-:164 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d
ed. 1983); Irwin J. Sehiffres, Annotation, Reformation of Insurance Policy to Correcty
Identify Risks and Causes of Loss, 32 A.L.R.3d 661-735 (1970); 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance
§§ 357-359 (1982).
Some courts have held that under traditional principles of insurance contract law, the
is held to the duty of reading his or her insurance policy, and failure to read the policy
would bar the insured from having the policy reformed. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y v. Aaron, 108 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1940). Other courts, however, have applied a better-
reasoned middle ground interpretive approach, holding that the failure of the insured to read his
or her policy will not per se constitute negligence or laches to deprive the insured of the remedy
of contract reformation. Instead, the courts have interpreted the insurance policy as a reasonable
person would. See, e.g., Schafer v. Maxyland Casualty Co., 123 F. Supp. 873 (D.S.C. 1954);
Mogil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 26 N.W.2d 126 (Neb. 1947); Portella v. Sonnenberg, 181
A.2d 385 (N.J. Super. 1962). This latter approach realistically recognizes that few insureds do
in fact read or fully understand their insurance policies. See supra notes 22, 77 and
accompanying text
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4. In Order to Further Validate the Reasonable Expectations of
the Insured to Coverage, Any Exclusion, Exception, or
Limitation to Coverage Must Be Clearly, Expressly,
and Unambiguously Stated in the Insurance Contract.
Since insurance policies are often perceived to be contracts of adhesion
where the insurance company often has a superior bargaining position, and the
insured often must accept the policy on a take it or leave it basis; 170 since
insurers and their agents often promise the insured peace of mind coverage
protection without fully explaining the contractual conditions, limitations, or
exclusions in the policy; 171 and, since insurers normally possess a superior
information position to the insureds,172 the middle ground interpretive
170 See supra notes 21 and 109 and accompanying text
171 See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text
172 See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1047-48.
It is a point of general understanding that the average insurer is much more
sophisticated and knowledgeable than the average insured. ...
The insurer's superior position is the result of several factors. First, the insurer is a
repeat player in the business of insurance whereas the insured is an occasional player.
The average insured probably looks at her insurance contract twice: once, cursorily, when
the contract is formed and again, with much greater care, when a loss or claim arises
which the insured hopes is covered by the policy. The specialized assistance that
insurance brokers and risk managers provide is not generally available to the average
insured at the time of insurance contract formation. Insurers, on the other hand,
constantly review and revise their contracts as they (or the ISO) receive data that reflects
on loss experience, judicial decisions, sales experience, etc. The insurer has the added
benefit of experts in both law and risk management to provide advice concerning
whether its contract language adequately will address the "risk' the insurer is willing to
accept. Finally, the insurer has in its employ, or at its call, actuaries and underwriters
who can evaluate the data and price the risk. These assets simply are not available to the
average insured.
Id
See also STEMPEL, supra note 20, at 300.
The overall structure of insurance policy marketing thus tends to advantage the insurer
by conmitting the policyholder to an insurance policy based on premium price, coverage
limits, and a few high-profile policy terms without substantial haggling over most terms.
Although the insures edge from this structure is most pronounced in consumer lines of
coverage, the advantage tends to prevail for commercia lines as well, unless the
prospective policyholder is quite sophisticated and able to devote sufficient resources
from inside the cxnmpany or with outside resources (e.g., use of a broker who charges a
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approach to insurance contract disputes provides that in order to further
validate the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, such coverage
will be liberally construed by the court, and any exclusion, exception, or
limitation to coverage therefore must be clearly, expressly, and unambiguously
stated in the insurance contract. 173
This crucially important (but often overlooked) middle ground interpretive
rule provides additional supplemental protection to the insured in further
validating the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage. One example of
this interpretive rule is found in the case of Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Globe
Indemnity Co.,174 a case involving the infamous D.B. Cooper who highjacked
a Northwest Airlines airplane, demanded $200,000 in ransom money, and then
parachuted out of the airplane between Seattle, Washington and Portland,
Oregon. But when the insurance company argued that this bizarre event was
fee or commission) to the task of policy shopping and negotiation.
Id.
173 See, e.g., Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 795 (N.J. 1979) (holding that
any limitation in coverage must be described in clear and explicit language in the policy);
Stempel, supra note 17, at 824 n.106.
Readers should not lose sight of the fact that, in the majority of cases, even in states
enamored of the [Keeton] reasonable expectations approach, it appears that when
insurers have drafted reasonably clear [exclusionary] language, it has been enforced by
the courts. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Power-O-Peat, Inc., 907 F.2d 58, 59 (8th
Cir. 1990) (applying Minnesota law) (enforcing CGL exclusion for liability for
advertising injury), Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 606 P.2d 987, 991 (Idaho 1980)
(holding insurm exclusion for loss "arising out of riot, civil commotion or mob action"
prevents coverage of promoter for loss suffered by concessionaires from unruly mob,
Cochran v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Neb. 1978) (upholding insurer
exclusion of theft coverage unless "visible marks of forcible entry" present on exterior of
vehicle when a car was taken with a "jiggle key" that left no marks).
Id.
See also Farmers Alliance Mut Ins. Co. v. Bakke, 619 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1980)
(applying New Mexico law); Casey v. Transamerica Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 511 F.2d 577
(7th Cir. 1975) (applying Indiana law); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Poirier, 415 A.2d 882 (N.H.
1980); Kronfeld v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 385 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Butche
v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 187 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio 1962). See generally 2 GEORGE J. COUCH,
CYcLoPEuA OF INsuRANcE LAW § 15:93 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984) ("A risk that
comes naturally within the terms of a policy is not deemed to be excluded unless the intent of
the parties to exclude it appears clearly [in the policy].") (citing numerous case authority
supporting this interpretive rule).
174 225 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 1975).
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never intended to be covered, nor could it possibly constitute a covered loss
under the insurer's crime insurance policy, the court replied:
When that policy is read as a whole, we find it to be in the nature of a
blanket or all-risk policy, as opposed to one which covers only specified risks.
As defendant's counsel admitted in oral argument, mere unforeseeabillity of
the manner in which the loss was sustained will not per se constitute grounds
for the insurer to deny coverage. In the present case, where there is blanket
coverage and the risk at issue was not excluded, the insurer must fulfill its
contractual obligation to indemnify the insured. 175
A second example involving this exclusionary interpretive rule involves the
definition of "property damage" in property and liability insurance coverages.
Although a number of courts have interpreted property damage in its traditional
sense as applying only to physical loss or destruction of tangible property, 176 a
number of recent middle ground judicial decisions have held that in the absence
of a clear and an unambiguous contractual limitation or exclusion in the policy,
property damage should not be limited only to tangible physical loss, but can
also include intangible property loss, economic loss, and diminution in
value. 77 Due to this recurring coverage dispute between the insured on one
175 Id; see also Steamboat Dev. Corp. v. Bacjac Indus., Inc., 701 P.2d 127, 128 (Colo.
Ct App. 1985) (construction insurance contract) (an "all-risk' policy extends to risks not
usually covered under other insurance, and recovery is allowed for all losses other than those
resulting from a willfiul or fraudulent act of the insured, unless the policy contains specific
provisions expressly excluding a particular loss from coverage); Bryant v. Continental Ins. Co.,
466 P.2d 201, 202 (Wash. Ct App. 1970) (aircraft insurance contract) (the term "all risk"
ordinarily covers every loss that may happen except by fraudulent acts of the insured, and it is
not given a restrictive meaning). See generally 13 GEoRGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSLRANM LAW § 48:141 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1982) (All-risk policy coverage "will,
as a rule, be allowed for all fortuitous losses not resulting from [an insured's] misconduct or
fraud, unless the policy contains a specific provision expressly excluding the loss fiom
coverage.") (footnote omitted).
176 See, e.g., Quails v. Country Mut Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d 1288 (Ill. App. Ct 1984)
(rejecting the argument that diminution in value is sufficient in itself to constitute property
damage in a general liability insurance policy); see also Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405
A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979) (holding that comprehensive general liability policies are intended to
protect the insured from liability for injury or damage to the persons or property of others, and
they are not intended to pay the insured's purely economic losses).
177 See, e.g., McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indenr Co.,
711 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the term "property damage" does not require actual
physical damage but can include intangible damage such as the diminution in value of the
tangible property); see also Continental Casualty Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209
(Mass. 1984) (same holding); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enters., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450
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hand, who has a reasonable expectation of coverage, and the insurer on the
other hand, with a desire to limit its scope of coverage for property damage,
the definitional language within the Standard Commercial General Liability
Insurance (CGL) Policy was subseqently revised by the insurance industry to
expressly and unambiguously exclude recovery for property damage based
upon intangible property loss, pure economic loss, or diminution in value.178
A third example of this exclusionary interpretive rule deals with the
"pollution exclusion clause" in CGL policies relating to environmental losses.
One of the greatest challenges facing the American liability insurance industry
today deals with the major threat of pollution-related environmental liability.
Like mass tort and mass property damage cases, these environmental pollution
cases inevitably generate enormous legal disputes, often involving hundreds of
millions of dollars, between the insured and the insurer, and among primary
insurers, excess insurers, and reinsurers. 179 In the wake of this massive
explosion of pollution-related litigation, many manufacturers and other
commercial enterprises have sought to shift the financial burden of pollution
liability claims onto their insurance companies under their comprehensive
general liability insurance policies (now called commercial general liability
insurance policies or CGL policies for short). Basically, the insureds
vigorously contend that they have purchased coverage for pollution liability
under their CGL policies and have a reasonable expectation to such coverage,
and the insurance companies just as vigorously respond that they never
intended to cover such risks.180 Many liability insurance companies, in order to
avoid such pollution liability claims, drafted and incorporated various pollution
exclusion clauses into their CGL policies. According to insurance industry
(Min. 1977); 3 ROWLAND R LONG, THE LAW OF LiABrrTm INsuANcE, Appendix B § 6
(1981) C'There is nothing in the definition [of property damage] requiring physical injuy or
destruction to property. The guide to determination of coverage is the kind of property rather
than the kind of injury.").
178 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17, § 7.03[b]. Most property and liability
insurance companies are now defining property damage in their policies to mean "physical
injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period." EMEC
FtscHER& PmR SWImmR, PRNCLES oFINSuRANcE LAW 530-31 (2d ed. 1994).
179 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 942 (1988). Such liability may be based on the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988), or liability also may be based on state pollution statutes or upon state common
law principles such as nuisance. See, e.g., New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron
Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 157--61 (N.J. 1983). See generally OSRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note
17, cbs. 10.01-.05.
180 See, e.g., EMRI FISCHER & PETER SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 659-60,
678 (2d ed. 1994); see also Swisher, supra note 4, at 1070-73.
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commentators, the liability insurance companies devised these pollution
exclusion clauses to exclude all pollution coverage for pollution-related liability
insurance claims except for those claims arising from causative events that are
"sudden" and "accidental." That is to say, the general exclusion for pollution
liability claims was purportedly made, according to insurance industry
commentators, subject to a narrow exception for claims resulting from
polluting discharges that are both fortuitous or accidental and nonrecurrent,
isolated in time, or truly "sudden." 18'
Although a number of courts have interpreted CGL pollution exclusion
clauses in this exclusionary manner, 182 a number of other courts have not.'8 3
This latter group has held instead that the "sudden and accidental" exception to
the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous, and therefore the pollution
exclusion clause should be construed to have no independent meaning at all,
since it is construed by these courts as a restatement of the policy "occurrence"
clause, with its limitation of coverage based only upon injuries or damages that
are either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.' 84 Again,
181 See generall ,Nancer Ballard & Peter M Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy
of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CoRNaL L. REv. 610, 613-
19 (1990); Scott D. Marrs, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Validity and Applicability, 26 TORT &
INS. L.J. 662 (1991); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through
the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L. REv. 1237, 1241-51 (1986).
182 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437,
449-50 (D. Kan. 1990), affid, 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993); Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515-16 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut
Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342, 348-50 (E.D. Pa. 1987); International Minerals & Chem.
Corp. v. Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758, 765-69 (Ill. Ct App. 1988), appeal denied,
530 N.E.2d 246 (11 1988); Barmet, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201,202-03 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Ind., 555 N.E.2d 568, 572-73
(Mass. 1990), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533-34 (N.Y. 1989). Other judicial decisions are listed in
New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1195 n.60 (3d Cir.
1991) (applying Delaware law), cert denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993).
183 See, e.g., Pepper's Steel & Alloys Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541, 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Jonesville Prod. Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 402
N.W.2d 46 (Mich. Ct App. 1986); Kipin Indus. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 535 N.E.2d
334, 338 (Ohio Ct App. 1987); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724,
726-27 (Wyo. 1988). Additional judicial decisions are listed in New Castle County v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1195 n.61 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Delaware law),
cert denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993).
184 See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686,687-88 (Ga. 1989);
Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990,992-94
(N.J. Super. 1982); see also New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d
1162,1198 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Delaware law, and holding the pollution exclusion clause
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based upon this recurring coverage dispute between the insureds and insurers
regarding CGL pollution exclusion clauses, and with a potential liability of
staggering proportions, the insurance industry redrafted its CGL policy in 1986
to provide for a clear and unambiguous "absolute" pollution exclusion
provision. 85
This rule of liberally construing insurance coverage in the absence of clear
and unambiguous exclusionary language in the policy can be found in many
other areas of insurance contract law. For example, courts that apply a middle
ground interpretive approach to insurance contracts have generally held that a
tenant186 or subcontractor 187 may constitute an unnamed co-insured for
to be ambiguous.), cert denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993). "[The authority appears to be evenly
divided between the parties' competing constructions of the pollution exclusion clause, with
about half the cases holding that the clause bars coverage, and with the other half holding that it
does not." Id at 1195. But see Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assoc. Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 192-
93 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law, and holding that the pollution exclusion clause is
not ambiguous and bars coverage).
185 See also Budofsky v. Hartford ns. Co., 556 N.Y.S.2d 438,441 (Sup. Ct 1990).
A typical "absolute" pollution exclusion now provides:
This policy does not apply... to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, funmes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants
into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water, whether or not
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden or accidental
See, e.g., id.
A more abbreviated version of this absolute pollution exclusion states: "This insurance
does not apply to bodily injury, personal injury, or property damage arising out of pollution or
contamination caused by the discharge or escape of any pollutants or contaminants." See
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 406-07 (7th ed. 1994). However, litigation in this
complex area will continue well into the foreseeable future based upon present and future legal
controversies involving thousands of pre-1986 CGL policy coverage disputes. See generaly
Henrick & Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms: An Introduction and
Critique, 36 FED. INs. & CORP. CousEL Q. 319 (1986).
186 See, e.g., Monterey Corp. v. Hart, 224 S.E.2d 142, 144 (Va. 1976); Rizzuto v. Morris,
592 P.2d 688, 691 (Wash. CL App. 1979) (both holding that an unnamed tenant "stands in the
shoes" of the insured landlord for the purpose of defeating a subrogation action against the
tenant, in the absence of any clear limitation or exclusion in the policy language).
187 See, e.g., Frank Briscoe Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co. Inc., 713 F.2d 1500, 1503-04
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding that an insurer was barred from maintaining a subrogation action
against a subcontractor, because the subcontractor was an unnamed coinsured under the
policy). See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Insurance: Subrogation of Insurer
Compensating Owner or Contractor for Loss Under "Builder's Risk" Policy Against
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purposes of defeating an insurer's subrogation action, unless there was clear
and unambiguous exclusionary language in the insurance policy; and that
sexual harrassment claims under a multi-peril liability insurance policy 188 or
the transmission of a sexual disease under a homeowners insurance policy189
likewise would be covered unless there is clear and unambiguous exclusionary
language in the policy.
In summary, the middle ground interpretive approach to insurance
coverage disputes continues to recognize the traditional insurance law doctrine
holding that, in general, insurance contracts will be construed according to
general principles of contract law, unless modified or regulated by state statute,
or unless contrary to state public policy. 19 However, in order to validate the
reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, the middle ground
interpretive view of insurance coverage disputes also recognizes a number of
supplemental rules of construction in favor of the insured: (1) that insurance
contracts will be construed and interpreted in their ordinary sense, rather than
in a purely technical or legal sense, from the viewpoint of the untrained mind,
or the "common layperson in the marketplace"; 191 (2) that ambiguous
insurance contracts will be construed liberally in favor of the insured, subject to
extrinsic evidence, if any, to determine the parties' intent, and subject to a
sophisticated policyholder defense;192 (3) that based on the acts and
Allegedly Negligent Contractor or Subcontractor, 22 A.L.R.4th 701 (1983) and cases cited
therein.188 ee, e.g., Hamlin v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 461 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn. Ct
App. 1990) (holding that "personal injury" coverage is broader than "bodily injury" coverage,
and may include an affront to one's reputation, such as defamation. However, the insurer in this
case explicitly limited recovery in the policy to injury arising from torts that the insured did not
allege); NPS Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 517 A.2d 1211, 1212-14 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1986) (holding that the term "bodily injury" in the insurance policy included emotional
and psychological consequences allegedly resulting from sexual harrassment, and thus the
insum" was required to defend the insured in a sexual harrassment suit alleging emotional
distress and mental anguish).
189 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Eddy, 267 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (Cal. CL
App. 1990) (holding that the infliction of genital herpes by voluntary sexual intercourse came
under policy coverage for damages as a result of bodily injury, which included diseases); North
Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. Ct App. 1989) (holding that the
insurer had the duty to defend the insured Aio gave a woman genital herpes through
consensual sexual intercourse since "the claim is arguably within the scope of coverage'); S.S.
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 808 S.W.2d 668 (fex. Ct App. 1991) (similar holding to
the Eddy and North &acases), af'd, 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993).
190 See supranotes 73-97 and accompanying text.191 See supranotes 109-24 and accompanying text
192 See supranotes 125-43 and accompanying text.
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representations made by the insurer or its agents, the legal doctrines of waiver,
estoppel, election, and reformation of contract are also available to the insured
and should be liberally construed to validate the insured's reasonable
expectation of coverage; 193 and (4) that in order to further validate the
reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, any exclusion, exception, or
limitation to coverage must be clearly, expressly, and unambiguously stated in
the insurance contract.' 94 These are not the only middle ground rules of
insurance contract interpretation, 195 but arguably they are the most important
supplemental rules of insurance contract interpretation.
A middle ground interpretive approach still allows for a great deal of
judicial discretion in ascertaining and honoring the reasonable expectations of
the insured to coverage, but within delineated parameters of interpretive rules
that are supplemental to, rather than at variance with, the policy language
within the insurance contract itself. A middle ground interpretive view of
insurance contract disputes therefore recognizes the "text" of an insurance
contract, and at the same time it also recognizes the "context" of honoring the
reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage-without the necessity of
expressly adopting Professor Keeton's noncontractual doctrine of reasonable
expectations. 196
193 See supra notes 144-69 and accompanying text
194 See supra notes 170-89 and accompanying text195 For an extensive discussion of many additional supplementary rules of insurance
contract construction and interpretation, see STeaMEL, supra note 20.
196 See STEWPEL, supra note 20, at 358.
However, judicial use of the [Keeton] concept [of reasonable expectations] is often
unclear and inconsistent It appears to be most popular in only a weak or nonaggressive
form that links its use to policy text or merely adds the policyholder's expectations to the
list of other factors weighed in the course of rendering decision. Until curent concerns
about expanding tort liability, insurance availability, and rising costs are satisfactorily
resolved, the [Keeton] reasonable expectations approach is unlikely to see another
"growth spur' as it did in the 1970s, although one might see a steadily increasing
acceptance in the coming decades as a generation taught under the dominance of Prof
Keeton's scholarship begins to occupy the bench.
Id.
On the other hand, one might still question how future generations of the judiciary may in
fact interpret instrance contract disputes. See supra notes 36-61 and accompanying text
Professor Stempel concludes that "In sum, the reasonable expectations principle, if not the
doctrine, appears to be on the insurance scene to stay, and properly so." STEiPEL, supra note
20, at 358. To Professor Stempel's lucid observation, this author would also add: "A
contractually-besed interpretation of insurance coverage disputes likewise appears to be on the
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V. ILLUSTRATiVE EXAMPLES OF THE MIDDLE GROUND APPROACH IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate every aspect of American
insurance law where a judicial middle ground interpretive approach may be
applied in analyzing and deciding insurance contract disputes. The selected
topics discussed below, however, further illustrate how this middle ground
interpretive approach successfully retains the best elements of a contractually
based Formalistic approach, while at the same time adopting certain
Functionalistic principles in order to validate the reasonable expectations of the
insured to coverage.
A. Negotiating the Insurance Contract
Since the insured frequently is an unsophisticated layperson or common
man or woman in the marketplace, 197 and since insurance often is sold by
appealing to the insured's peace of mind and his or her reasonable expectation
of coverage, 198 the negotiation and formation of an insurance contract offers
important examples of how a middle ground interpretive approach recognizes
the contractual terms of the insurance policy, while still recognizing the
reasonable expectation of the insured to coverage.
1. Conditional Receipt Coverage Disputes in Life Insurance Applications
Whether or not a so-called "conditional receipt" for life insurance or a
"binding receipt" for property or liability insurance constitutes temporary
insurance or not-and under what conditions-has been subject to a great deal
of insurance litigation. The interests of the insured who desires immediate
protection against a risk of loss, and the needs of the insurer in attempting to
insurance scene to stay, and properly so." Indeed, the Keeton reasonable expectations
principle-if not the doctrine-can be readily subsumed into a middle ground interpretive
approach of insurance contract disputes without varying significantly from the express terms of
the policy language. See supra notes 73-196 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 197-
315. Accordingly, under these middle ground supplemental rules of insurance contract
interpretation, even those jurisdictions that have expressly adopted the Keeton reasonable
expectation doctrine arguably ought to apply the Keeton doctrine only as a last resort rather
than as a prinmy mode of judicial interpretation. See supra notes 9, 24-34, 62, 164-65 and
accompanying text197 See supranotes 109-15 and accompanying text.
198 See supranotes 144-46 and accompanying text.
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limit an undesirable risk distribution, are both legitimate concerns. 199
Binding receipts are almost always contracts of temporary insurance since
liability and property insurance agents normally are general agents who have
the power to bind their principal insurer to a temporary contract based upon
their express or implied authority, absent any language of express limitation in
the insurance contract. 200 For example, statements by general agents, such as
"You're covered" or "I'll take care of it," have been held to constitute oral
binders of temporary insurance.201 Life insurance agents, on the other hand,
normally are soliciting agents rather than general agents, and do not have the
power to create coverage in a life insurance contract absent approval from their
home office,2°2 so life insurance agents normally can only give conditional
receipts rather than binding receipts. 20 3
199 See generaly EMER FcisciR & Pz'aR SWmER, P~iNcWiLEs OF INSLuRANCE LAW 24-
30 (2d ed. 1994); JERRY, supra note 43, at 148-55; KEETON & WIDISs, supra note 23, § 2.3, at
52-70.200 See, e.g., State Auto. Mut Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 220 N.W.2d 717,722 (Mich. Ct. App.
1974) (as a general nile a binder may be written or oral and founded upon the words or deeds of
the agent).
201 See, e.g., American Universal Ins. Co. v. Kruse, 306 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1962)
(applying Montana law); Turner v. Worth Ins. Co., 472 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Ariz. 1970); Julien v.
Spring Lake Park Agency, Inc., 166 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. 1969); L.A. Bradshaw,
Annotation, Temporay Automobile Insurance Pending Issuance of Policy, 12 A.L.R.3d 1304
(1967).
202 Life insurance agents, however, may still bind their principal insurer under the doctrine
of apparent or ostensible authority. See, e.g., Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.
2d 1172, 1181 (Miss. 1990) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that
agents for a life insurer were cloaked with apparent authority to form an immediate binding
contract with the insureds based upon the testimony of a life insurance company executive and
agent, as well as the blantant failure by the insurer to provide notice to the insureds of any
restrictions or limitations on its agents' authority to avert misleading or fraudulent
misrepresentations); see also Weaver v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 545 F. Supp. 74, 78 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) (ambiguous "sales aids" provided by the insurer gave the agent the apparent
authority to make coverage promises to the insured that would bind his principal insurer).
2 03 See, e.g., Arnold P. Anderson, Life Insurance Conditional Receipts and Judicial
Intervention, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 593, 593 (1980); Alan I. Widiss, Life Insurance Applications
and Interim Coverage Disputes: Revisiting Controversies About Conditional Binding
Receipts, 75 IowA L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1990); Note, Life Insurance Policies and "Binding"
Receipts: Is the Insurer Bound?, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 448, 448; Comment, Life Insurance
Receipts: The Mystery of the Non-Binding Binder, 63 YALE L.J. 523, 523 (1954).
Geinerally speaking, instead of unconditional temporary coverage, many life insurance
companies offer applicants who pay a first premium deposit a "conditional receipt"
commitment that if an applicant is an acceptable risk, the effective date of the coverage will
precede the actual delivery of the policy to the applicant In other words, the insurance company
Vol. 57:543
INSURANCE CONTRACTDISPUrlS
To make matters more complicated, American courts generally have
interpreted conditional receipt insurance coverage disputes as falling within one
of three distinct categories: "approval" type conditional receipts; "satisfaction"
type conditional receipts; or unconditional temporary or interim insurance.2°4
On one hand, some courts have interpreted conditional receipts by strictly
construing the language found within the life insurance application to constitute
only an approval type conditional receipt, and these courts have held that no
contract of insurance exists until the insurer actually approves of the insured as
a satisfactory risk.205 An approval type conditional receipt, however, provides
illusory coverage since the applicant for insurance receives nothing upon its
issuance, while still having to tender an initial premium payment. 2°6 On the
other hand, a number of courts have held that the insured is entitled to
unconditional temporary or interim insurance until the insurer properly notifies
the applicant that his or her insurance application has been rejected by the
insurer. 20 7 The judicial rationale for recognizing unconditional temporary or
interim insurance coverage in conditional receipt controversies has been based
upon one of three legal doctrines: (1) the reasonable expectations of the
applicant to immediate interim coverage should be honored even though this
may not be what the insurer actually intended; 208 (2) the insured is covered
states that its coverage will be made retroctive to some point in time, such as when the
application was made or when the medical examination was completed. See KEON & WIDxss,
supra note 23, at 151-53.
204 See, e.g., Simpson v. Prdential Ins. Co. of Arm, 177 A.2d 417, 422-23 (Md. 1962);
see also JERRY, supra note 43, at 151-53.
205 See, e.g., Union Life Ins. Co. v. Rhinehart, 315 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Ark. 1958);
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Etheridge, 154 S.E.2d 369, 370-72 (Ga. 1967); see
also C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Temporay Life, Acciden; or Health Insurance Pending
Approval orlssuance ofPolicy, 2 A-LR.2d 943,964-67 (1948) and Later Case Service.
206 See JERRY, supra note 43, at 151. Judge Learned Hand was an early vocal critic of the
"approval" type conditional receipts, arguing that these life insurance applications preted on
"persons utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance" who would "read it
colloquially" and reasonably expect coverage. Gaunt v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d
599,601 (2d Cir.) (applying Connecticut law), cert denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).2 07 See JERRY, supra note 43, at 152; KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 23, at 58-62.
20 9 See, e.g., Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353-54 (Pa. 1978)
(holding that even though the terms of the life insurance application and conditional receipt
unambiguously provided that no tempora ry contract for insurance was created, the term of the
contract would be ignored in favor of the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Gdovic v. Catholic Knights of St. George, 453 A.2d 1040, 1042
(Pa. Super. 1982) (holding that although the insurer might not have intended to provide
temporary interim insurance, nevertheless by accepting the applicant's premium the insurer had
the burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant did not have a
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because the terms of the conditional receipt were ambiguous; 209 or (3) the
terms of the conditional receipt are unconscionable and against state public
policy. 210
Other courts have adopted a more balanced middle ground analysis to
conditional receipt coverage disputes through a satisfaction type interpretive
approach that recognizes both the contractual language of the conditional
receipt and the applicant's reasonable expectation of coverage. Under a
satisfaction type conditional receipt, if the insurance company determines that
the applicant is insurable as a standard risk, then the insurance relates back to
the date of the application, but if the applicant is deemed to be uninsurable as a
standard risk, then no contract of insurance arises. 211 The rationale underlying
reasonable basis for believing that he or she was purchasing immediate interim insurance
coverage); see also Sanchez v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 974, 977 (Colo. Ct
App. 1984) (holding that an insurer who wishes to avoid liability must not only use clear and
unequivocal language evidencing its intent to limit temrporay coverage, but it must also call
such limiting conditions to the attention of the applicant that an ordinary layman would
understand). But see Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 261 N.W.2d 804, 807 (S.D.
1977) (holding that when a conditional receipt stated in boldface letters "IMPORTANT: This
Receipt Does NOT Provide Any Insurance Until Afer Its Conditions Are Met". "the ordinary
meaning of the words ... would alert any ordinary person to understand what had to be
completed before the temporary or interim insurance would be effective"); Jacobson v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 652 P.2d 909,911 (Utah 1982) (similar holding).
209 See, e.g., DeFouxe v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 596 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Ark. Ct App. 1980)
(holding that conditional receipts are subject to interpretation under the doctrine of ambiguities,
and finding that an ambiguity existed in the conditional receipt as to when the appellant and her
children were insurable); Simses v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 394 A.2d 710, 714-
15 (Conn. 1978) (holding that a conditional receipt was ambiguous since the plaintiff could
reasonably expect coverage to take effect on a certain date, and the insurer easily could have
stated in exact language that the life insurance coverage would not take effect until the company
actually determined that the applicant was a standard risk, but the insurer chose instead to use
ambiguous language).
210 See, e.g., Glamer v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591, 595-96 (Min. Ct App. 1991)
(holding that a provision in the conditional receipt was ambiguous, and even if the clause were
given the interpretation asserted by the insurer, the conditional receipt was still unconscionable
under Minnesota law, the court further applied the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations
as adopted by the Minnesota cous).
211 See, e.g., Smith v. North Am Co. for Life & Health Ins., 775 F.2d 777, 778 (7th Cir.
1985) (applying Wisconsin law); Hildebrand v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 455 N.E.2d 553, 563
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 177 A.2d 417, 425 (Md. 1962); Damm v.
National Ins. Co., 200 N.W.2d 616, 619-20 (N.D. 1972); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co.,
666 P.2d 245, 247 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 261
N.W.2d 804,808 (S.D. 1977); Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 537 (Utah
1979).
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this middle ground interpretive approach in conditional receipt coverage
disputes was stated by an Illinois appellate court in the case of Hildebrand v.
Franklin Life Insurance Co. :212
Without expressing a view on approval receipts and interim coverage, we
conclude that an insurance company's good faith rejection of an applicant
under a ["satisfaction" type conditional] receipt may have retroactive effect.
This solution fairly balances the applicant's interest in prompt protection, if
available, against the insurer's interest in accepting only risks which are
insurable under its underwriting standards, gives some effect to all the terms
used in the [conditional receipt] binder, and does not conflict with past
decisions of the Illinois courts.2 13
This middle ground conditional receipt approach fairly balances the
contractual language in the insurance application with the reasonable
expectation of the applicant to coverage without expressly adopting any
Functionalistic doctrinal bias in favor of either party. Alternatively, a middle
ground court may also apply the legal doctrines of contract ambiguity214 or
unconscionability215 to conditional receipt contract disputes.
Thus, as Professor Alan Widiss observes, if insurers are to avoid liability
while life insurance applications are being processed, "it is absolutely essential
that conditional receipts be written in unambiguous, clearly comprehensible
terms and that sales representatives fully explain those provisions, as well as
the choices available to applicants." 216
212 455 N.E.2d 553 (M. App. Ct. 1983).
213Id at 563; see also Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 177 A.2d 417, 425 (Md. 1962);
WwT, supra note 20.
Other advantages that would accrue to the applicant from the ["satisfaction" type
conditional receipt] analysis are (a) that the policy would become incontestable sooner,
(b) that the policy would reach maturity earlier with corresponding acceleration of
dividends and cash surender, and (c) that if the insured's birthday fell between the date
of the application and the date of approval, the premium would be computed at the lower
rate.
Id at 289 n.248.
214 See supra notes 125-43, 209 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 95-97, 210 and accompanying text.
2 16 Alan I. Widiss, Life Insurance Applications and Interim Coverage Disputes:
Revisiting Controversies About Conditional Binding Receipts, 75 IoWA L. REv. 1097, 1117
(1990). Professor Widiss fiuiher suggests that the interests of consumers "would be even better
served by offering those customers who want interim protection the option of buying a
tempomy life insurance policy that would provide protection until either the coverage sought by
19961
OHIO STA7ELAWJOURNAL
2. Insurer's Delay in Acting upon the Insurance Application
The courts also are deeply divided on the question of an insurer's liability
for any unreasonable delay in acting upon an insurance application. Those
courts applying a strict Formalistic contractual analysis to the issue of an
insurer's unreasonable delay in acting on an insurance application have
concluded that a "mere delay" in passing upon an application for insurance
cannot be construed as acceptance by the insurer so as to support any
contractual remedy.217 The traditional rationale for this rather severe
contractual rule is that an application for insurance is only a "mere offer"
which must be accepted by the insurer before an insurance contract comes into
being.218 On the other hand, a number of state courts have recognized a
separate tort action, referred to as the "negligent delay" theory. The negligent
delay theory, generally stated, is that an insurance company is under a duty to
act upon an application for insurance within a reasonable period of time, and a
violation of that duty, with resultant damages, will subject the insurer to tort
liability based upon its negligence.219
the applicant goes into effect or the individual is notified that the application has been rejected."
Id.at 1118.
217 See, e.g., Justice v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 351 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1965) (applying
Virginia law); see also Usher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 218 N.W.2d 201 (Minn. 1974) (holding that
there is no remedy in contract or tort for an insurer's unreasonable delay); Cameron v. First
Nat'l Bank, 607 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Mont 1980) ('It is a well-settled rule, established by the
great weight of authority, that mere delay in passing upon an application for insurance cannot
be construed as acceptance thereof by the insurer, so as to support an action ex contractu.");
Hayes v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 96 S.E.2d 109 (Va. 1957) (holding that "mere delay" on the
part of the insurer in failing to act upon an application for insurance does not of itself create a
contract, nor estop the insurer from denying that any contract was made, and retention of the
premium by the insurer is immaterial).
218 See, e.g., Giddings v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 U.S. 108 (1880); see also
Annotation 15 A.L.R. 1026 (1921); Annotation, Rights and Remedies Arising Out of Delay in
Passing upon an Application for Insurance, 32 A.L.R.2d 487, 493 (1995); 1 GEORGE J.
CoucH CYCLOPEDiA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 7:24-:26 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984).
2 19 See, e.g., Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 210 F. Supp. 735, 738 (W.D. S.C. 1962)
(applying South Carolina law); Continental Life & Accident Co. v. Songer, 603 P.2d 921, 929
(Ariz. CL App. 1979); Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 503 So. 2d 376, 378
(Fla. Dist App. Ct. 1987); Talbot v. County Life Ins. Co., 291 N.E.2d 830 (111. Ct App. 1973);
see also Kristine Kamezis, Annotation, Liability ofInsurerfor Damages Resulting from Delay
in Passing upon an Application for Life Insurance, 1 A.L.R.4th 1202, 1229-30 (1980);
Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Liability of Insurer for Damages Resulting from Delay in
Passing upon an ApplicationforHealth Insurance, 18 A.L.R.4h 1115, 1132-34 (1982).
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Between these two irreconcilable extremes a number of other state courts
have adopted a realistic middle ground approach which, although it still retains
a contractual analytical basis, also recognizes the reasonable expectation of the
insured to coverage. This middle ground contractual approach holds that the
retention of the premium by the insurer and the failure to reject the insurance
application in a timely manner is tantamount to acceptance of the insurable risk
and is an inconsistent rejection of the application offer. 220 Alternately, other
middle ground courts have held that although acceptance of an insurance
application may not be inferred from the insurer's delay in acting upon it, the
insurer nevertheless may be estopped from denying acceptance, or may be held
to have waived its acceptance of the application.221 Once again, this middle
ground interpretive view constitutes the better reasoned judicial approach since
it still retains a contractual basis in the interpretation of insurance coverage
disputes, but at the same time it honors the reasonable expectation of the
Various courts during the past 75 years have considered the question of whether an action
by an insurd against a liability insurer for failing to settle a tort claim against a third party
plaintiff is predicated on: (1) the breach of a contractual obligation; (2) a failure to exercise due
care on behalf of its insured which warrants tort liability, or (3) both grounds. See, e.g., Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); see also KEEION & Wixss, supra note 23, at 877-
79; Milton R. Roberts, Annotation, Insurer's Tort Liability for Consequential or Punitive
Danages for Wrongful Failure or Refusal to Defend Insured, 20 A.L.R.4th 23, 58 (1983). A
number of middle ground courts have split on the issue of whether or not such tort liability is
warranted, and to what extent Although tort liability against an insurer is beyond the scope of
this Article, it presently constitutes an alternative cause of action for a number of middle ground
courts.
2 20 This middle ground remedy is based on the theory that an unreasonable delay in acting
on an insurance application, along with the retention of the premium, may imply an acceptance
of the application, since retention of the premium under these circumstances is inconsistent with
a rejection of the risk. See, e.g., Harvey v. United Ins. Co., 245 P.2d 1185, 1188-91 (Kan.
1952); Cartwright v. Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co., 247 N.W.2d 298 (Mich. 1976); Szlapa v.
National Traveler's Ins. Co., 233 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Allen v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 638 (N.J. 1965); Peddicord v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 498 P.2d 1388,
1390 (Okla. 1972); Brand v. International Investors Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 423, 426 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1974); see also Kamezis, supra note 219, at 1223-27; Nadel, supra note 219, at 1126-
29.
221 See, e.g., Depositors Trust Co. v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 445 A.2d 1014, 1019
(Me. 1982) C'An insurer's unreasonable delay in acting upon an application for a policy of
insurance on which a premium has been paid is alone sufficient to estop the insurer from
denying coverage, both because the insurer has sought to retain the premium without accepting
the corresponding risk and because the insurer has significantly preempted the applicant from
seeking coverage elsewhere."); Barnes v. Atlantic & Pacific Life Ins. Co., 325 So. 2d 143 (Ala.
1975); Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 73 S.E.2d 688 (S.C. 1952); see also Kamezs,
supra note 219, at 1216-19; Nadel, supra note 219, at 1125.
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insured to coverage when there is an unreasonable delay by the insurer in
acting upon the insurance application.
3. Misrepresentations by the Insured in the Insurance Application
Misrepresentations made by the insured222 in providing incorrect
information in an insurance application have resulted in confusion and
inconsistent treatment in a number of state courts and legislatures. 223 The
courts have had a great deal of trouble in two crucial interpretive areas: (1)
2 2 2 For Misrepresentations of coverage by the insurer or its agents, courts oflen apply the
doctrines of waiver and estoppel against the insurer. See supra notes 149-54, infra notes 243-
47 and accompanying text; see also 4 GEORGE J. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§§ 26A:1--126 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984).223 See, e.g., KEETON& WDiSS, supra note 23, at 569.
More than one commentator has used characterizations such as "confised",
"erroneous" "misleading", and "inconsistent" to describe the body of law (legislative
provisions and the judicial decisions interpreting those laws or applying common law
principles) that determines the rights of the parties to an insurance contract when it is
subsequently discovered that an application for insurance coverage contained incorrect
information.
Id.
See also PATrESN, supra note 43, at 378-79, 382-85.
A representation is a statement made by the applicant for insurance or by someone acting
for him and by his authority, to the prospective insurer, before the making of the contract
of insurance ....
A representation has legal consequences only if it is relied upon and thus induces
the insum to make a contract which it would not otherwise have made....
The law of misrepresentation is frequently identified with the law of fraud. This is
eroneous. The latter is only a part of the former.... Probably in most of the United
States an innocent misrepresentation is available as a defense to an action brought upon a
contract thus induced. Yet in many courts the confusion persists, with uncertainty in the
law.
... The law of misrepresentation has thus become unsettled and confused in many
jurisdictions. The sources of this confusion are twofold. One is the failure to distinguish
between freud and innocent misrepresentation. . . . The other distinction often
overlooked is that between statements of fact and statements of opinion.
Vol. 57:543
INSURANCE CONRACTDISPU7ES
defining what "materiality" actually means; and (2) making a distinction
between an insured's statement of fact, and an insured's statement of
opinion.224
It is a well recognized insurance law principle that insurers have a legal
right and a legitimate interest in protecting themselves from issuing policy
coverage on substandard or unacceptable risks, and therefore insurers generally
possess the legal right to rescind coverage based upon any material
misrepresentations of the insured in his or her insurance application. 2 s
Although most states today recognize that a material misrepresentation made by
the insured in an application for insurance may be either a fraudulent or an
innocent misrepresentation, 226 the courts have been at odds in defining what
2 2 4 See PATEWSON, supra note 43.
225 See generally KEE.TON & WIDS, supra note 23, at 527-37; JERRY, supra note 43;
Jane Ml Draper, Annotation, Recission or Cancellation of Insurance Policy for Insured's
Misrepresentation or Concealment of Information Concerning Human Immunnodeficiency
Virus (HMJ), Acquired Immunodeficiency Sydrome (AIDS), or Related Health Problems, 15
A.L.R.5th 92 (1993) (discussing misrepresentations or concealment of HIV, AIDS, and other
related health problems); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Fire Insurance: Failure to Disclose Prior
Fires Affecting Insured's Property As Ground for Avoidance Policy, 4 A.L.R-5th 117 (1992)
(discussing failure to disclose prior fires in property insurance applications); William H. Danne
Jr., Annotation, Modem Status of Rules Regarding Immateriality and Effect of False
Statement by Insurance Applicant As to Previous Insurance Cancellations or Rejections, 66
A.L.R.3d 749 (1975) (discussing misrepresentations of previous insurance cancellations); E.T.
Tsai, Annotation, Insured's Lack of Knowledge of Adverse Health Conditions Affecting
Applicabiliy of "Good Health" Clause in Insurance Policy, 30 A.L.R.3d 389 (1970)
(discussing misrepresentation of "good health" clauses in insurance applications); see infra
note 227. Compulsory insurance coverage that is mandated by state law-such as automobile
liability insurance-places additional statutory limitations on an insurer's right to rescind its
contractual obligations based upon the misrepresentations of the insured in his or her
automobile insuaance application. See, e.g., Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Cancellation of
Compulsory or "Financial Responsibility" Automobile Insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th 13 (1986)
(discussing an insurer's right to cancel compulsory automobile insurance coverage).
226 See, e.g., FLA STAT. § 627.409 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 154 (Smith-Hurd
1993); N.Y. INs. Law § 3106 (McKinney 1993); VA. CoDE ANN. § 38.2-309 (Michie 1993);
see also PATmRSON, supra note 43, at 385 ('the doctrine that innocent misrepresentation of
material fact [as well as fraudulent misrepresentationl suffices to make the policy voidable is
still law by the decided weight of authority"); Continental Assurance Co. v. Carroll, 485 So. 2d
406 (Fla. 1986); Kulikowski v. Roslyn Say. Bank, 503 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986);
Evans v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 455 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio CL App. 1982). But see Banks
McDowell, The Misrepresentation Defense in Insurance: A Problem for Contract Theory, 16
CONN. L. REy. 513 (1984) (arguing that only intentionally fraudulent misstatements by the
insured should be a ground for rescinding the insurer's contractual obligation in order to
validate the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage).
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actually constitutes such a "material" misrepresentation. 227
Some courts have interpreted the test of materiality under a traditional and
subjective "particular insurer" standard: Would this particular insurer, had it
known the truth of the insured's misrepresentation, have charged a substantially
higher premium or refused to cover the risk of loss?228 Other courts, however,
have adopted the better-reasoned objective test of materiality under a
"reasonably prudent insurer" standard: Would a reasonably prudent insurer in
the community, had it known the truth of the insured's misrepresentation, have
charged a substantially higher premium or refused to cover the risk of loss?229
2 27 See, e.g.,KEETON& WIlxss, supra note 23, at 570.
An insurer is entitled to relief on the basis that an insured provided incorrect information
in an insmrance application, when it is proved (1) that the information was not correct,
(2) that the information received was important either to the insurer's decision to insure
or to the term of the insurance contract; (that is, the information was "material"), and
(3) that the insurer in fact relied on the incorrect information.
Id.
See also JERRY, supra note 43, at 527.
A representation is a statement either oral or written, made by the insured to the insurer
which forms at least part of the basis on which the insurer decides to enter into the
contract If a representation (1) is untrue or misleading, (2) is material to the risk, and (3)
is relied upon by the insurer in agreeing to issue the policy at a specified premium, the
insurer can void the policy or refuse a claim for payment of proceeds on account of the
misrepresentation (unless the policy has become incontestible).
Id.
2 28 See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kuhlenschmidt, 33 N.E.2d 340 (nd. 1941);
Fagen v. National Home Life Ins. Co., 473 So. 2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1985); see also VANCE,
supra note 43, at 375-76, 407; 7 WIGMORE ON EVIENCE § 1946 (1978 rev. ed.). This
"particular insurer" test of materiality, however, could reward a capricious "particular insurer"
who might employ some questionable or unreasonable underwriting standards not shared by
other "prudent insurers in the community." See EMERmC FISCHER & PETER SWISHER,
PRINCIPLES OF NSURANCE LAW 319-20 (2d ed. 1994).
229 See, e.g., Nappier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 961 F.2d 168, 170 (11th Cir. 1992) ('A
material misrepresentation is one that would influence a prudent insurer in deciding whether to
assume the risk of providing coverage."); Penn Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Say. Bank &
Trust Co., 72 F. 413, 430 (6th Cir. 1896) ('Are you able to say, from your knowledge of the
practice and usage among life insurance companies generally, that information of this fact
would have enhanced the premium to be charged, or would have led to a rejection of the
risk?"); 18 GEOARGE J. CoucH, CYCLoPEDtA OF INSURANCE LAW § 69:120 (Mark S. Rhodes,
rev. 2d ed. 1983) (stating a clear preference for this middle ground prudent insurer objective
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This middle ground interpretive view of a "reasonably prudent" insurer
continues to recognize the contractual implications of a fraudulent or an
innocent material misrepresentation in an insurance application, but at the same
time it protects the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage against
possible rescission by a capricious or unreasonable "particular insurer."2 0
A second important and much-litigated issue involving insurance coverage
disputes is whether an insured has misrepresented a statement of fact or merely
given his or her good faith opinion in an insurance application. For example, if
an insurer asks an applicant if he or she is in "good health" and the applicant,
unaware that he or she has a serious latent illness, answers "yes," may the
insurer rescind its contract based upon the applicant's innocent-but material-
misrepresentation? Once again, the courts are deeply split on this issue. Some
courts have held that a good health provision in an insurance application means
"precisely what it says," that the insured must be in good health as a condition
precedent to the insurer's liability. 231 Other courts, however, have adopted a
rule, rather than the traditional particular insurer subjective rule); see also Oakes v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, Inc., 317 S.E.2d 315 (Ga. Ct App. 1984); Burnham v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 470 P.2d 261 (Utah 1970).
23 0 See JERRY, supra note 43, at 531-32.
As between the tw tests, the objective [reasonably prudent insurer] test is more
consist=t with general contract law, the rules of which are generally premised on what a
reasonable person in the shoes of the contracting party would believe the other party's
manifestations mean in context
Id
Arguably, a Functionalistic approach to this materiality issue would be either to ignore the
underlying contractual implications in favor of honoring the reasonable expectations of the
insured to coverage, or perhaps to limit the insurer's rescission rights only to fraudulent
misrepresentations. See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 226.
231 See, e.g., Ruwitch v. William Penn Life Assurance Co., 966 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir.)
(applying Missouri law) (holding that the "good health" clause in the life insurance application
was a condition precedent to coverage and allowed the insurer to rescind the contract, even
though the insured applicant was unaware that he had colon cancer), cert denied, 506 U.S 919
(1992); Leach v. Miller's Life Ins. Co., 400 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Mississippi
law) (holding that the requirement that the insured be in good health was a condition precedent
to coverage, and it was immaterial that the applicant did not know that he had cirrhosis of the
liver); see also Huffinan v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 174 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. Ct App. 1970);
American Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. John R. Corley Co., 73 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Ct Civ. App. 1934);
Grover v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 125 A.2d 571 (Vt. 1956).
Under this strict contractual interpretation of a "good health" clause in an insurance
application, good health would mean the applicant's actual good health in fact. and under this
traditional doctrine the insured's knowledge of any latent illness is "entirely immaterial." See
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better reasoned middle ground approach that seeks to honor the reasonable
expectation of the applicant to coverage by holding that the good health test
should not be based on the factual accuracy of the applicant's representation,
but it should be based on the applicant's opinion and good faith belief in his or
her representation of sound health. 232 A number of middle ground courts also
have held that representations in most insurance applications need be only
"substantially correct" rather than being literally true, in order to protect the
reasonable expectations of the applicant to coverage. 233
Finally, a number of courts have adopted the so-called Stipcich doctrine,
holding that an insured has an affirmative duty to disclose to the insurer any
changes that materially affect the risk of loss that come to the knowledge of the
insured after the application for insurance has been completed but before the
insurance policy has been delivered. 234 The rationale underlying Stipcich is
that:
generally Tsai, supra note 225, at 406-10; 1 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMA,
INsuRANcELAwANDPRACTc § 154 (rev. ed. 1981).
232 See, e.g., Harte v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1967) (holding that
a "good health" provision does not bar recovery under a life insurance policy where the
applicant believes in good faith that he is in good health since it is the insured's own knowledge
of the state of his or her health which is decisive); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Lee, 166
S.E. 253 (Ga. Ct. App. 1932) (holding that the good health test is not the accuracy, but the good
faith of the insured's representation of sound health); National Aid Life Ass'n v. Persing, 63
P.2d 35 (Okla. 1935) (holding that an expression of good health as used in an application for
life insurance means apparent good health without any ostensible or known symptoms of the
disorder); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Devore, 424 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1967); Lynch v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 235 A.2d 406 (Pa. 1967); Madsen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
156 A.2d 203 (R.I. 1959); United States Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 289 S.E.2d 407 (S.C. 1982); Sharp
v. Richmond Life Ins. Co., 183 S.E.2d 132 (Va. 1971); Tsai, supranote 225, at 397-401.
2 33 See, e.g., Holtzclaw v. Bankers Mut. Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co., 442 N.E.2d 1362 Il. App. Ct 1982); see also JERRY, supra
note 43, at 528-30.
2 34 Stipoich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1928). Although the Stipoich
doctrine has been applied most frequently to life and health insurance disputes, it has also been
applied to other types of insurance as well, such as property and liability insurance. See, e.g.,
Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Moss, 298 N.E.2d 304 (11. App. CL 1973); see also 9 GEORGE J.
CoucH, CYCLOPEDiAOF INSURANCE LAW § 38:21 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1985) ('there is
a continuing duty on the part of the applicant to disclose newly discovered matters arising
between the application for, and the confirmation of, the contract where they come to the
applicant's knowledge and render his former answers no longer true"); 12A JOHN A.
APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACICEn § 7275 (rev. ed. 1981) ('the
insured is under a duty to disclose to the insurer all facts affecting the risk which arise after the
application and before the contract has been consummated"). See generally KEETON & Wmiss,
supra note 23, at 574-76; JERRY, supra note 43, at 536-37.
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[E]ven the most unsophisticated person must know that in answering the
questionaire and submitting it to the insurer he is furnishing the data on the
basis of which the company will decide whether, by issuing a policy, it wishes
to insure him. If, while the company deliberates, he discovers facts which
make portions of his application no longer true, the most elementary spirit of
fair dealing would seem to require him to make a full disclosure. If he fails to
do so the company may, despite its acceptance of the application, decline to
issue a policy, or if a policy has been issued, it has a valid defense to a suit
upon it.2 35
Although many courts have applied the Stipcich doctrine by operation of
law, 236 the better reasoned middle ground approach would be that a court, in
order to validate the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, apply
the Stipcich doctrine only when such a requirement is clearly, expressly, and
unambiguously stated in the insurance application.237 For example, in the case
of Cosby v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co.,238 a federal district
court held that the Stipcich doctrine would apply to an insured who failed to
inform his insurer of a change in his health and his hospitalization for a brain
tumor that occurred after the insurance application had been completed, but
before the insurance contract had been accepted by the insurer. However, in
this particular case the insurance application contained the following express
language: "All of the statements and answers given in this application to the
best of my knowledge and belief continue to be true and complete as of the
date of delivery of the policy."239 Thus, the applicant was bound by this
contractual limitation that was clearly, expressly, and unambiguously stated in
the insurance application. Other middle ground courts likewise have held that
unless an insurer specifically requests information, a prospective insured is
under no duty to volunteer it.240
235 Shpcich, 277 U.S. at 316-17 (citations omitted); see also Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 5 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Illinois law); MacKenzie v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1969) (applying Kentucky law); Mayes v.
Massachusetts Mut Life Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 612 (fex. 1980); United States Life Ins. Co. v.
Coulson, 560 S.W.2d 211 ("ex. Civ. App. 1977).
236 The Stipcich Court further stated that the failure of the insurance company to stipulate
in the application or the policy that disclosure by the insured was required did not relieve the
applicant of the duty to do so. Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318; see also supra notes 234-35 and
authority cited therein.
237 See, e.g., supra notes 170-89 and accompanying text.
238 860 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (applying Georgia law).
239 Id. at 832 (emphasis added).
240 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co., Inc. v. Shirah, 466 So. 2d 940 (Ala. 1985); Graham v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 132 S.E.2d 273 (S.C. 1963); US Life Credit Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981); see also JERRY, supra note 43, at 540.
19961
OHIO STA7E LAWJOURNAL
B. May Coverage Be Extended by Waiver and Estoppel?
Although a large majority of state courts have stated that the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend coverage that was expressly
excluded in the insurance policy, 241 there are important exceptions to this
general rule.242
First, a number of courts have held that an insurer will be estopped from
denying coverage whenever its agent, in selling the policy, misrepresents the
scope of coverage to the insured and the insured justifiably relies on the agent's
misrepresentations to his or her detriment. 243 A major problem with this
expansion of coverage doctrine based upon an agent's misrepresentations,
however, is that under a middle ground contractual approach, the insured also
is under the duty to read his or her policy as a reasonable layperson would
The Sipcich rule has much to commend it The insurer, through the application, is free
to ask questions on any matter it deems relevant to the risk. It is fair for the insured to
presume in the usual case that information not requested by the insurer is immaterial.
Basic estoppel concepts also support the Stipcich rule: the insurer that has failed to ask
the proper questions should be estopped to deny that the insured has concealed material
facts that would have caused the insurer to make a different underwriting decision.
Id.
241 See, e.g., Midwest Office Technology, Inc. v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 437
N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1989) (holding that estoppel is a defense to forfeiture of an insurance policy,
but that it does not extend coverage); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Klein & Son, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 763
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an insurer cannot waive a coverage clause of an
exclusionary nature); see also Lloyd v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1300, 1305
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Topeka Tent & Awning Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 774 P.2d 984,986
(Kar. Ct. App. 1989); Design Data Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 503 N.W.2d 552, 560
(Neb. 1993); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1104 (Ohio
1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993); Shannon v. Shannon, 442 N.W.2d 25, 33 (Wis.
1989); supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
2 4 2 Autior Allan Windt states that "Itihe coverage afforded by an insurance policy should
be extended by estoppel whenever the insurer's actions prior to its final coverage denial are
justifiably relied on by the insured to his or her prejudice. The elements of justifiable reliance
and prejudice, however, must always be present" WnDT, supra note 20, at 461-62.
243 See, e.g., Roberts v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 404 A.2d 238 (Me. 1979);
Industro Motive Corp. v. Morris Agency, 256 N.W.2d 607 (Mich. Ct App. 1977); Scott v.
Transport lndem. Co., 513 So. 2d 889 (Miss. 1987). But see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Albany SOh. Dist., 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that an agent's misrepresentations
cannot expand coverage pursuant to waiver or estoppel doctrines).
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understand it.244 Thus, under a middle ground interpretive approach, policy
coverage would be extended under waiver and estoppel principles based upon
an agent's misrepresentation, and in order to validate the insured's expectation
of coverage, only when the insurance policy, with all its limitations and
exclusions to coverage, was not made available to the insured; 24 5 or when the
policy language was misleading or ambiguous. 246 Alternately, the insured also
may sue the insurer and its agent for such misrepresentations in a separate legal
action based on fraud or negligence. 247
Second, an insurance company may be estopped from denying coverage
based upon its failure to properly issue a reservation of rights letter, whenever
the insured can demonstrate that he or she was prejudiced based upon the
insurer's actions. 248 The public policy rationale underlying this middle ground
extension of coverage for an insurer's failure to properly issue a reservation of
rights notice is once again to honor both the parties' contractual intent and the
244 See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Home Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 825 (Ala. 1987); Pete's
Satire, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 698 P.2d 1388, 1391 (Colo. Ct App. 1985) (holding
that since the insured was required to read his policy, and since the policy stated that it could not
be modified orally by the agent, the agent's misrepresentations could not serve to expand the
policy coverage), af'd, 739 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1987); Sarnafil Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 636
N.E.2d 247 (Mass. 1994); Ostroffv. Keystone Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 584, 590 (Pa. Super CL
1986) (holding that reliance on an agent to provide coverage is unreasonable if it is contradicted
by a clear and unambiguous clause in the policy itself); see also supra notes 22, 110-15 and
accompanying text
245 See, e.g., Shepard v. Keystone Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 429,433 (D. Md. 1990) (holding
that an insured cannot justifiably rely on an agent's misrepresentations after the insured has
received a copy of the policy); General Ins. Co. of Ar. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 664 P.2d 686, 689
(Ariz. CL App. 1983) (holding that an insured may assert estoppel against an insurer to extend
coverage beyond the terms of the written policy when the insured does not receive a copy of the
insurance policy prior to the time that loss occurs).
246 See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text; see also Guy v. National Old Line
Ins. Co., 164 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 1968).
247 See, e.g., Terryv. Avemco Ins. Co., 663 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D. Colo. 1987) (holding that
an insurer could be sued in negligence for failing to provide the coverage requested by the
insured, even though the insured failed to read his policy); Guy v. National Old Line Ins. Co.,
164 S.E.2d 905, 907 (S.C. 1968) (holding that a fraud action is available if the insured read his
policy but the policy provisions were so unclear and confusing that an ordinary layperson could
not determine from the policy language if the agent's misrepresentations of coverage were in
fact false); see also Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982); Walters v. First
Nat'l Bank, 433 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio 1982).
248 See, e.g., O'Neill Investigations Inc. v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 636 P.2d 1170
(Alaska 1981); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Tom Gustafson hidus., 401 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kay, 487 P.2d 852 (Utah 1971).
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insured's reasonable expectation of coverage. 249
Third, although a large majority of courts have held that coverage under an
insurance policy cannot be created or enlarged by waiver,250 nevertheless
waiver may still be utilized to preserve existing insurance coverage when: (1)
an insurer retains an unearned policy premium and thereby waives its right to
rescind the policy;25 1 (2) an insurer fails to rescind its policy coverage within a
"reasonable time" after learning of such grounds for rescission;25 2 (3) an
249 See, e.g., WINDT, supra note 20.
The typical situation in which prejudice will be present is when the insurance
company defends the insured until ajudgment is entered without advising of a conflict of
interest between the insured and the company regarding the manner in which the
insured's defense should be conducted. Specifically, in the event an insurer
1. Becomes aware of the potential applicability of a policy defense, the existence of
which creates a conflict of interest
2. Fails to properly reserve its rights
3. Conducts the insured's defense until judgment without providing the counsel
necessary in a conflict of interest situation
4. Attempts to disclaim based on that policy defense the insurer should be estopped
fiun so denying coverage.
Id
2 50 See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Klein & Son, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 763,767 (Wis. 1990)
(holding that an insurer cannot waive a coverage clause of either an inclusionary or exclusionary
nature that goes to the scope of the coverage assumed, however a forfeiture clause fiunishing a
ground for forfeiture of coverage or defeasance of liability can be waived); see also Alan Corp.
v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 339 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Massachusetts
law); Topeka Tent & Awning Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 774 P.2d 984 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989);
Kitchen v. Automobile Ins. Co., 445 A.2d 552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Bortz v. Merrimac Mut.
Ins. Co., 286 N.W.2d 16 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979); supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., Dusich v. Horley, 525 So. 2d 507, 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1988) (holding
that an insurer may be precluded from rescinding its contract when the insured's premium
check is dishonored by the bank, and the insurer fails to notifty the insured of this fact within a
reasonable amount of time); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Kammerer, 327 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Neb.
1982) (holding that the insurer was precluded from rescinding its contract based upon its
knowledge of the insured's misrepresentation, and its retention of a portion of the premium paid
bythe insued).
252 Examples of this middle ground "reasonable time" waiver doctrine include: Foremost
Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 910 F.2d 118, 129 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying Virginia law);
Verex Assurance Co. Ins. v. John Hanson Say. & Loan Inc., 816 F.2d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir.
1987) (applying Oregon law); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Sahlen, 807 F. Supp.
743, 747-48 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that an insurer is precluded from rescinding its
insurance policy only if the insured was prejudiced by the insurer's unreasonable delay in
seeking rescission), af'd, 999 F.2d 1532 (1 th Cir. 1993).
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insurer accepts a late premium payment or ratifies policy coverage in some
other manner, although it has legitimate legal grounds to cancel the policy;253
(4) an insurer elects to make a policy cancellation at some subsequent date
rather than cancelling the policy immediately;254 or (5) an insurer pays an
insured's claim prior to receiving a proof of loss statement from the insured.255
Thus, a liberal construction and application of various waiver and estoppel
doctrines by a number of middle ground courts in an insurance law context
continues to recognize the legitimate contractual obligations of the parties as
well as the reasonable expectation of the insured to coverage-but without the
necessity of adopting an unpredictable, subjective, and highly questionable
noncontractual alternative.
C. Insurance Causation Issues
1. Proximate Cause in Insurance Law
It is perhaps fitting that Benjamin Cardozo, who has confused and humbled
generations of American law students with his discussion of proximate cause in
the landmark tort case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.25 6 would be the same
judge to discuss the doctrine of proximate cause in insurance contract disputes.
For example, in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Maine Ins. Co.,257 Judge Cardozo
wrote:
253 See, e.g., State Farm Mut Ins. Co. v. Brockhurst, 453 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1977)
(applying Kansas law); Rice v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 512 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (D.
Del. 1981) (holding that a jury could infer that the insurer waived the terms of its policy
regarding premium payments through the insurer's long-standing custom of accepting late
premium payments); Mfixson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. Dist Ct App.
1980) (insurer waived its right to cancel the policy by accepting the insured's late premium
payment).
254 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Fanners Ins. Exch., 264 N.W.2d 62, 63
(Mch. Ct. App. 1978).
255 See, e.g., Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ins. Ass'n v. Reed, 242 S.E.2d 731,733
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Whitefield, 355 So. 2d 307, 310
(Miss. 1978); see also STh-PEL, supra note 20, at 209-38 (1994). See generally WNDT, supra
note 20, at 468-73.
256 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). For those readers who have successfully repressed Palsgraf
from their first-year law school torts class experience, this case dealt with a plaintiff who was
allegedly injured by the "domino effect" of an explosion, the resulting panic of a crowd, and a
falling weight scale at a railroad station. In my own first-year torts class in 1971, Professor
Prosser told us that although he had studied the doctrine of proximate cause for well over fifty
years, he still did not fully understand it. He added that it would, however, be on our final exam.
257 120N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918).
1996]
OHIO STATE7 LAW JOURVAL
General definitions of a proximate cause give little aid [in interpreting
insurance contract disputes]. Our guide is the reasonable expectation and
purpose of the ordinary business man when making an ordinary business
contract....
Precedents are not lacking for the recognition of the [remoteness] element
as a factor in causation. This is true even in the law of torts where there is a
tendency to go farther back in the search for causes than there is in the law of
contracts.... [But other traditional insurance law precedent holds that] "[i]n
an action on a policy, the causa proxima is alone considered in ascertaining the
cause of loss" ....
... Proximity and remoteness are relative and changing concepts.
... Between these extremes there is a borderline where [the trier of fact]
must solve the doubt.258
Accordingly, although a number of courts continue to recognize the
traditional approach that the cause of an insured loss is the immediate cause of
the injury as opposed to the proximate cause of the injury,259 other middle
ground courts today are more willing to interpret a covered loss in an insurance
policy as a "direct loss" rather than a "remote loss" whenever such a
construction is fairly indicated in order to honor the reasonable expectation of
the insured to coverage, and whenever the proximate cause of such loss is the
dominant cause, rather than the most immediate cause.260
258 Id. at 87-88 (citations omitted). Cardozo likewise applied a middle ground judicial
approach to honor the reasonable expectations of ordinary business men and women in
insurance coverage disputes involving the interpretation of the highly technical terms accidental
means and accidental results in insurance policies. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying
text
259 See, e.g., Obvey v. Continental Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 726, 728-29 (N.D. Ga. 1985);
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 777 S.W.2d 501, 505 (fex. Ct App. 1989).
This apparently constitutes the majority view. See generally WINIYr, supra note 20, at
389-92.
260 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 929 F.2d 447, 451 (9th Cir. 1991) (the "efficient
cause" of loss, not the immediate loss, controls the coverage issue); John Drennon & Sons Co.
v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (The direct cause of an
event is that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces
the event and without which the event would not have occurred. "Direct" as used in an
insurance policy relates to causal connection and is to be interpreted as the immediate or
proximate cause as distinguished from the remote cause. A cause is proximate if it is the
efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading up to the damage, and
which in a natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by a new and independent cause, produced
the damage. The product of two or more concurrent and contributing causes is the direct result
of each, although neither is the sole cause); Granchelli v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 561 N.Y.S.2d 944,
944 (App. Div. 1990) ('direct loss" is equivalent to proximate cause); Graham v. Public
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Employees Mut Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash. 1983) (Where a peril specifically
insured against sets other causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence and connection
between the act and final loss, produce the result for which recovery is sought, the insured peril
is regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss. It is the efficient or predominant cause
which sets into motion the chain of events producing the loss which is regarded as the
proximate cause, not necessarily the last act in a chain of events); see also STEMPEL, supra note
20, at 436-37.
[C]ourts are often unclear about whiat they mean by terms like "efficient" proximte
cause. Is an efficient cause the least remote cause contributing to the loss? The least
remote cause capable of bringing about the event on its own? The most dominant cause
in the chain of causation? The dominant cause capable of alone bringing about the event?
... The better-reasoned decisions implicitly use dominance analysis in preference to
proximity analysis where they find a loss caused by an event viewed as most important
even though it is significantly more remote from the loss than other nontrivial causes.
Id
Indeed, in order to validate the reasonable expectation of the insured to coverage, some
middle ground courts have applied either the "immediate cause" rule or the "dominant cause"
rule according to which rule would provide coverage in a particular insurance contract dispute.
See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 201, 206 (Wash.
1994); see WnT, supra note 20, at 392.
[Wihehe a court applies the immediate cause rule [or the dominant cause rle] might
depend upon whether one is considering a "cause" that would exclude coverage or one
that would create coverage. If the policy language is ambiguous, a court should adopt the
immediate cause rule when the nile would serve to render an exclusion inapplicable,
even though the court would apply a different rule when applying a policy provision
extending coverage.
Id.
See also Sft EE, supra note 20, at 437.
The conmmon thread running through these decisions appears to be one in which courts are
more attracted to a strict proximity view and focus on the cause physically nearest the loss (the
last event in the causal chain) where this benefits the policyholder in a coverage dispute,
either by bringing the claim within the scope of the policy or avoiding the potential application
of an exclusion. Conversely, where the causes physically closest to the loss are uncovered,
courts will implicitly or expressly use dominance analysis to find a more remote but covered
peril to constitute the "efficient proximate cause" of the loss. Not surprisingly, the tendency is
more pronounced where the potentially excluding policy language is arguably ambiguous.
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2. Multiple Concurrent Causation
The courts have utilized three different approaches in insurance causation
issues involving multiple concurrent causation. On one extreme, some courts
still apply a traditional Formalistic approach which tends to restrict coverage in
most concurrent causation situations. Under this traditional approach, if a
covered cause combines with an excluded cause to produce the loss, then the
insured cannot recover under the policy based on the rationale that an insurer
should not be held responsible for any loss caused by an excluded peril. 261 The
weakness of this traditional approach, however, is that the reasonable
expectations of the insured to coverage-even under a "common insured in the
marketplace" interpretation 262-are easily frustrated and abrogated.
On the other extreme, some other courts have adopted the so-called
California Rule holding that when loss occurs through the concurrence of
covered and excluded risks, the insurer would be liable for the entire loss so
long as at least one of the covered risks was a proximate cause of the loss. 263
The advantage of this liberalized rule is that when various causes combine to
produce an insured loss, a "dominant" or "predominant" cause need not be
shown, only a minimally sufficient "proximate" or legal cause. The
disadvantage of this liberal rule, however, is that the insurer probably never
intended to provide such broad coverage under its policy.264
A more realistic middle ground approach to concurrent causation, in order
to validate both the insurer's contractual rights and obligations as well as the
insured's reasonable expectation of coverage, is to require the finding of a
covered dominant or predominant cause in any concurrent causation
controversy. Under this middle ground approach, if multiple concurrent causes
exist, and if the dominant or predominant cause is a covered peril, then
2 61 See, e.g., Lydick v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 187 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Neb. 1971)
(holding that the "general rule" is if a [covered hazard] combines with a hazard exTressly
excluded from the policy coverage to produce a loss, the insured may not recover); see also
Graffv. Farmer's Home Ins. Co., 317 N.W.2d 741 (Neb. 1982).
262 See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text
263 See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying California
law); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Cal. 1973); Sabella v. Wisler,
27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963); see also Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 454 N.E.2d
1156 (11. 1983); Benke v. Mukwonago Vernon Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1982).
264 See generally JERRY, supra note 43, § 67[d][I]. Recently, however, the California
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas's conservative majority has adopted a more
middle ground predominant cause approach involving issues of concurrent causation. See, e.g.,
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Von der Lieth, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (Cal. 1991); Garvey v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Cal. 1989); see also supra note 61; infra
note 265 and accompanying text
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coverage would exist for the entire loss, even though other concurrent causes
were not covered under the policy.265
For example, in Shirone, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,266 the
insured's cattle were killed during a violent storm that produced high winds,
damp snow, and muddy field conditions. The insurance policy insured
livestock against death by windstorm, but did not provide coverage for any loss
caused by "dampness of the atmosphere or extremes of temperature." Expert
witnesses testified that the cattle died due to a combination of concurrent
causes-including wind, cold temperature, snow, muddy conditions, lack of
adequate wind protection, and the size and age of the cattle. The jury found
that the windstorm was the dominant, efficient, and proximate cause of the
loss, notwithstanding the contributions of the other noncovered factors, and this
jury verdict was affirmed on appeal. 267 Shirone thus serves as a good
illustration of the realistic middle ground predominant cause approach
regarding concurrent causation issues in insurance law coverage disputes.
This middle ground concurrent causation approach is therefore justified,
not only because it honors the reasonable expectation of the policyholder to
coverage and disallows the insurer any unconscionable advantage, but it is also
based on the rationale of liberally resolving any ambiguities regarding coverage
in favor of the insured, and strictly construing such ambiguities against the
insurer.268
3. Establishing a Causal Nexus to the Covered Loss
As numerous middle ground courts have found coverage based upon more
liberalized concepts of proximate cause269 and concurrent causation 270 in an
265 See, e.g., Goodman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1979)
(applying Maryland law); Ovbey v. Continental Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ga. 1985),
affd, 782 F.2d 178 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 257 Cal. Rptr.
292 (Cal. 1989); Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1972); Hahn v. MFA Ins.
Co., 616 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. CL App. 1981); Yunker v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 442 N.E.2d
108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); King v. North River Ins. Co., 297 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1982).
If neither cause was dominant, loss will probably be attributed to the cause that would
result in coverage. See, e.g., Wasecu Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W.2d 917, 920-23 (Minn.
1983); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 527 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145
(App. Div. 1988); see also supra note 259 and accompanying text.
266 570 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978).
267 Id.
2 68 See also supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text. See generally JERRY, supra note
43, § 67; KEETON & W=rxss, supra note 23, § 5.5; Lashner, supra note 30.
269 See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
1996]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURIAL
insurance law context, a number of other middle ground courts, in order to
honor the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage while at the same
time honoring the parties' contractual rights and obligations, have also adopted
a realistic middle ground approach of requiring only a minimal or "sufficient"
causal nexus to a covered loss, rather than requiring a more traditional or
"substantial" causal nexus.
For example, in fire and property insurance coverage disputes, the courts
are split as to whether or not damage by heat, smoke, or soot would come
within fire insurance coverage as a direct loss caused by fire.271 While some
courts interpret a direct loss caused by fire to require actual ignition, burning,
or charring, 272 the better-reasoned middle ground view also allows recovery
for smoke and soot damage as a direct loss caused by fire.2 7 3 The courts are
also split on whether or not coverage is available for loss caused by a
"friendly" 274 rather than a "hostile" 275 fire. Even though the word "fire" as
used in an insurance policy, in the absence of contractual language showing a
contrary intent,2 76 is construed according to its ordinary meaning, 277 and is
271 "As to whether or when damages caused by heat, smoke, or soot without extemal
ignition may be recovered under the usual form of [a] fire [insurance] policy, the decisions are
not altogether in agreement" AM. Vann, Annotation, Loss by Heat, &noke, or Soot Without
Externai Ignition As Within Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 17 A.L.R.3d 1155, 1157 (1968);
see also 5 JoHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEmAN, INS CE LAW AND PRACEIcE § 3084
(rev. ed. 1970).
2 72 See, e.g., Washington State Hop Producers Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 660 P.2d 768
(Wash. Ct App. 1983) (holding that there was no evidence of any flame or glow to constitute a
"direct" loss by fire when 253 bales of hops stored in plaintiff's warehouse were damaged by
"browning'). See generally Vann, supra note 271.
2 73 See, e.g., Marshall Produce Co. v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 98 N.W.2d 280
(Minn. 1959) (finding that smoke damage where the fire has not touched the object was a
covered loss when the fire is the direct and proximate cause of the smoke); see also 10A
GEORGE J. Couc, CYCLOPEDiA OF INSuRANCE LAW § 42:31 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed.
1984); VANCE, supra note 43, at 866.
274 A "friendly" fire is defined as a fire lighted and contained in a usual or ordinary place
for a fire, such as a furnace, stove, incinerator, or the like. See Owens v. Milwaukee Ins. Co.,
123 N.E.2d 645, 646 (Md. 1955); Barcalo Mfg. Co. v. Firemen's Mut Ins. Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d
807, 809 (App. Div. 1965). See generally 10A GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSuRANCE
LAW § 42:14 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984); VANCE, supra note 43, at 869-71.
275 A "hostile" fire is defined as being a fire which is unexpected and in a place where a
fire is not ordinarily maintained. See Owens, 123 N.E.2d at 646; Barcalo, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 809;
VANCE, supra note 43, at 869-71; 10A GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDiA OF INSURANCE LAW §
42:15 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2ded. 1984).276 See supra notes 170-89 and accompanying text
277 See supranotes 109-24 and accompanying text
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normally defined as combustion accompanied by visible heat or light,278 a
number of courts still recognize an ill-conceived traditional insurance law
principle that only hostile fires are covered under a fire insurance policy,
regardless of any consumer expectation to coverage for any fire loss. 279 A
better-reasoned middle ground approach would be to reject the "friendly versus
hostile fire" dichotomy either because such terminology is ambiguous, 280 or
because in the absence of any express limitation or exclusion to coverage that is
clearly and unambiguously stated in the insurance contract, 281 the friendly
versus hostile fire doctrine should not be utilized. 2
82
A second example of how various middle ground courts find a sufficient
causal nexus to the covered loss in fire and property insurance policies is where
coverage is provided for any loss by explosion, even though there is a policy
exclusion for "water damage."2 83 Again, the term "explosion" generally is
278 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Electrical Dist, 452 P.2d 539 (Ariz. Ct App. 1969).
See generally 1OA GEORGE J. CoUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 42:13 (Mark S.
Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984).
279 See, e.g., Levert-St John Inc. v. Birmingham Fire & Casualty Co., 137 So. 2d 494
(La. Ct App. 1961) (where a welder's arc ignited pure hydrogen gas and an explosion
followed, and the insurance policy excluded loss by explosion where no fire resulted, the trial
court properly dismissed the action since the explosion was caused by a "friendly fre"--the
welder's aro-and so loss resulted from the explosion rather than the fire); see also Pacific
Fidelity Ins. Co. v. C.C. Anderson Co., 47 F. Supp. 90 (D. Idaho 1942); Spare v. Glen Falls Ins.
Co., 75 A.2d 64 (Conn. 1950); Youse v. Employee's Fire Ins. Co., 238 P.2d 472 (Kan. 1951).
See generally 10A G3EORGE J. CoUCH, CYCLOPEDmAOF INSURANCE LAW §§ 42:13-:42 (Mark S.
Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984); Vann, supra note 272.
280 See, e.g., Sadlowski v. Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 1146 (Del. Super. 1984)
(holding that language in a homeowner's policy covering "direct loss caused by fire" was
ambiguous, and would be interpreted in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the
insured, rather than using the "friendly vs. hostile fire" doctrine for determining coverage); see
also supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text
28 1 See generally supra notes 170-88 and accnpanying text
282 See, e.g., Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. American Protection Ins. Co., 421 N.E.2d
331 (M. Ct App. 1981) (holding that replacement of a baker's oven that was seriously
damaged by abnormal internal temperatures would be allowed under an insured's fire insurance
coverage despite the insurer's contention of the friendly vs. hostile fire doctrine); see also
KEErON& WIDss, supra note 23, at 486-91.
283 See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 308 P.2d 119 (Kan. 1957)
(where concrete sides of a grain elevator were disintegrated due to flood waters which caused
the grain to expand and gases to form, damage was caused by an explosion within the policy
terms rather than coming under a water damage exclusion); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bulch, 350
P.2d 514 (Okla. 1960) (where water damage resulted from a hot water system, and the break in
a copper water pipe resulted from excessive temperature and pressure, the damage was due to
an explosion rather than to water damage). See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Coverage of
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interpreted from the viewpoint of the ordinary and reasonable insured, rather
than being interpreted in a highly technical or legal sense. 84
A third example of this middle ground interpretive approach using a
minimal or "sufficient" causal nexus involves automobile liability insurance
and loss "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of such
automobile or another insured vehicle.285 Although earlier courts applied a
severely restricted interpretation of the word "use" of an automobile to mean
the actual "operation" of the vehicle, 286 most middle ground courts today have
not applied such a strict interpretive standard. A majority of courts have held
that the use of an automobile is not necessarily synonymous with "driving" or
"operating" the vehicle, and it is sufficient to show only that the accident "was
connected with," "grew out of," or "flowed from" the use of the
automobile.287
The courts are split, however, as to whether a "substantial" causal nexus
involving the use of an automobile is required, or only a minimal or sufficient
causal nexus is required in order to honor the insured's expectation of
coverage. 288 For example, some middle ground courts have held that when a
Ckse of Fire Policy Insuring Against Explosion, 28 A.L.R.2d 995 (1953); 5 JoHN A.
APPLEMAN & JEAN APPL.MAN, INSuRANCE LAW AND PRAcrCE §§ 3085-3087.25 (rev. ed.
1970).
2 84 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.2 85 See, e.g., Richland Knox Mut Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1967)
(applying Michigan law); Waseca Mut Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W.2d 917 M 1983);
Fanners Fire Ins. Co. v. Kingsbury, 461 N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), affid, 481
N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). See general, v Insurance Services Office, Sample
Personal Automobile Insurance Policy, Insuring Agreement Part A, Section 1 (1983). The
phrase "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of a vehicle is utilized to define
coverage in automobile insurance policies, but this same term is utilized to exclude coverage in
homeowners' insurance policies and in other nonvehicular insurance policies. Thus, very often,
this legal question of interpretation hinges on whether the automobile insurer or the
homeowners' insurer ultimately will be liable to the insured.
286 See, e.g., Kienstra v. Madison County Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 44 N.E.2d 944 (11. App.
Ct. 1942) (defining "use" as the "operation" of the vehicle).
287 See, e.g., Unigard Mut Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 732 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying
Montana law); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 691 P.2d 1289 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Plaxo
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 166 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 1969). See generally Lany D.
Scheafer, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What Are Accidents or Injuries
"Arising Out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use" of Insured Vehicle, 15 A.L.R.4th 10
(1982).
288 Compare Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Logan, 451 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982) (holding that an automobile insurer was not liable to its insured for an accident
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of the automobile when the injury resulted
from the insured's fall in an icy automobile parking lot) with Novak v. Government Employees
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plaintiff is injured as a result of an object thrown from an automobile, only a
minimal or sufficient causal nexus is required to find coverage under loss
"arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of the vehicle.289 Other
middle ground courts, however, have required a more substantial causal nexus
between the thrown object and the use of the vehicle.290 Still other courts have
held that if the vehicle is moving and the speed of the car contributes to the
impact of the thrown object, then there would be a sufficient causal nexus with
the use of the vehicle.29' This same causal conundrum is illustrated in the issue
of whether the accidental discharge of a firearm in an automobile constitutes the
use of that vehicle.292 Insurance coverage disputes involving the "ownership,
maintenance, or use" of an automobile thus continue to serve as a litigator's
dream come true or, alternately, a litigator's worst nightmare.2 93
Ins. Co., 424 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1983) (holding that an insured was covered for
loss "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of her automobile when she was shot
in her driveway after refusing an assailant's request to give her a ride).
289 See, e.g., National An. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 140 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that a minimal causal connection had been established when a teenage
boy threw an egg from the window of a moving automobile which struck a pedestrian in the
eye, causing loss of the eye, and the grievous injury was exacerbated by the automobile's 40
mile per hour speed); see also Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1974),
cert denied, 341 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1974) (beer mug thrown from a moving vehicle that struck
and killed a pedestrian); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 312 A2d 664 (N.J.
Super. 1973) (stick thrown fiom a moving vehicle that struck and injured a bicyclist), aff'd, 319
A.2d 732 (N.J. 1974).
290 See, e.g., Richland Knox Mut Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1967)
(applying Michigan law) (an attempt to throw a firecracker from the rear of an automobile had
no causal connection with the use of the automobile); Mazon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 491 P.2d
455 (Ariz. 1971) (no causal connection was found between a stone thrown by an unknown
person in an unidentified car and the "ownership, maintenance or use" of that vehicle);
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Melton, 357 F. Supp. 416 (S.C. 1972) (applying South
Carolina law) (no sufficient causal nexus was found between throwing a bottle from the rear of
a pickup tnck and the use of the vehicle), af'd, 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973).
291 See, e.g., National An. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 140 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Cal. CL
App. 1977); Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Evans, 637 P.2d 491, 494 (Kan. 1981) (firecracker
thrown from the backseat of a parked station wagon was not causally connected to the use of
the autonmobile). See generally 12 GEORGE J. COUcH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:56
(Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1984) and cases cited therein.
29 2 Compare Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 236 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. CL App.
1977) and Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Lott, 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1950) (applying Texas law)
(both finding coverage) with United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 450
S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1970) and State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 543 P.2d
645 (Wash. CL App. 1975) (both finding no coverage).293 See generally Scheafer, supra note 287; Swisher, supra note 4, at 1066-70; 12
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D. Coverage Issues Involving an Insured's Intentional Acts
Because insurance normally is intended to cover only accidental or
unintended losses, any losses that are intentionally caused by an insured
generally are not covered in property294 and liability295 insurance policies.
Likewise in life, health, and accident insurance policies an "accidental" death
generally is defined as death that is not expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured.296 A number of middle ground courts, however,
have moderated these doctrines significantly.
First, the courts are widely split regarding the judicial interpretation of
what constitutes an accidental297 death in life, health, and accident insurance
coverage disputes. On one hand, a number of courts continue to employ the
traditional or "classic tort" doctrine that if an injury or death was reasonably
foreseeable as a natural consequence of an intentional act, then it could not be
GEORGE J. Couca, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsuRANCELAW § 45:53-:57 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed.
1984); George Sayres, Coverage Problems Relating to the Policy Term "Arising Out of the
Use" ofa Vehicle, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 253 (1969).294 See, e.g., Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 696 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1985); St Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cuminsky, 665 P.2d 223 (Mont 1983); see also JERRY, supra note 43, at
302-04 ("If the insured intentionally causes damage to his own property, the loss is not
covered. The public policy supporting this exclusion is identical to that which supports the
insurable interest requirement Insureds should not receive coverage for destroying their own
property. Otherwise, insureds would have an incentive in many instances to destroy their
property and collect the proceeds.").
2 95 See generally KEETON & Wlmss, supra note 23, at 493, 518-33 ("Losses which are
intentionally caused by an insured generally are not covered by liability insurance.");
OSMRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 306-25; James L. Rigelhaupt, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding
Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R4th 957 (1984); Annotation, Liability
Insurance: Assault As an 'Accident, " or Injuries Therefrom As "Accidentally" Sustained,
Within Coverage Clause, 72 A.L.R3d 1090 (1976); Annotation, Coverage Under Uninsured
Motorist Clause of Injury Inflicted Intentionally, 72 A.L.R.3d 1161 (1976); W.E. Shipley,
Annotation, Liability Insurance As Covering Accident Injury Due to Wanton or Willful
Misconduct or Gross Negligence, 20 A.L.R.3d 320 (1968).296 See generally lB JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACrICE §§ 451-62 (rev. ed. 1981); 10 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§§ 41:15-:17 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1982).
297 In the absence of an express statutory or contractual definition, the word "accident" or
"accidental" used in life, health, or accident insurance policies generally is given its ordinary
and popular meaning as something that happens suddenly or unexpectedly without any
intentional design on the part of the insured or the person injured. See generally 10 GEORGE J.
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 41:7-:8 (Mark S. Rhodes, rev. 2d ed. 1982).
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an accidental death. 298 On the other hand, a growing number of middle ground
courts have adopted a more liberal definition of what constitutes an accidental
death, holding that where an insured commits a voluntary act not intending to
cause himself harm, this act would constitute an accidental death within the
terms of the policy coverage. 299 In practice, however, these two interpretive
approaches are difficult to apply.3°°
One rather bizzare example of this interpretive dichotomy regarding what
298 Courts applying this approach tend to look at the insured's voluntary acts from an
objective "reasonable insured" viewpoint. See, e.g., Jones v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins.
Co., 731 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that there was no accidental death by a
handgun during an ensuing struggle since the death was a foreseeable consequence of a
deliberate act when the husband aimed the pistol at wife's head); Nicholas v. Providential Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 536 (Fenn. Ct. App. 1970) (playing "Russian roulette" with
a loaded pistol does not constitute an accidental death since the consequence of the insured's act
is foreseeable); see also Wooden v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 139 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 1965)
(holding that if the death of the insured, although in a sense unforeseen and unexpected, iesults
directly from the insured's voluntary act or misconduct, or if the insured provokes an act which
causes death or injury, it is not an accidental death, even though the result may be accidental).
See generally lB JoHN A. APPLEqmA & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACHnCE
§ 453 (rev. ed. 1981). But cf Cockrell v. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying
Arkansas law) (pointing out that Arkansas courts have declined to adopt the "classic tort"
concept that one intends the natural and foreseeable consequence of one's deliberate acts so as
to bar recovery for unintended results).2 99 Courts applying this approach tend to look upon the insured's voluntary acts from a
subjective "particular insured" viewpoint. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 299
F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Califomiia law) (The insured shot and killed himself by
placing a loaded gun to his temple and pulling the trigger, mistakenly thinking that the safety
catch was engaged. The court ruled his death was accidental.); Knight v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 437 P.2d 416 (Ariz. 1968) (The insured died after a voluntary dive from atop the Coolidge
Dam in Arizona, a height of more than 139 feet. He had previously made dives from heights of
25, 40, 50, and 75 feet from diving boards, ship decks, rocky ledges, and box canyons, and he
stated (correctly) that the Coolidge Dam venture would be his last dive. The court ruled the
insured's death was accidental.). See generally Couc, supra note 296, § 41:16.300 Compare Bias v. Advantage Int'l, Inc. 905 F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir.) (applying D.C. law)
(holding that an insurance agent was not liable for failing to procure insurance coverage on
basketball star Len Bias, since Bias's death from cocaine intoxication was a foreseeable
consequence of a deliberate act and not an accidental death), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990)
with Marsh v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 1121 (Il. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that an
insured's death by a self-administered overdose of heroin was an accidental death).
One approach to resolving this interpretive conundrum might be through the so-called
"damn fool doctrine" for incredibly foolish conduct. The damn fool doctrine is embodied in the
statement that insurance coverage "is not provided for acts which are simply too ill conceived to
warrant allowing the actor to transfer the risk of such conduct to an insurer." KEETON &
WIDSS, supra note 23, at 539-41.
19961
OHIO STATE LAW JO URINAL
constitutes an insured's accidental death is found in a number of life insurance
coverage disputes involving beneficiaries of insureds who died as a result of
intentionally "hanging" themselves in order to create an asphyxial state for a
heightened autoerotic experience.30' Not surprisingly, a number of courts have
held that these intentional acts would not constitute an accidental death because
death was a foreseeable consequence of the insured's deliberate act of self-
induced asphyxiation. 302 Other courts, however, have applied a liberalized
middle ground approach to these cases, holding that even though the insured
committed voluntary autoerotic asphyxia, he did not intend to ultimately kill
himself by hanging. 303
Likewise, an insured's intentional act does not always preclude recovery in
property insurance contract disputes involving property intentionally destroyed
by one of the co-owners. For a number of years in most jurisdictions, the
interpretive rule was that an innocent co-insured could not recover for property
loss intentionally caused by another co-insured. 3°4 However, a growing
number of middle ground courts in recent years have allowed recovery to an
301 Life insurance disputes involving autoerotic asphyxiation apparently are not isolated
cases judging from the A.L.R. Annotation discussing this bizarre topic. See, e.g., Alan
Stephens, Annotation, Accident or Life Insurance: Death by Autoerotic Asphyxation As
Accidental, 62 A.L.R.4th 823 (1988); see also COUCH, supra note 296, § 41:16.
302 See, e.g., Sigler v. Mut Life Ins. Co., 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Iowa law)
(holding that since a reasonable person would have recognized that an insured's act of
"hanging" himself to create an asphyxial state for a heightened masturbating experience could
have resulted in his death, this was not an accident, and recovery was barred under the policy
exclusion for intentional acts); see also International Underwriters Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662
F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Virginia law) (same holding); Runge v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying Virginia law) (same holding).
303 See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Iex. Civ. App.
1981) (holding that based upon the testimony of two phyisicians the insured's death by
autoerotic asphyxiation was unforseeable and unintended, and therefore the insured's death was
accidental); Kennedy v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 1987) (holding that
the insured, an oruhopedic surgeon, knew of the medical risks of asphyxiation, and although his
conduct was bizarre and unusual, his death was unintended and accidental); see also supra
note 300. But cf. International Underwriters Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir.
1981) (holding that notwithstanding the insured, an engineer, utilized a "fail safe" device to
prevent death by autoerotic asphyxiation that malfunctioned, the insured's death was not an
accident since it still was the foreseeable consequence of the insured's deliberate act).
304 See, e.g., Short v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1980);
Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 671 S.W.2d 666 (fex. Civ. App. 1984); Rockingham Mut
Ins. Co. v. Hummel, 250 S.E.2d 774 (Va. 1979). The rationale for this traditional rule is that
since the coinsureds own their property jointly and have a joint interest in the property insurance
policy, they also have a joint obligation to preserve the property and not to defraud the insurer.
See JERRY, supra note 43, at 303.
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innocent co-insured for loss intentionally caused by another co-insured under
the interpretive doctrine that an insurance contract between an insurer and co-
insureds is severable rather than joint, and the unilateral intentional act of one
co-insured should not divest the innocent co-insured of his or her separate
contractual rights under the property insurance contract.305
Finally, a number of courts have found that an "intentional" act does not
always bar recovery in various liability insurance contract disputes. Although
many courts interpret accidental and intentional conduct in liability insurance
coverage disputes from the standpoint of the insured, 306 a number of other
middle ground courts, to broaden liability insurance coverage to protect injured
third party plaintiffs, also have interpreted accidental or intentional conduct
from the standpoint of the injured party.307 For example, in liability insurance
coverage disputes, a number of middle ground courts have found coverage
when the insured: intentionally shot and wounded another person;30 8 assaulted
and injured another person with a motor vehicle;3°9 defamed another person or
intentionally caused emotional distress;310 and intentionally polluted the
environment. 31' The underlying rationale for this middle ground view of
305 See, e.g., American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. Ct App.
1981); Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329 (Maine 1978); Howell v. Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240 (N.J. Super. 1974); Lovell v. Rowan Mut Fire Ins. Co., 274
S.E.2d 170 (N.C. 1981); Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1982); see also
JERRY, supra note 43, at 303-04.
306 See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 411 N.E.2d 1157 (l. App. Ct 1980);
Great Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Legg, 444 S.W.2d 324 (rex. Civ. App. 1969).
307 See, e.g., Baser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1952); Fox
Wisconsin Corp. v. CentUty Indern Co., 263 N.W. 567 (Wis. 1935). See generally KEoN &
WIDISS, supra note 23, at 510-13,518-44.
308 See, e.g., Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Colonial
Penn Ins. Co. v. Wait, 291 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. CL App. 1982); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364 (Neb. 1973). But cf. Armstrong v. Security Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 134
(Ala. 1973); Draffen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 407 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Bay State
Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451 N.E.2d 880 (1. 1983).
309 See, e.g., Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brandum, 419 N.E.2d 246 (Inc. Ct.
App. 1981); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 322 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Peterson v.
Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 93 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. 1958). But cf Boyd v. Great Cent Ins.
Co., 401 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1981); Wigginton v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 169 So. 2d 170
(La. CL App. 1964); Dochod v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. CL App. 1978).
310 See, e.g., Runyan v. Continental Casualty Co., 233 F. Supp. 214 (D. Or. 1964); Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. Bethancourt, 331 S.W.2d 943 (rex Civ. App. 1959). But cf. Continental
Casualty Co. v. Schaubel, 380 So. 2d 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.), cert. denied, 389 So. 2d 1114
(Fla. 1980); Sbapirov. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. 1976).
311 See, e.g., Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978); Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prod. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145 (D. Or. 1966);
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expanding liability insurance coverage within a contractual framework is based
upon a number of interrelated factors: (1) that an exclusion for intentional
injury in a liability insurance policy is inherently ambiguous; 312 (2) that the
words "expected" and "intended" are not synonymous for purposes of
construing an intentional injury exclusion provision in a liability insurance
policy;313 and (3) that the "classic tort" doctrine3 14 of looking at the
foreseeable consequences of the insured's intentional act are not appropriate in
an insurance law context since an insured must have had the specific intent to
cause the specific type of injuries suffered. 315
These illustrative examples of a realistic middle ground approach to the
interpretation of insurance contract disputes further demonstrate how middle
ground courts are able to honor the reasonable expectations of the insured to
coverage, but within contractually based parameters and interpretive rules that
are supplemental to, rather than at variance with, the policy language of the
insurance contract itself, and without the necessity of adopting an unpredictable
and unsatisfactory noncontractual doctrine of reasonable expectations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reports of the demise of a contractually based judicial resolution of
insurance coverage disputes have been greatly exaggerated. The application of
underlying contractual remedies, defenses, and limitations by many judges in
the interpretation of insurance contract disputes remains alive and well today,
and a large number of American courts continue to utilize an insurance-as-
contract baseline for resolving such disputes. However, a traditional
Formalistic contractual approach to insurance coverage disputes has been justly
criticized for not adequately addressing the reasonable expectations of the
insured to coverage, and for not recognizing that insurance policies often
see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 306-25. But cf Ashland Oil Inc. v. Miller
Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana law).
312 See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965); Home
Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (hnd. Ct App. 1975); Gowing v. Great Plains Mut Ins.
Co., 483 P.2d 1072 (Kan. 1971); Dochod v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct
App. 1978); see also supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
3 13 See, e.g., Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979)
(applying Iowa law); Bay State Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451 N.E.2d 880 (I. 1983); Northwestern
Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1979).
3 14 See supra note 298 and accompanying text
315 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Foxley &
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 N.W.2d 686 (Neb. 1979); Pachucki v. Republic
Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 1979). See generally Rigelhaupt, supra note 295.
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constitute adhesion contracts that are seldom read by the insured. On the other
hand, the Functionalistic noncontractual Keeton doctrine of reasonable
expectations also has been justly criticized for varying from the express terms
of the insurance contract, and for being applied by the courts in an inconsistent
and uneven manner.
A better-reasoned middle ground interpretive approach to insurance
contract disputes should be utilized by more American courts. This middle
ground interpretive approach continues to recognize the traditional insurance
law doctrine holding that, in general, insurance contracts should be construed
according to general principles of contract law, unless modified or regulated by
state statute, or unless contrary to state public policy. However, in order to
validate the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, this middle
ground interpretive view of insurance coverage disputes further recognizes a
number of supplemental rules of construction in favor of the insured: (1) that
insurance contracts will be construed and interpreted in their ordinary sense,
rather than in a purely technical or legal sense; (2) that ambiguous insurance
contracts will be construed liberally in favor of the insured and construed
strictly against the insurer; (3) that based on the acts and representations made
by the insurer or its agents, the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, election, and
reformation of contract are available to the insured and should be liberally
construed to validate the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage; and (4)
that in order to further validate the reasonable expectations of the insured to
coverage, any exclusion, exception, or limitation to coverage must be clearly,
expressly, and unambiguously stated in the insurance contract. These are not
the only middle ground supplemental rules of insurance contract interpretation,
but arguably they constitute the most important supplemental rules.
A middle ground interpretive approach still allows for a great deal of
judicial discretion in ascertaining and honoring the reasonable expectations of
the insured to coverage, but within certain delineated parameters and
interpretive rules that are supplemental to, rather than at variance with, the
policy language within the insurance contract itself. A middle ground
interpretive approach to insurance contract disputes therefore recognizes the
"text" of an insurance contract, while at the same time it also recognizes the
"context" of honoring the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage-
but without the necessity of adopting Professor Keeton's noncontractual
doctrine of reasonable expectations at variance with the language in the
insurance policy. A middle ground interpretive approach to insurance contract
disputes therefore adopts the principle-if not the doctrine-of an insured's
reasonable expectation to coverage, while at the same time remaining relatively
true to, and consistent with, its underlying contractual roots, rationales, and
defenses. It is a middle ground interpretive approach that successfully
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reconciles the competing doctrines of Legal Formalism and Legal
Functionalism in an insurance law context.
